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Studies in Danish city branding

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Ole

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Chapter 1

Introduction

This PhD thesis is forwarded to Department of Management, Aarhus School of Business and Social Sciences, Aarhus University, according to § 15, stk. 2, in the Ministerial Order of the Danish PhD program. The paragraph opens for an institution to decide that a thesis may be accepted for assessment without the author having completed the PhD program, if the institution assesses that the author has in other ways gained comparable qualifications. The PhD Committee at Aarhus BSS has in March 2019 confirmed that the author Ole Have Jørgensen has gained the comparable qualifications.

The thesis is based on three published papers and two papers accepted for publication:

Jørgensen, O.H. (2015). Developing a City Brand Balance Sheet – using the case of Horsens, Denmark. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, 11 (2), pp. 148 – 160.

Jørgensen, O.H. (2016). Place and city branding in Danish municipalities with focus on political involvement and leadership. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, 12 (1), pp. 68 – 77.

Jørgensen, O.H. (2016). Key Performance Indicators in Danish Place and City Branding – Proposal for a new Brand Strategy Platform. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, 12 (4), pp. 339 – 351.

Lundholt, M.W., Jørgensen, O.H., and Blichfeldt, B.S. (2019). Intra-organizational Brand Resistance and Counter-narratives in City branding – a Comparative Study of three Danish Cities. Accepted for publication in *Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal*.

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1.1 Background and introduction to the research perspective.

‘The prison stands as a dark shadow over the city line when the train arrives in Horsens, and the taxi driver reports that Horsens is fight and violence, a crude city. But this Sunday afternoon, it is first and foremost extremely boring when the only one you know - about – won’t raise his voice until hours from now’.

Journalist Peter Thygesen in Weekendavisen before the Bob Dylan concert on May 21, 2000.

When my family moved to Horsens in 1990 after my appointment as chief executive in the municipality, my wife was asked by one of her colleagues (they both worked in the nearby city Vejle) ‘How dare you live in Horsens?’ The question illustrates how Horsens was perceived among people living outside the city - and to some degree also among local citizens. The city’s image was for years dominated by Horsens State Prison, in operation between 1853 and 2006. The prison may be described as a non-iconic signature institution with a 20.000 m² complex of buildings, situated in a 12 hectare fenced area on a small hill in the outskirts of Horsens. Horsens was earlier perceived as violent and criminal, in the media described as the ‘Chicago of the North’ and ‘The City of Fear’. As the opening quote illustrates, this notion still lingered in the year 2000. Already during the 80’s politicians and key CEOs from private companies in Horsens complained about the image. The complaints led to a very thorough and professional but traditional brand campaign ‘Horsens is flourishing’ and ‘Horsens is not what it used to be’. It was planned and implemented 1984 – 1989 with the purpose of attracting new companies to the city. In 1988 the City Council had to realize substantial cuts in the city budget and the campaign was closed down without documented effect (Jørgensen 2005). The

greatest value in *'Horsens is flourishing'* is probably that many of the subsequent initiatives used the campaign as inspiration, and deliberately tried to avoid some of the errors and mistakes.

The prison image, the alleged reputation for a high level of crime, negative stories in national newspapers, lack of industrial development, stagnant population, and a high unemployment rate reaching over 16 % in 1993, created what is often called a *'burning platform'* or to use Kotter's (1996) expression *'A sense of urgency'*. That is why the image issue was a major concern in the Mayor's office during the 90's. Several initiatives were taken. The final breakthrough came in 2000 with the abovementioned concert by Bob Dylan for 500 spectators in Horsens New Theatre. This initiative was taken by Mr. Frank Panduro, the manager of the theatre. A string of concerts including open-air concerts with artists like The Rolling Stones and Madonna (both with 85.000 spectators) followed during the next six years. The concerts led the city to a position where up to 50 % of Danes related the city's name to concerts and events in the city's annual Top of Mind Awareness analysis. A new brand was created alongside the persisting prison image.

The image issue and a parallel effort to develop the municipal organizations reputation has been dealt with in Jørgensen (2002) and in Danish in Jørgensen (2005, 2008, 2009 and 2017), but never in a scientific context. The organizational reputation issue is dealt with in more detail in chapter 2.

The idea to have a more scientific approach to the Horsens case evolved in 2013 in a dialogue with professor Søren Askegaard and his colleagues at the University of Southern Denmark in Odense and led to the first paper *'Developing a city brand balance sheet – Using the case of Horsens, Denmark'* (Jørgensen 2014). This paper is a case study of the image development of Horsens where particularly the systematic annual analysis of Top of Mind Awareness among people living outside Horsens plays a central role.

During the preparation of the case study paper my attention was drawn to the general lack of documentation and time series of data in city branding. Besides, there was no common understanding of city brand equity, and the role of local politicians in brand projects was also disputed and unsettled. Consequently the case study in Horsens led to proposal of the City Brand Balance Sheet and a survey of the state of city branding in Denmark. The outcome of this survey is presented in *'Place and city branding in Danish municipalities with focus on political involvement and leadership'* (Jørgensen 2016a) and *'Key Performance indicators in Danish place and city branding – proposal for a new brand strategy platform'* (Jørgensen 2016b). The first paper illustrates how important politicians are in development and support of Danish brand projects. The second paper uses the City Brand Balance Sheet to structure the different key performance indicators found in the national survey and to propose a more strategic approach to city branding using a Brand Strategy Platform inspired from Balanced Scorecards.

The issue of political involvement and brand resistance was studied further in the next paper *'Intra-organizational Brand Resistance and Counter-narratives in City Branding - a comparative Study of three Danish Cities'* (Lundholt et al. 2019). The paper, based on personal interviews with mayors and city executives, supports the earlier findings about the significance of political influence on city branding. It also clarifies and describes the character of intra-organizational brand resistance within the political and the administrative arenas.

The final paper *'THE PRISON - From liability to asset in branding of the Danish city Horsens'* (Jørgensen 2019) is in a way a follow up to the first paper. The old state prison in Horsens has been closed and is now developed into an event venue and a museum with a total of 900.000 visitors over the period 2012-2017. Findings are that the process of change has been brought about by consensual governance by the city council, a *'pre-branding'* explorative process to build local support, skunk work on content, timing, systematic documentation - and time. Besides it is found how the cognitive knowledge of the prison in national TOMA is slightly varying but that the affective evaluation is growing positive (as one of the extremely few examples of image change described in the literature).

Each of the papers mentioned has its own research question and identity with the consequence that, unlike most PhD studies, there is no focus on one common research question. It has, as shown above, been an iterative process in which knowledge gathered from one research project has been used to develop the subsequent project.

Two themes turn out to be key issues in this process. The first theme concerns the role and importance of local politicians in city branding. There is a widespread recognition that city branding is politics, but the scientific literature views the role of politicians very differently, see section 4.5. The second theme is about a more systematic approach to documentation and impact measurement. In addition to ambiguity about the strategy for documentation and measurement methods, there is a fundamental lack of performance measurements of brand impact, longitudinal studies and time series, see Chapter 5. In particular, access to an extensive data material from the successful brand project in Horsens has had an impact on the proposals for a more systematic approach to documentation and impact measurement. These two themes, the politician's role and metrics, will be at the heart of this thesis.

1.2 General structure of the dissertation.

Chapter 1 introduces the background for the studies, while chapters 2 to 5 present some practical information and the theoretical background. Chapter 2 will serve as background information on Horsens. The chapter is based on Jørgensen (2002) and translation of relevant material from Jørgensen (2005, 2008, 2009 and 2017, all in Danish). This chapter addresses one of the strategies for place improvement mentioned in Kotler et al. (1993) – good public service – that is hardly ever found in city brand publications but is a link to corporate reputation mentioned in chapters 3, 4 and 5. The text in chapter 2 has not been through any scientific evaluation, but the city's communication strategy has been discussed in Hansen et al. (2004). Besides there is information on the data collected before the brand process took off, data from the assessment and audit process (Hanna and Rowley 2011, Baker 2019) that are rarely reported in city brand publications but are an essential part in the pre-conditions for the systematic data collection.

Each published paper has a literature review but since three of the papers are now 3-4 years old, I have chosen to allow chapter 3 to be a broad general approach to the theme of reputation, brand and image. Chapters 4 and 5 serve as a more up-to-date entry into the two main themes, which are subsequently addressed in the chapters on discussion and conclusion. Chapter 6 is a chapter on methodology and chapters 7 -11 include the five studies. Chapter 12 is a discussion at meta-level across the five studies, chapter 13 is conclusions and implication, chapter 14 is summaries and chapter 15 references. Appendix 1 is the co-author statement for article 4.

1.3 Purpose and research questions

The five papers mentioned above have their individual research questions. Rather than re-introducing these research questions I have chosen to give a meta-perspective across the five papers in relation to two questions:

- 1) Is it possible to find a more appropriate definition of the role local politicians plays in city branding?
- 2) Is it possible to propose a more systematic approach to data collection and monitoring in city brand projects?

A consequence will be that a number of other findings in the five papers are neglected or given less attention.

1.4 Reflections on the process

This thesis is the result of the author's long journey into initially unknown scientific theory and tradition and represents an iterative process where findings in one study led to the next. But my pre-understanding grown from an experience with a successful image change is considered very helpful. As illustrated in the introduction to section 1.2 and the more elaborate description in chapter 2, Horsens was in trouble and data, and documentation was one of the keys that were used to change this position. So these figures were 'lived' alongside with their production and action was taken as they developed. But the long life in public service has also taught me that arguments in a political and managerial context are well supported by documentation, longitudinal studies, time-series of information, and correlation between investments and output and outcome. Another reflection has been that 'the political system', 'city hall' or 'the mayor' may seem and are often looked upon from the outside as black boxes. Having worked as CEO for 18 years I am happy to say that they are not, they function with relative efficient rationales and processes. But it has a consequence for my perspective in the studies, where my perspective on the political theme will be an insider looking into the processes where most students have been outsiders looking in. And finally, I am well aware of the problems with being a student in my own organization and to depend on information collected up to 20 years ago. Data in this thesis are therefore either based on publications in Danish, where key information has been translated into English, or based on data published in Danish, which is visible in the figures. I have personally written all papers published in my name during my service as City CEO from 1989 – 2007 and afterwards.

Chapter 2 Horsens – a city with a contested image

2.1 Horsens – a city with a contested image

Kotler et al. (1993) writes about place auditing as an introduction to a city brand process, Hanna and Rowley (2011) describe brand evaluation including audit and assessment, and Baker (2012) points to the same audit and assessment of a place as precursor for a project. Data from this part of the process is however rarely found in literature, but they may be of significant importance in what Jørgensen (2019) describes as the pre-branding process. Data can be used to argue and explain to politicians and citizens why something ought to be done. One must so to speak reveal the weaknesses and shortcomings to use them as a platform for argumentation and communication, and they must be addressed in the brand initiatives instead of risking a strategic perspective out of line with real and recognized problems.

This chapter summarizes in a short form a good deal of the ex-ante information that was collected and evaluated during the initial phases of the brand project in Horsens including details on the development of the municipal organization. This is an area where the proposal of Kotler et al. (1993) about improved public service leads directly into the discussion of corporate reputation by Carpenter (2001) and summarized in Wærås and Maor (2015). The text is based on Jørgensen (2002) and translated from Jørgensen (2005, 2008, 2009 and 2017) all in Danish. This part will primarily serve as background information and an illustration of the approach and the many initiatives taken in the initial phases. The information will also serve as a platform for understanding the idea leading to the proposal of the city brand balance sheet in Jørgensen (2015) and the brand strategy platform in Jørgensen (2016b).

2.2 Introduction to the city

Horsens is situated in East Jutland and has been known as a settlement before 1100 and with city rights since 1442. The municipality has 90.000 inhabitants and 60.000 live in the city Horsens. It is led by a social democratic mayor, and all mayors in Horsens since the beginning of the 20th century have been social democrats. The organization is formally led by an elected city council and the Mayor is the top political and administrative executive in an organization with a unity of command. For further information on local government in Denmark see i.e. Berg (2005). At the turn of the century and before the municipal reform there were 60.0000 inhabitants in the municipality and 4200 employees in the rather complex organization working at City Hall and several different institutions (more than 100 addresses in the municipality). Also more than 325 registered child minders carried out their job in their own homes and some 1,000 employees in the senior and disability sector worked in the private homes of the citizens. The majority of employees had short or medium education, nearly 40% had no formal or only a short education and they solved their job based on courses and supplementary training. Only 2% had an academic background.

The use of the words '*local government*' and '*municipality*' may sometimes confuse readers. The word municipality translates into Danish as the municipal geography – or the municipal organization, here including the politicians. In English as well as in Danish scientific papers the distinction is sometimes unclear and proper meaning must be found in the surrounding text. I intend to state clearly when '*municipality*' is about geography and when it is about the organization.

A municipal organization is no high-end company, where people are queuing up for jobs - there are completely different and more prosaic reasons for seeking municipal employment. Through a multiple choice questionnaire in 2000 with a number of response categories (and up to 3 responses) it appeared

* In 2017 the number of employees was 6.000 and the annual turnover 700 mill. Euro.

how over 60% of employees had applied for their jobs because of the job content. 40% had applied for geographical reasons. In other words, the workplace was convenient for their residence. The municipal prestige as perceived by the employees is illustrated in tables 2.1 and 2.2 from the ethical account organized by the HR department in the period 1996 - 2001 (Jørgensen 2002). The data will not be analyzed further but serve here as an illustration of the complicated organizational reputation issue – changing slowly over time and varies between departments.

Table 2.1 Employees responses to question 57 from the ethical account in Horsens 'In my experience my work place is connected with prestige' (answers in %).

	To a very large degree	To a large degree	To some degree	Not so much	Not at all	Total
1. round	3	8	23	25	41	100
2. round	2	12	27	27	32	100
3. round	3	12	28	24	33	100

In spite of the prestige issue, a survey about *'The good work life'* among 2,191 employees (response rate 59%) and almost all 240 middle managers told us that 95% of the responding managers and 85% of the responding employees answered that they would recommend Horsens Municipality as a work place (Jørgensen 2002).

Table 2.2 Responses from the ethical account to the question: In my experience my work place is generally respected among our users.

	To a very large degree	To a large degree	To some degree	Not so much	Not at all	Total
1. round	9	38	38	12	3	100
2. round	9	40	40	9	2	100
3. round	8	40	39	11	3	100
Data from 1. Round, split between departments, % responses in each category, total number of respondents in the last column.						
Fire Department	38	45	13	4	0	47
Cultural Department	17	54	21	8	0	10
Child care and schools	9	42	37	11	1	726

Care for the elderly and health Department	8	41	39	9	3	809
Technical Department	11	26	36	19	8	254
HR Department	10	20	42	20	8	132
Tax Department	0	8	53	33	5	60
Economic Department	0	20	46	24	10	41
Others	9	13	59	9	9	26

2.3 The challenges for Horsens

2.3.1 The Prison

As mentioned in section 1.2 had the perception of Horsens been dominated by the presence of Horsens State Prison for decades. Horsens Tugthus - from 1930 Horsens State Prison - was commissioned in 1853. And the prison has been visible from the railway line ever since the train connection between Fredericia and Aarhus opened in 1868. The new prison not only provided workplaces to the city but it also provided cheap labor to local companies.


Stories were told about inmates whose families moved to Horsens and where the whole family stayed after serving, and about crime committed by inmates during exiting, not least by young people from the nearby open youth prison at Møgelkær. The generally increased level of crime throughout the country (also in Horsens) gave rise to a very heated debate in the city in the early 1970ies. The discussion included the conflict between the police's experience of quite often encountering current or former prisoners during investigation work and the Prison and Probation Service's desire for improved socialization through a more open connection with the surrounding society.

In Horsens, the many prison institutions in the police district extended the debate. The city developed into a battlefield between criminologist Flemming Balvig (later professor of sociology of law and criminology at the University of Copenhagen) and the local liberal newspaper Horsens Folkeblad. The atmosphere was built up over a long period, and the situation culminated in a large-scale meeting with 2000 participants 1974. The meeting was planned and organized without a specific case, but it received nationwide media attention, and Horsens was presented as *'The Chicago of the North'*, *'The City of Fear'* and *'a fortress'*. Just or not? It is impossible to judge from the crime statistics available and addressed in the report *'Theft of a city - law and order tendencies in a Danish provincial town'* (Balvig 1975) and *'Anxiety for crime - law and order tendencies in a Danish provincial town'* (Balvig 1978). But the city's prison image was fixed and stayed there for many years to come.

2.3.2 Examples of negative media coverage



Jyllandsposten 1988 – on the run from Horsens.



Berlingske Tidende 1990. Medium growth.



Ekstrabladet 1991- the must ugly



Det Fri Aktuelt 1991 – the city refuses to wither.

high street in Denmark.



Horsens Folkeblad, February 1996 - Horsens removed from the map of Denmark by the Ministry of the Environment.



Jyllandsposten 1998 (Horsens missing on the map).



Ministry of the Environment, Landsplanredegørelsen 1999 - Horsens is again missing on the map.

2.3.3 Stagnant population

Table 2.3. Population development from 1990 to 2000, almost stagnant between 1990 and 1995.

1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
55210	55088	55123	55159	55314	55252	55747	56235	56412	56595	56803

2.4 The first attempt to improve the city's image – 'Horsens blomstrer' (Horsens is flourishing) – an aborted campaign.

In 1984, the city council decided to initiate a marketing campaign. A marketing agency organized a well-prepared and very professional campaign, which under the heading "Horsens is flourishing" and with the message "Horsens is not what it has been" was aimed at attracting new companies to the city. A presentation video, music and a large folder with a description of the city's offers were prepared and in 1987, a large-scale advertising campaign was conducted in Copenhagen. In 1988, however, the city council had to make significant savings, which led to the closure of the campaign in 1989. Seen historically, "Horsens is flourishing" is one of the earliest Danish city-marketing campaigns. But at the time it was not recognized what several years later was realized - a city or municipality cannot be marketed as a product with the same methods used in product marketing. A city and its citizens are too complex, and some of the problems are mentioned in an evaluation by Jørgensen (2005):

'The campaign was very professionally organized and implemented - but suffered from:

Lack of credibility - among the citizens of Horsens there was a very negative perception of the city. The problem was experienced especially among the local citizens, while migrants seemed to have a greater eye for the city's qualities. In any case, this meant that the citizens did not feel that there was coverage for the heading 'Horsens is flourishing' and therefore they did not engage in the process.

Lack of recognition of the city's problem - there was not enough understanding / recognition of the necessity and neither from the local citizens nor from local companies gave sufficient support to the necessity of a marketing campaign at all.

Insufficiently rooted - The City Council was formally responsible for the project, but the management anchoring in the municipal organization - and in the City Council - was completely inadequate, even though the employees involved were very committed.

Missing receiving organization - in fact, the project led to contact with a number of companies that were interested in moving to Horsens, but the municipal organization was not geared to solve the practical problems associated with getting the companies to the city.

No one was not sufficiently aware of the problems with image marketing as a long-term process, and carried out over many years before effects can be registered.

No documentation – there was no plan for collecting and dissemination of data and results and therefore it became difficult to create credibility about the positive reactions that, after all, came on the campaign'

2.5 Public service development

2.5.1 Citizen's satisfaction surveys

Without using the word 'reputation' there was already in the late 1980ies a general concern about the 'standing' of the city's administration in many local communities (like Horsens, see Jørgensen 2017). A more detailed analysis of citizens attitude to municipal service began in the early 1990ies (Møller and Boll Hansen 1993) with a study of citizens and user satisfaction with the municipal service in Horsens in 1992. This was followed by similar surveys in 1996, 1998 and 2000. The surveys incorporated all municipal service areas and involved more than 1500 respondents each year. In 1996 and 1998, it was possible to benchmark with four other municipalities of similar size using the same questionnaire, see fig. 2.1 as an example of the presentation to the council.






Fig. 2.1 Citizens satisfaction with child care, a benchmark for five cities

Figur 1:



Anm.: Eldreudgifter 1996 pr. 67+ årig er defineret som budgetterede bruttodriftsudgifter 1996 på funktionerne 5.02, 5.03 grp. 01-05 og 91-92, 5.29-5.34 og 5.52 grp. 01 pr. indbygger i aldersgruppen 67 år og derover 1. januar 1996. Kilde: Indenrigsministeriets kommunale nøgletal, 1996.

Figur 2:



Anm.: Undervisningsudgifter 1996 pr. 7-16 årig er defineret som budgetterede bruttodriftsudgifter 1996 på funktionerne 3.01-3.12 (ekskl. 3.05, 3.10 grp. 04 og 3.11) pr. 7-16 årig 1. januar 1996. Kilde: Indenrigsministeriets kommunale nøgletal, 1996.

Fig. 2.2 Relation between citizen satisfaction in % (abscissa) and expenditure in DKr. per elderly over 67 (ordinate) to the left and satisfaction in % (abscissa) and educational expenditure in DKr. per child (ordinate) in schools to the right. A benchmark for 5 cities.

Further analytical work on the data revealed interesting new information. Most politicians thought there was a link between how much money you spend on an area and the citizens' satisfaction. As this old figure 2.2 from 1996 shows, there is no connection, neither in the elderly area nor in the school area (nor in any other service area) between spending and satisfaction. Citizens usually have no idea about the cost of individual service areas. The satisfaction with the municipal core services is governed by the media's mention of individual cases and the citizens' own personal experience.

2.5.2 Citizen's Charter and Customer's Contracts

The idea of a Citizens Charter came as an initiative from the Conservative English Prime Minister John Major in 1992. The program's stated goal was to raise the standard of the public sector in England, and the starting point was that since the mid-80s a negative perception of English municipalities in general has been developed. The citizens considered the municipalities to be bureaucratic, arrogant, incompetent, closed, slow and irresponsible. The idea was that all municipalities should inform about the citizens' rights in the individual municipality, but also that the information should be passed on to the central authorities, which then could compare the municipal service.

In Horsens, the council decided to produce a Citizens Handbook from 1995 to 2002. The handbook was distributed annually to all households, organizations and private companies within municipal borders. The intention was that the handbook would work as 'Citizen's Charter' containing general information, service goals and action plans for each municipal service area and institution and in this way serve the political 'promise' to the local citizens.

2.5.3 Improved communication

The Mayor's office engaged a journalist in 1997 to find the good stories in the municipal organization, find the areas where the employees made a particularly good effort, or where the municipality's service solutions were so innovative that they could also be interesting outside the municipality, that they could 'make the front page' in the national media. The journalist was not allowed to work with political issues. From 1998, between 70 and 110 press releases were produced annually, all of which were based on municipal conditions and initiatives. 70 – 90 % of these led to stories in one or more media, as well locally,

as regionally and nationally. In the first five years of the project (from 1998 – 2003) newspaper line counts and TV and radio-minutes were counted and analyzed for quality to support the idea of an “open window” of information (Jørgensen 2005)

2.5.4 Municipal planning - Agenda 21

The development of Danish municipalities is in many ways controlled by the municipal planning system. The planning period is four years and the council decided to let the United Nation's Agenda 21 be the perspective on the obligatory municipal plans for 1997-2001 and 2001-2005. National NGOs were involved in preparing the first draft in 1997. In the first plan period 1997-2001 more than 1000 local citizens contributed (and 1200 to the second plan period) with ideas, proposals or comments, and every proposal was dealt with by the responsible political committee. It was the most widely organized hearing of the local population and citizen's involvement in any Danish municipality at the time. The process included an unusual initiative about non-party-policy involving of the city council members, described in Hedemark (2003).

The cooperation with the three NGOs and the many comments and ideas from citizens led to development of four key values for the municipal plans for the two periods: **Health and preventive measures, Greener and more attractive city, Quality in municipal services and Sustainability.**

The content of the plans is of lesser interest in the present context but there was an assumption that local citizen's respect could be evoked if the surrounding world would give a positive assessment of the activities in the municipal organization. Eventually this may lead to a rise in the organization's self-confidence and local reputation (and eventually the national reputation). The path to this potential improvement of reputation was a systematic participation in – and possibly winning - national awards in different service areas. The following is a list of the award or positions won by different sections of the municipal organization during the following years (2001 -2006).

2.5.5 Prizewinning

The Agenda 21 plan

Danish Urban Planning Laboratory and the Architectural Association awarded the Urban Plan Award 2005 to Horsens: *'The town plan award 2005 is presented to Horsens Municipality for targeted urban policy and high quality strategic planning. This is a long haul with a focus on process and cross- sector planning. This effort has resulted in that Horsens now is seen as a good city to live in. In the motivation for the award ceremony, it is emphasized that the municipality has convincingly turned the picture of the city from "Jutland's cemetery" and "Prison town" to a city that appears dynamic, adventurous and quality conscious - also in the physical area.'*

Health and preventive measures

National CSR People Network Prize to Horsens municipality 2001.

'Project Workplace' designated by the Ministry of Finance as the best national example of cooperation between private companies and municipalities in 2002, and presented at 2. International European Quality Conference in Copenhagen in 2002.

National CSR People Prize to Danish Crown A/S for cooperation with the municipality 2003.

The National Public Health Prize 2006, instituted by the Danish Society for Public Health, was awarded to Horsens Municipality, because *'Horsens as the country's first Healthy City Municipality had worked with and designed a comprehensive health policy that involves all sectors and citizens.'*

Greener and more attractive city

Under the heading *'Good living through good architecture'* the national newspaper Jyllands-Posten awarded the prize *'City of the year 2002'* to Horsens with the following arguments: *'Against all the odds'. The development is reversed. Through a conscious, sustained and goal-oriented practice, Horsens has managed to change the city's face radically. From fighting with the reputation as a gray prison town Horsens is now a very attractive city'.*

Quality in municipal services

An application on behalf of the municipality has been completed for the Danish Quality Award in 1994 (site visit) and for the Public Quality Award in 1998 (site visit and scored for 350-400 points).

'Best in the public sector in Denmark to develop leaders and employees', appointed by the Ministry of Finance in 2002. Presentation at the 2. International European Quality Conference in Copenhagen in 2002 (Jørgensen 2002).

Great Place to Work – *Best Public Work Place* in Denmark twice (Care for the elderly in 2003 and Care for children in 2004). Horsens Library came in second in 2002 and one of the schools came in second in 2004.

The Danish governments national *'Seniorpraksisprisen'* (DK).

Awarded *'The International Innovative Employer Award'* in 2006 by American Association of Retired People.

Sustainability

Meeting the EMAS (The European Commission's Eco-Management and Audit Scheme) standards as the first municipality in the EU, verified by Norsk Veritas in 2005.

The prize-winning situations most certainly had an effect on the involved departments in the organization. They may also have helped to improve self-esteem among employees in general, and triggered respect from local companies, and professionals from other authorities. But the results were very difficult to communicate to a broader audience and surely they never reached the annual ToMA measurements among people living outside Horsens. It also turned out that some politicians felt uneasy about the 'competition-element' because it was out of line with their political opinion and attitude to public sector service. Later Lobeck et al. (2010) studied city contests in Germany and show how the contests correspond with different interests and expectations of the contractee and the participating cities. Cities who participate believe that they can improve their reputation by winning such contests and thus demonstrate to their citizens and voters that the city is renowned outside city borders. Neither Lobeck et al. (2010) nor the Horsens-case can document any change in citizens evaluation of the municipal organization from prizewinning.

2.6 The image change

2.6.1 The assessment and audit phase

The first Top of Mind Awareness analysis among Danes living outside Horsens was made in 1997, see table 2.4. The further process is described in Jørgensen (2015), but these data is not part of that paper. They serve to illustrate some of the preparative work made during the initial stages of the process and at a time, where no one knew what was actually going to happen.

The ex-ante situation:

Table 2.4. Top of Mind Awareness among Danes living outside Horsens.

First thought (500 respondents)	Decision makers	journalists	18 years + N = 500
The prison	47	68	52
Family/friends	11	6	8
A city in Jutland	10	6	13
Mention specific company	6		
Bygholm Hotel	6		2
Industry	3		
Education	3		1
Customer/supplier	3		
The harbor	2		
Electronics	2		
Organized crime			2
Horsens Fjord		4	2
The local newspaper		14	1
Something else/nothing/don't know (every theme less than 1 %)	33	56	42

Table 2.4 serves to underline one of the points made in chapter 4 on stakeholders how different groups of citizens hold different cognitive evaluations of a city.




Fig. 2.3 In the citizens satisfaction surveys 1998 and 2000 there were questions about the relevance of improving the city's reputation. From the top questions are '*How is Horsens spoken of in the media?*', '*Your personal view of Horsens*' and '*More should be done to improve Horsens's reputation*'. Ordinate shows % of respondents, abscissa in 5 categories from the left: Agree absolutely, agree partly, neither agree nor disagree, disagree partly and disagree absolutely. These questions were part of the questionnaire from the citizen's survey mentioned above from 1998 and 2000. (Surveys by Kommunedata)

The citizen's response in fig.2.3 is a request for political action, but the inquiry in itself will also be an element in a pre-branding process, because the questions will open some citizen's minds to the problem.

The third element in the analysis was to understand how citizens in Horsens saw their city. Table 2.3 is based on telephone interviews, while figure 4.2 is based on the citizen's satisfaction survey. The responses from citizens living outside Horsens were noted in the questionnaire, see fig. 2.4 (including a supplementary theme about the European Medieval Festival). Respondents were asked to pick the three alternatives they found the most relevant for them.




Fig. 2.4 While table 2.3 is based on telephone interviews, this figure is based on the citizen's satisfaction survey in 1998. The responses from citizens living outside Horsens, see table 2.3, were given as options in the questionnaire (including a supplementary theme about the European Medieval Festival).

Respondents were asked to pick the three alternatives they found the most relevant. Blue color refers to the total number of respondents, red the part of respondents who did not mention the prison as one of their three examples. Green color represents the group of respondents (30 %) who mentioned the prison as one of their options. Ordinate is the different response options, abscissa the % of respondents in each category. A closer look shows that the population in Horsens was divided. The 1/3, who 'saw' the prison tended to be more critical about the city (organized crime and a boring city and less observant of the surrounding nature). An even closer look at the data revealed that this critical group, on average, was more oriented towards a liberal ideology compared to the other group. Anyway, the data emphasized the significance of the prison also within the local population.

2.6.2 An initiative against organized crime.

There were full chapters for as well Hells Angels as Bandidos in Horsens (as in several cities in Jutland). In the years around the turn of the millennium, particular problems had emerged throughout the country but no one really reacted. After the election in November 2001, the mayors from Horsens and Randers (another city in Jutland) then organized several meetings between mayors and the local police to discuss a joint intervention. They all adopted a proposal from the police in Horsens for interdisciplinary cooperation between the health and social administration, the tax administration, debt collection administration, and the police. In 2004 this model for cooperation was nominated as one of five European initiatives to win The European Crime Prevention Award.

The initiative also led to a more systematic analysis of local crime and as illustrated in fig. 2.5. Statistics did not support people's old notion of high crime in Horsens compared to other cities and municipalities.




Fig. 2.5 Number of criminal offences/1000 citizens in municipalities in Jutland. Annual average 1999 - 2001. From Jørgensen (2005).

2.6.3 The event strategy

With the city economy recovering slowly the newly elected mayor decided to take several initiatives in 1994, including an attempt to change the city image. Experience with a successful Landsstævnet (the largest sports event in Denmark, taking place every 5 years) in 1990 with 27.000 visitors and hosting the Europeade (Largest European Festival on Folk Culture) with 3000 international dancers in 1993, led in 1995 the local museum and the city's Cultural Department to create and organize a European Medieval Festival, which later developed to one of the largest annual festivals in Denmark with 80.000 – 100.000 visitors over 2 days. This successful experience made the city council to decide an objective about 'greater events' in the Agenda 21 mentioned above: *'to give citizens common experiences, contribute to networking, mark Horsens nationally and internationally, and create economic turnover'*.

There was an ongoing discussion among citizens, politicians and businesses about the problematic situation for Horsens. There was a potential risk to end up in what was seen as the *'slit in a double bed'* between the dynamic cities south of Horsens and Aarhus, the largest city in Jutland positioned north of Horsens. Above all the article on the front page of the local newspaper Horsens Folkeblad, see section 2.3.2, led to intensified discussions and finally to a proposal from the local chairman of the board of Business Horsens. The board would support if the city council increased taxes on local businesses on the condition that the revenue was used for marketing and branding the city. For further information about the event strategy and the process, see Jørgensen (2005 and 2015).

Later the city's administration tried to figure out whether the event and music strategy was successful by questioning in-migrants to the city, see table 2.5. Geography, work and family and friends are the key drivers in both studies while the cultural activities are of less significance.

Why did you move to Horsens?

	2004*	2008**
• Geography	40 %	58 %
• Work	46 %	56 %
• Family and friends	51 %	51 %
• Shopping	41 %	44 %
• Prices on housing	24 %	43 %
• Nature	34 %	42 %
• Cultural activities	27 %	37 %
• Education	16 %	30 %

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Table 2.5 Elaborate questionnaires were sent to all persons over 18 who moved to Horsens in 2004 and 2008 (with more than 600 responses each year). Table 2.5 describes the key reasons for moving to Horsens. The data will not be elaborated apart from the fact that the growing cognitive evaluation of Horsens outside the city as measured in TOMA is not immediately retrieved in the in-migrant studies. (Source Horsens Municipality)

Chapter 3 Reputation, brand and image

3.1 Introduction

Image, reputation, brand, all words used and often alternately and sometimes confusing in everyday communication by employees, citizens, customers, tourist and the public in general. The words are used about private companies and products, public organizations, cities, regions, and countries. And the confusion is understandable. The English word *brand* is defined as 'A type of product made by a particular company under a particular name', 'A brand name', or 'A particular identity or image regarded as an asset' (Oxford Dictionaries) or 'A type of product made by a particular company', 'A particular type of something', or 'A way of doing something' (The Cambridge Dictionary). *Reputation* is defined as 'The beliefs or opinions that are generally held about someone or something' or 'A widespread belief that someone or something has a particular characteristic' (Oxford living Dictionaries) or 'The opinion that people in general have about someone or something, or how much respect or admiration someone or something receives, based on past behavior or character' (The Cambridge Dictionary). The Cambridge Dictionary defines an *image* as 'A picture in your mind or an idea of how someone or something is', 'The way that something or someone is thought of by other people' or 'A mental picture or idea that forms in a reader's or listener's mind from the words that they read or hear'. The Oxford Dictionaries define the word as: 'the general impression that a person, organization, or product presents to the public'. This is a demonstration of the dilemmas authors meet, when they try to find, describe, and agree upon operational definitions of the three words, not least the image definition seen in opposite perspectives by the two dictionaries.

3.2 Image formation

Gartner (1993) described the image formation process as a continuum of separate agents that act independently or in combination to form a destination image that is unique to each destination. He classified agents as induced (by suppliers or providers), organic (e.g., based on own experience and friends and acquaintances), or autonomous (e.g. media, books, guides) information sources, and he argued that destination images result from three distinct but hierarchically related components – cognitive, affective, and conative - whose links determine product predisposition. The conative component is analogous to behavior, the action component. The image can be formed solely through these information sources (Gunn 1972, Gartner 1993) or even in the absence of any commercial information (Alhemoud and Armstrong 1996).

Baloglu and McCleary (1999) found that perceived place image is formed by two distinctly different but hierarchically interrelated components, the cognitive and the affective component. The cognitive evaluations refer to beliefs or knowledge about place attributes, whereas affective evaluation refers to feelings toward or attachment to it. Peter et al. (1999) have suggested a relative hierarchy of cognition and affection leading from 'Thinking about, paying attention to, remembering, understanding, interpreting, and evaluation (good/bad, favorable/unfavorable)' as cognitive evaluations to affective evaluations with reduced intensity of affect 'emotions (love and anger), feeling states (satisfaction and frustration), moods (boredom and relaxation) and evaluations (liking and disliking)'. There is a good deal of overlap between good/bad, favorable/unfavorable, and evaluations (liking/disliking).

But since images only have a tenuous and indirect relation to facts (Reynolds 1965) and whether an individually perceived image is correct is not as important as what the consumer believes to be true (Hunt 1975). In a study of Utah's image change Gartner and Hunt (1987) postulated that 'in the absence of any catastrophic impact or international importance, image(s) will continue to evolve at a rate contingent to the

relative strength of an area's induced (i.e., advertising or second-party endorsement efforts) and organic (incidence of travel) factors'.

Thus images become more important than reality (Gallarza et al. 2002), and the place image projected in information space will, therefore, have a great influence on the place images as perceived by consumers, or *'perception is a reality'* (Pike 2012). San Martin and del Bosque (2008) see destination image as a multidimensional concept formed by cognitive and affective evaluations of a place. Noticeably it is suggested that cognitive images have stronger impacts on destination image than affective image.

3.3 Reputation

Reputation is seen as a more stable indicator of performance than image (De Charnatony 1999, Fombrun and Van Riel 1997). Schultz et al. (2000) found that reputation is a key driver to people's attitudes and behavior towards a particular object, leading Braun et al. (2017) to describe reputation in a city's perspective as *'reflecting people's collective attitude towards something – in this case, a place'*.

The reputation changes over time but is overall less volatile than place image, and reputation can be seen as influential over decisions regarding investment, residential location, and tourism (Braun et al. 2017). The goal of place branding has been reached when people in general, and over longer periods, hold a favorite reputation of the place. In consequence, results of place branding primarily but not exclusively belong to the affective domain of attitude and should, therefore, be measured and evaluated within that domain as pointed out by Boisen et al. (2017). In an attempt to describe and define the differences between place promotion, place marketing, and place branding, Boisen et al. (2017) see place branding as identity-driven with the task to manage reputation.

3.4 Influence of information sources

The rapid development in information and communications technologies (ICT) have been transforming tourism (and consequently also city image formation and branding) globally since the 1980s (Buhalis & Law 2008). Particularly the Internet as communication channel linking consumers and suppliers (e.g. online travel agencies, destination websites) has led to substantial changes in the development of destination images, further triggered by the introduction of Web 2.0 (O'Reilly 2005) as a platform. This is bound to affect the traditional notion of image communication described as primary, secondary and tertiary communication, (Kavaratzis 2004), where primary communication relates to the communicative effects of actions when communication is not the main goal, secondary communication is the formal intentional communication and tertiary communication refers to word of mouth reinforced by media and competitors communication.

Without changing Gartner's (1993) original distinction between induced, organic, and autonomous information sources, single studies, and meta-analysis over the last 20 years have revealed a much more dynamic and complex information situation. Different formats of questionnaires, varying search strategies for respondents, as well as national cultural differences, contribute to the complexity. The growing number of induced and organic information sources has had a significant influence on information studies. Baloglu and McCleary (1999) used four information sources to measure the importance of the type of forming impressions about selected destinations, while Llodrá-Riera et al. (2015) and Björk and Kauppinen-Räsänen (2015) used 14 (but not mutually identical) information sources for their surveys on the same subject. Particularly word-of-mouth (WOM) has been widely studied in recent years. Originally defined as *'oral, person-to-person communication between a perceived non-commercial communicator and a receiver concerning a brand, product, or a service offered for sale'* (Arndt, 1967) advances in information technology and the development of social media WOM and electronic word of mouth, (eWOM), has taken WOM to a new level. eWOM has been defined as *'any positive or negative statement made by potential, actual, or*

former customers about a product or company, which is made available to a multitude of people and institutions via the Internet' (Hennig-Thurau et al., 2004) and further as *'a group of Internet-based applications that build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the creation and exchange of user-generated content'* (Kaplan and Haenlein 2010). Consumer-generated content is becoming of crucial importance (Munar & Jacobsen 2014) for image formation.

But it is also believed that visitation (the conative element) creates an image more realistic than that existing before visitation. Several studies (see, i.e. Engeset and Elvekrok 2015, Prayag et al. 2017) identify that satisfied tourists are more likely to say positive things about the destination to others, while dissatisfied tourists will engage in negative word-of-mouth (Chen and Chen 2010). Papadimitriou et al. (2018) found that the cognitive and affective destination image factor had a significant and positive influence on WOM intention.

3.5 Essential elements of public sector transformation from private sector inspiration

Since the early 1980s New Public Management (NPM) has been part of a Danish modernization strategy for the public administration, primarily driven by the Ministry of Finance and the Local Government Association (Pedersen 2004). As a consequence the private sector's traditional focus on performance and bottom line has been applied by the public sector, where terms such as *'corporate management'*, *'marketization'* and *'in search of excellence'* (OECD 1995, Klausen 2001) are added. The performance perspective was advanced further in e.g. establishment of a quality award for the public sector (see Nilas 1998) and a separate prize as best public workplace of the year in the competition *'Denmark's best workplaces'* (Great Place to Work 2004).

Traditionally, performance measurement was about quantifying the efficiency and effectiveness of organizational actions in financial measures and such information was used to decide on, implement, and control any strategy formulated within an organization. Non-financial measures were linked to the strategy of an organization (Kaplan & Norton, 1992) and the re-conceptualized Balanced Scorecard (BSC) came in 1996 (Kaplan & Norton, 1996). The BSC became a baseline assumption of contemporary performance measurement, which integrated financial and non-financial performance measures, where outcome measures and performance drivers were linked in cause-and-effect relationships. The modern Balanced Scorecard has since moved into the non-profit and public sector organizations in the early 2000's. It is seen as a strategic planning framework where government and nonprofit organizations align business activities to the vision and strategy of the organization, and monitor organization performance against strategic goals (Lawrie and Cobbold 2004).

The notion of corporate reputation and corporate branding has also found its way from the private to the public sector in a more systematic, theoretical, and empiric way at the turn of the century (Carpenter 2001, 2002), and into a number of public sector organizations, i.e. hospitals (Byrkjeflot and Angel, 2007) and universities (Bulotaite 2003, Judson et al. 2006, Wæraas & Solbakk 2006). Different government and regulatory agencies (Aberbach & Christensen 2007, Illia et al. 2004, Kvåle and Wæraas 2006) tried to formulate vision and mission statements, core values, slogans and logos which raised the question whether public sector organizations can be coherent corporate brands. Other authors like Hansen et al. (2001, 2004) saw image and identity building in public sector organizations (and local government) as part of the *'managerialization'* of the sector. The key to strategic communication, identity and image in the private sector was corporate communication (van Riel and Fombrun 2007). In Denmark a new focus on strategic communication developed after the municipal reform in 2006 (Frandsen et al. 2005) and Ekeroth (2007) in what Frandsen and Johansen (2009) describe as *'communicative rearmament'*.

Coinciding with the marketization of the public sector, several cities and regions were challenged by the industrial recession, where factories were closed down, jobs centralized and moved to a reduced number of production sites, eventually moved abroad. Harvey (1989) is the first to use the term *'entrepreneurial city'* to describe how the challenged cities tried to change behavior by exploiting private sector experience. Ashworth and Voggd (1990) write about *'selling the city'*. The same perspective with inspiration from

private companies is also behind the book *'Marketing Places'* by Kotler et al (1993), based on examples of American cities with severe financial problems (such as New York, Cleveland and Philadelphia), but also on a more general economic challenge for the majority of US cities. They suggest five strategies for place improvement and strategic place marketing: Urban design, infrastructure improvement, good public services, attractions, and people as part of cities' attempts to attract investments, new businesses and tourists. Other governance policies were proposed by Hubbard & Hall (1999) and Anholt (2006).

There is no consistent differentiation in the literature between place and city branding, and the words are often used together, like in Boisen et al. (2017). They identify four different reasons for the city's increased use of place promotion, place marketing and place branding: i) the shift from a managerial to an entrepreneurial approach by urban governments (Harvey 1989); ii) the dominating paradigm of neo-liberalism with a strong focus on competitiveness (Jessop 2002); iii) a rescaling of statehood leaving more and more responsibility for future social and economic development to the cities (Brenner 2002); and iiiii) growing global urban hierarchies where the position of any given city is perceived more volatile (Beaverstock and Taylor 1999, Taylor 1997).

Place and city marketing and branding has also become part of everyday life in many Danish municipalities as mentioned in Langer (2002), Jensen (2005), Jørgensen (2005), Stigel og Frimann (2006) and Jensen (2007), and Jørgensen (2016a) found 25 Danish municipalities involved in different city brand initiatives.

The following sections will give a short comment on the private sector corporate perspective, an extended comment on public sector organizational perspectives and a more elaborated text on city perspective. Regional and national issues and product issues are not considered.

3.6 The corporate perspective

3.6.1 The corporate brand

Ries and Trout (1981) present a short and concise definition: *'Brands succeed when they colonize valued 'cognitive territory' in the consumers' mind'*, but there is more to it. Ballmer (2001) analyzed fifteen different definitions, and he proposed the following extensive definition for corporate branding: *'A corporate brand involves the conscious decision by senior management to distil and make known the attributes of the organization's identity in the form of a clearly defined branding proposition. This proposition underpins organizational efforts to communicate, differentiate, and enhance the brand vis-a-vis key stakeholder groups and networks. A corporate brand proposition requires a total corporate commitment to the corporate body from all levels of personnel. It requires senior management and financial support. Ongoing management of the corporate brand resides with the chief executive officer and does not fall within the remit of the traditional directorate of marketing'*.

Corporate brands are relations between corporations and consumers and corporations, consumers, and communication channels. Media in general have developed over time, as phrased by Kornberger (2010) *'brands are the interface for this rapidly expanding conversation between consumers and producers. The result is a radical new configuration of production and consumption: the monopoly of organization is being subverted by creativity of the networked community'* and *'they have a fundamental impact on the way organizations are managed. Brands function as the new organizing principle for business; they enable the conceptualization and design of business from the outside in'*.

Schultz et al. (2012) describe that the corporate branding field has moved through at least three significant development stages:

1) *A shift from focusing on the origin of brands in individual products and services to including the corporation/organization as the platform for branding.*

2) *A shift from focusing on consumers as passive receivers of brand messages to multiple stakeholders as active co-creators of brand value.*

3) *A shift from branding as a subset of the marketing discipline focused on the marketing mix towards branding as a cross-disciplinary activity influenced, but not controlled by the company.*

They find that corporate branding and reputation are interlinked via management practice, and corporate branding also have implications for corporate reputation. In their table 2h.1 they define as well branding as corporate reputation:

*A **brand** arises from the emotional, cognitive and aesthetic experiences and expressions of stakeholders (internal and external) when they (alone, in groups, or in community with others) interact with and/or use the symbols and practices associated with products, services, corporations, cities, and/or nations.*

***Corporate reputation** is 'a collective assessment of a company's attractiveness to a specific group of stakeholders relative to a reference group of companies with which the company competes for resources (Fombrun 2012).*

3.6.2 Corporate reputation

Reputation is created based on information, generated by behaviors, actions and activities carried out at different levels (Solove 2007), and the different theoretical perspectives underpin the multifaceted character of corporate reputation as described by Wæraas and Maor (2015). From an economic perspective reputation is formed among stakeholder groups as a result of actions chosen by the organization. In a constructivist perspective reputation is understood as a socially constructed aggregate product referring to collective knowledge or recognition and derived from social interactions between stakeholders as well as from actions from the organization. The institutional perspective shares the constructivist view of collective knowledge and recognition, but adds a macro-cultural context with the organizational competition, monitoring organizations, financial analyst, and the effect of the media communicating information and eventually adding their own evaluations.

A particular challenge is the continued lack of consensus on definitions of corporate reputation. Based on their review of 49 definitions Barnett et al. (2006) proposed an integrated definition '*Observers' collective judgment of a corporation based on assessments of the financial, social, and environmental impacts attributed to the corporation over time*'. Walker's (2010) review of 27 years of research in corporate reputation definitions lead him to propose '*Corporate reputation is a relatively stable, issue specific aggregate perceptual representation of a company's past actions and future prospects compared against some standard*' as definition'. Fombrun (2012) developed his definition further, see the section above. More recently Dowling (2016) after having reviewed 50 different definitions of corporate reputation proposed a new definition: '*A corporate reputation is the admiration and respect a person holds of an organization at a point of time*'.

Understanding that reputation is an intangible asset Rindova et al (2010) draw the attention to '*the idea that the value of reputation as an asset depends not only on perceived quality (i.e., the extent to which an organization is evaluated positively by stakeholders) but also on its level (i.e., the extent to which large numbers of stakeholders focus their attention on the focal firm rather than on competitors*'.

In a recent study Ravasi et al. (2018) have reviewed four decades of research on the formation of organizational reputation. They find six perspectives on reputation formation: a game-theoretic, a strategic, a macro-cognitive, a micro-cognitive, a cultural-sociological, and a communicative one. They compare how the different perspectives lead to differences in definition of organizational reputation, how reputation is formed, focal actors and their functions and the primary areas of application. The following

three figures, taken from Ravasi et al. (2018, fig.1, 2 and 3) illustrate the authors attempt to synthesize the six perspectives to find a common ground.






Figure 3.1. Figures 1, 2 and 3 from Ravasi (2018) as an attempt to synthesize 6 different perspectives on organizational reputation.

In a survey of private company managers in Germany (carried out in 2005 and replicated ten years after) Wiedmann (2017) found that a good reputation is seen as a hygiene factor rather than a real motivator in management of customer relationships while management of corporate reputation is particularly important from a risk-avoidance perspective.

3.7 From private to public sector organizations

As noted in the introduction, the public sector has attempted to transform the experience from private sector organizations into public sector organizations. There has been a lot of inspiration and lessons to be learned, but several authors have also drawn the attention to significant differences between the private and the public sector limiting the immediate transfer of knowledge and practice.

Kotler et al. (1993) argue that *'quality public services can be marketed as a place's primary attraction and product'* (the word *'reputation'* is not found in the index of the book). However, the systematic, theoretical, and empirical approach to public sector reputation came after the change of the millennium with Carpenter (2001, 2002) and a number of other authors (see Wæraas and Maor 2015). Reputations provide governmental agencies with decisive benefits on top of their formal authority and powers, reputation is *'valuable political assets – they can be used to generate political support, to achieve delegated autonomy and discretion from politicians, to protect the agency from political attack, and to recruit and retain valued employees'* (Carpenter 2002). The focus of literature is, however, not on the public sector as a whole but often on independent administrative units with the ability to act autonomously within the political-administrative system. It is assumed that, although they are not in a competitive situation, they can gain benefits by creating and maintaining a good reputation.

It must be born in mind that the public sector is characterized by a fundamentally different legal framework and several conditions much unlike conditions in the private sector (see e.g. Mourizen and Svava 2002). Black (2002) found seven basic differences between the public and private sectors: Public expectations, political responsibility, clear goals and priorities, the relationship between needs, demand supply and revenue, decision making, and professional self-government. Christensen et al. (2007) highlight three characteristics of a public organization like a municipal organization: i) they have leaders elected by popular vote, ii) they are multifunctional, and iii) they differ from private organizations because they do not operate within a free and competitive market. Salomonsen (2011) conducted a cross-sectional analysis of Danish municipalities' strategic communication, and found that there were two key challenges if one wishes to transfer private companies' business communications to the municipal sector - to ensure democratic dialogue and to maintain the political aspects of communication. *'The democratic dialogue with the recipients is ideally symmetrical, while business communication is asymmetric. The second challenge is to make the organization appear as a unit, one company. It may apply to the administrative part of the organization but not to the political part, which has just been chosen based on different attitudes'*. Thus, both the diversity and possibly conflicting voices becomes an obstacle for a successful transfer.

In a local government context municipal organizations are multifunctional organizations (Frandsen and Johansen 2009) with multiple identities (Wæraas 2008), and consequently they must operate with multiple reputations (Carpenter and Krause 2012). Carpenter (2010) defines organizational reputation as: *'a set of symbolic beliefs about the unique or separable capacities, intentions, roles, obligations, history, and mission of an organization that are embedded in a network of multiple audiences'*, and Carpenter and Krause (2012) further argue that the reputations of public organizations include (at least) four dimensions: i) *performative*, as the ability to execute its tasks competently and efficiently, ii) *moral*, as the capacity to meet the normative expectations posed to public organizations, iii) *technical*, representing the organizations professional qualifications and iv) *procedural*, as conformance with set procedures and legislation.

A reputation is built among the public during their encounters with the organization (MacMillan et al. 2005) and the aim of reputation management is to guide these encounters in a favorable way for the organization (Aula and Mantere 2008). Therefore the whole notion of reputation management is built on the understanding that every organization has a reputation that should and can be managed (Doorley and Garcia 2011). Wæraas (2008) finds that *'it is more important for a public organization to respect its internal diversity in corporate branding than to have a consistent self representation'*. He suggests an adapted and more pragmatic version of corporate branding where the organization draws on existing attributes, their de facto diversity and the chance of offering several different but strong corporate brand images. Picci (2015) makes in his rather critical reflections over actors and strategies in the bureaucratic reputation game an essential observation: *'If I have deemphasized the role of communication, it is because I am convinced that, when thinking about organizational reputation, we should not lose sight of the simple reality that reputational beliefs are about real organizational characteristics and that the main venue to modify such beliefs is to act on them'*.

Within the public organization, negative images can influence how public servants behave and act, taking away their motivation if they are always the cause of political pander (Rho, Yun and Lee 2015). This is a general observation but is certainly valid in a municipal context where the level of transparency is high and local politicians and municipal staff live next door to the citizens.

Bjørnå and Salomonsen (2016) open up for an analysis of the endogenic factors that affect and are affected by reputation and brand management as in how or even whether reputation management is strategically linked to other aspects of the organization (Frandsen et al. 2016). Starting point is what they call the *'somewhat fragmented landscape of theoretical approaches to reputation management'*, a landscape that Wæraas and Maor (2015) propose should be divided between political science and organizational approaches. Political science research (typically) how organizations (rationally) perform selective responses to threats to their reputation in their environment to protect their reputation as an asset to ensure autonomy. The organizational approach view organizations as institutionalized entities embedded in institutional environments capable of influencing and framing the managerial choices and challenges facing public managers.

Hansen et al. (2001) have a more managerial approach organized around the discourse of New Public Management and on professional expertise, identity, and image building efforts. Taking a social constructivist approach they reflect on public sector organizations' concern with identity and image building and connect this development to the travel of specific knowledge about governance and public sector reform. Without a distinction between brand and reputation the analysis demonstrates how managerialism links identity and image management at the organizational and territorial levels to the goal of improving the performance of public sector organizations.

Hansen et al. (2004) take this approach further in a study of communication management built on a case study in Horsens. They find that *'At the municipal level, it is often seen - and very significantly in, for example, Horsens - that political communication serves to create a special idea about the municipality as a whole, both in order to offer the citizens and businesses of the municipality specific identities and visions, and in order to position the municipality in the regional / national / international competition for attractive citizens, companies, tourists and investors 'and' Experience from Horsens shows that political communication management here is included as an important management technique when the goal is to create organizational change and political capital'*. Finally, Hansen et al. (2004) conclude that *'political communication management appears to be an absolute necessity when it comes to ensuring the identity and reputation processing of the material and structural changes in and around public organizations'*.

Byrkjeflot (2016) mentions a number of examples of paradoxes in reputation management. For example, there seems to be no strong correlation between reputation and result, the uniqueness paradigm, where

the quest for the uniqueness leads to convergence, the confidence paradox, where the informant loses credibility and openness paradox, where openness leads to more attention to deficiencies, which may trigger a more closed communication.

As described above reputational management is an attempt to influence the valuation of a given organization by the audiences (Byrkjeflot et al. 2013), but it is also argued that a good public sector reputation may be useful in attracting citizens and businesses, an objective usually linked to place and city branding, see below.

3.8 The transition from branding and reputation of organizations (private and public) to place and city branding.

Different authors have to different times tried to equate product branding and corporate reputation with city branding, but so far no agreement has been reached. Trueman et al (2004) analyzed the English city Bradford questioning whether the city could be a corporate brand. They found that *'cities can be seen as highly complex brands that are constantly changing and less well defined as well as more difficult to control than those in the corporate domain'*, and Parkerson and Saunders (2005) found that corporate branding decisions made in the corporate center for a product brand may be made externally for a city brand.

Asworth and Kavaratzis (2009) identify and discuss the similarities between corporate brands and city brands. City brands may be fundamentally different from product brands but this does not mean that they cannot be treated as corporate brands. They conclude that it is possible to adopt a branding philosophy for the management of cities and to use tools and principles of corporate branding particularly. *'It is necessary, however, to adapt such tools and models to the specific characteristics and demands of cities. Cities are neither products nor corporations in the traditional meaning of the terms, and therefore, a distinct form of branding is needed'*.

Several authors have tried to develop the field based on a meta-analytical approach. Gertner (2011) analyzed 211 articles published between 1990 and 2009 and commented rather critically that he failed to find evidence *'that 'place marketing' and 'place branding' literature has reached a point where we can say that a hefty theory is under construction'*. He suggested that the field should move from a descriptive to a more normative stage of theory building. Other meta-studies are Stepchenkova and Mills (2010) who analyzed 152 articles from 2000-2007 on conceptual and empirical research on destination image assessment while Lucarelli and Berg (2011) analyzed 217 articles from 1988 to 2009 on city branding to describe the state-of-the-art of the research domain. They proposed future research to focus on the political, aesthetical, and ethical implications of city brands and city branding. Oguztimur and Akturan (2016) analyzed 146 articles from 1988-2014 on city branding and found that there was a general tendency to describe the data but not to interpret the relations between the concepts and theories on city branding literature. Vuignier (2016) gives a statistical overview of 1172 articles on place branding and marketing from the period 1976 -2016, and Glinska and Tomaszewska (2017) made a purely bibliometric analysis of conceptual and empirical research on destination image. Adding to the city brand literature is an important meta-study by Getz and Page (2016) on categorization and critical evaluation of event-tourism.

Green et al. (2016) have in their analysis of literature on city branding identified several waves. The first wave lasts from the end of the 1980's up to around 2000 and is dominated by marketing concepts and marketing principles. It is recognized that traditional marketing campaigns did not lead to anything which triggered a new stage of development between 2000 and 2010. During this development, the branding paradigm was transferred into an urban context, i.e. Trueman et al. (2004), Hankinson (2007) and

Kavaratsis (2009). The argument was that there are similarities around many product categories, many and very different market contact points, and a variety of stakeholders.

More recent authors like Bonaiutu et al. (2019) argue that the conceptual lens of corporate reputation can be used to study city reputation, referring to Bronfenbrenner (1979), who see corporations and cities as micro-systems and to UN-HABITAT (2012) where cities are seen as entities that include a certain number of people sharing the same environment, culture, and objective. Henninger et al. (2016) find that *'the transformational nature of cities is similar to those of organizations that continuously change their appearance and (in) tangible features'*.

What perhaps is overlooked in this discussion is, for example, that the city is not an organization, it is not organized with unity of command, citizens can reject a brand project without risking their jobs, city councils cannot restrict citizens from moving into the city to just those who accept the city brand, and the citizens cannot immediately choose alternative products (move to another city). Likewise statements like *'cities constantly change their appearance'* may be contested.

Braun (2011) point to the fact that city branding is the subject to political decision-making in the context of urban and regional policy and must deal with regional or municipal organization(s) and policy making procedures. *'This setting cannot be compared to regular business practice and any application of branding concepts needs to take these characteristics into account'*, and Zenker and Braun (2017) conclude in their analysis of place brands that *'place branding cannot be separated from its political governance context'*.

3.9 Place and city brand definitions – the noun

Academia has not yet agreed on a final definition of the substantive brand (in city brand) and the verb branding, and Rössler (2018) refers to 11 different definitions. Anttiroiko (2014) chose to illustrate the duality of a city brand approach by comparing the definition of a city brand by Dinnie (2008) as the *'unique, multidimensional blend of elements that provide a city with locally grounded differentiation and relevance for all its target audiences'* with Baker's (2012) definition *'A place brand is the totality of thought, feelings, and expectations that people hold about a location. It's the reputation and the enduring essence of the place and represents its distinctive promise of value providing it with a competitive edge'*. The two definitions show how city brands may be seen from two different angles. Dinnie starts with the city and ends up with the target audience while Baker's definition starts with the audiences and ends up with the city brands promise of value. Boisen (2015) points to another dichotomy: *'Is a place a brand or does it have a brand'*?

A more recent definition is found in Zenker and Braun (2017). They define place brands as: *'....a network of associations in the consumer's mind based on the visual, verbal, and behavioral expression of a place and its stakeholders. These associations differ in their influence within the network and in importance for the place consumers' attitude and behavior'*. Baker (2019) develops his definition from 2012 further into *'Your city's brand isn't a building, river, museum, street, or other physical occurrence. Your brand isn't a physical entity. It exists only in the customer's mind. A brand is the assembly of powerful intangible associations and thoughts that are stored in the minds of target audiences, and not the opinions and hopes of a committee or the marketing department'*. He defines the noun a place brand as: *'the totality of thoughts, feelings, and expectations that people hold about a location. It's the character, reputation and the enduring essence of the place and represents its distinctive promise of value and sense of place. Most importantly, it's a valued promise that must be grounded in truth and reality'*. Baker (2019) sees the verb place branding as *'strategic and provides the toolkit and actions for defining, managing and communicating the city's competitive identity to ensure that messages and experiences are as distinct, compelling, and rewarding as possible.'*

As pointed out by Boysen et al. (2017) the concepts of place promotion, place marketing and place branding are often used by practitioners as if they were synonymous – but Boysen et al. (2017) argue that they are not. As a consequence they propose a conceptual framework where place promotion is limited to increasing the attention for what the places have to offer. Place marketing is concerned with fine-tuning the place to manage supply - and demand through promotional measures and should not be detached from the actual development of the place. Finally, place branding is suggested to be the most encompassing of the three and that it asks most of the organizational capacity. And place branding is place driven – from the inside and out. The conceptual interrelation is shown in fig. 3.1 (copy of fig. 1 in Boysen et al. 2017).

	PLACE PROMOTION	PLACE MARKETING	PLACE BRANDING
DRIVER: APPROACH:	SUPPLY-DRIVEN SENDER TO RECEIVER	DEMAND-DRIVEN OUTSIDE-IN (NEEDS)	IDENTITY-DRIVEN INSIDE-OUT (RELEVANCE)
TASK: MANDATE: BUDGET:	TO COMMUNICATE OFFERINGS COORDINATED PROMOTION TARGET AUDIENCES	TO MANAGE SUPPLY & DEMAND PRODUCT-MARKET COMBINATIONS TARGET MARKET SEGMENTS	TO MANAGE REPUTATION IMAGE ORCHESTRATION PERCEPTION & ASSOCIATION
RESULTS:	ATTENTION	CHOICE	REPUTATION
PRIMARY* DOMAIN:	COGNITIVE* (KNOWLEDGE)	CONATIVE* (BEHAVIOUR)	AFFECTIVE* (ATTITUDE)
*) It should be noted that all three concepts relate to all three domains (cognitive, conative, and affective), albeit to different extents. The distinction here is meant to help differentiate between them, and therefore emphasise their primary domain, which is the domain to which the main results belong to.			

Fig. 3.2. The conceptual interrelation between place promotion, place marketing, and place branding. Fig. 1 in Boysen et al. (2017).

Anttiroiko (2014, not quoted in Boysen et al. 2017) proposes a variation where brand relates to managing, identity to being, image to seeing and reputation to knowing, while Bonaiuto et al. (2019) argue that image is based on look and appearance whereas reputation is based on behaviors and activities (either past and/or intended), (Bonaiuto & Alves 2012). Besides reputation is not simply rooted in the personal experience, but also and especially in the collective experiences and communication processes of the social actors. Braun et al. (2017) ‘translate’ the notion of reputation from corporate reputation literature into place and city branding contending that *‘a place’s reputation is the composite of its past developments, investments, actions, achievements and place (brand) images. The reputation changes over time but is overall less volatile than place image’*. Boysen et al. (2017) define the image of a place as *‘how the place is perceived’*. *‘Place images needs to be interpreted within a specific context to be deemed positive or negative, while place reputation is a long term sum of normative opinions about the place that stimulates an immediate judgment and/or emotional response’*.

3.10 Place and city branding – the verb.

Kotler et al. (1993) propose five strategies for place improvement and strategic place marketing: Urban design, infrastructure improvement, good public services, attractions, and people. Blichfeldt (2005) finds that is a prerequisite of a brand process to understand the perceptions of city image among city consumers, and Kavaratzis and Ashworth (2005) argue that branding of a city should focus on how the residents are related to their city, how they make sense of it and what are their most valued physical and symbolic elements. Local citizens living and working in a city are likely to be the first affected by changes in the city’s image (Reiser and Crispein 2009). The authentic experience of local citizens also plays an important role for tourists (Wagner et al. 2009).

But in literature most attention has been given to regeneration intervention and the ‘re-imagining’ of cities through flagship projects, cultural and event-led regeneration including managing the physical landscape, and construction of iconic architecture (‘Attractions’ in Kotler et al. 1993). They are often seen as leading examples of image change (Evans 2005, Jencks 2006, Peel and Lloyd 2008, Richards and Palmer 2010, Smith 2012, Garcia 2017). Mossberg and Getz (2006) argue that *‘festivals and events can be managed as brands, but only through multi-stakeholder involvement in the process.’* The evidence of this effect is however still limited (Evans 2005, Bell & Jayne (2006). Richards and Palmer (2010) and Smith (2012) mention no examples of well documented brand impacts in relation to events and urban regeneration. Sainz (2012) analyzed the image of Bilbao among university students from Barcelona, Madrid and Santander ten years after the opening of the Guggenheim Museum. She concluded that more than the spectacular landmark should be considered to create a new image. The European Capital of Culture (ECOC) program is also often seen as a leading example of culture-led regeneration intervention of host cities, but little evidence has been gathered to determine long-term sustained image change in these cities (Garcia 2017). On the other hand Lemmetyinen et al. (2013) found that the Finnish city of Pori has a long history of event production that has positively affected the brand and contributed to the development of higher education provision in the city (Luonila and Johansson 2015). And the case from Horsens (Jørgensen 2015) demonstrates how a long series of musical events led to a well documented development of a new brand.

Sport and sport events provide the place/the city with benefits, tangible as well as intangible (Rein and Shields 2007), and sport is frequently used in promoting a place reaching from Olympic Games and World Cup Bids to (eventually public) funding of sports facilities, arenas and teams (Siegfried and Zimbalist 2006). And it is evident that there are cities and places in the world that are renowned either for their football clubs (Barcelona, Munich, Manchester), for golf (St. Andrews), for professional cycling (Alpe d’Huez or Col du Galibier) or in some instances for their arenas (as Madison Square Garden in New York), not to mention the Arena in Verona or Forum Romanum in Rome. But Gammelsæter (2017) studied media coverage across Norwegian cities of similar size that host/do not host a premier professional football club. He found that the media coverage of a city was largely magnified when hosting a national top football club, but there was no indication that sports media coverage enhanced media exposure of other attributes connected to the place. Jørgensen (2015) and Jørgensen (2017) show how hosting a stage of Giro d’Italia in Horsens in 2012 had no effect on the city’s image in TOMA the following year. Tasci et al. (2019) studied changes in Brazil’s image during hosting a mega-event (the 2016 Summer Olympics) and found no change in destination image over time. On the other hand has particularly the introduction of urban transformations and mega-events as parts of branding strategies led to dramatic public resistance (Sanchez and Broudehoux 2013, Gray and Porter 2014, Maiello and Pasquinelli 2015), see more about resistance in section 4.6.

And practice is still far from settled, as described by Moilanen (2016). He compared the challenges of city branding in European cities across 10 countries based on interviews with high ranking city branding practitioners and he identified 9 major challenges: Large number of stakeholders, limited understanding of branding among key stakeholders, limited internal buy-in among stakeholders difficulties in securing sufficient funding, general slowness and time related challenge, organizational issues and lack of authority to lead, operational level challenges in market communication campaigns and in transferring the brand identity to product experiences and finally poor situational awareness resulting from poor monitoring.

3.11 City brand objectives

The purpose of city branding activities is traditionally and in a generalized way described as attracting attractive citizens, companies, investors and tourists in a world of increased competition (Kotler et al. 1993, Kavaratzis and Asworth 2005, Govers 2011, Zenker et al. 2017 and others). But the more specific reason for undertaking a city brand project, the argument for spending taxpayers money on a nonobligatory activity, what could be called ‘The big WHY’, is often unclear or just stated in general terms. Jansson and Power

(2006), Middleton (2011) and Jørgensen (2015) have pointed to several explanatory statements - labeled brand objectives (see also Dinnie 2011):

- Attract inbound investment and venture capital
- Attract and retain companies
- Attract and retain skilled knowledge workers
- Attract tourists and visitors
- Attract students
- Attract new citizens
- Increase political influence at regional, national and international level
- Increase chances to create partnerships with other cities, public or private research, higher education institutions, and private sector organizations
- Utilize the 'city of origin' effect on products and services
- Marketing locally produced goods and services outside the city
- Create civic pride and related ability to increase local harmony and confidence.
- Image change
- Exploit 'golden opportunities'
- Reinforce municipal coherence after municipal reforms
- A new political beginning

Any of these brand objectives will have consequences for the selection of method, discussions of process, and definition of target groups and monitoring.

The survey of Danish municipalities in 2014 (Jørgensen 2016a) found 25 municipalities actively engaged in branding, but when mapped the data demonstrated a national difference, where a number of and often neighboring municipalities in Jutland were actively involved, while there were just a few projects on Zealand and none around Copenhagen. This may be taken as an indication of stronger inter-municipal competition in Jutland, (in spite of differences in majority's political ideology) where particularly the competition between Herning and Horsens on musical events led to higher prices for artists and consequently higher ticket prices as compared to i.e. Hamburg (Frank Panduro, pers. communication).




Fig. 3.3 City brand projects in Denmark 2014 (Jørgensen 2016)

3.12 The reputational risk

Management of corporate reputation is considered important from a risk-avoidance perspective (Wiedmann 2017), and there are different definitions of reputational risk as pointed out by Eckert (2017). For instance has the Comité Européen des Assurances (CEA and the Group Consultatif Actuel Européen (2007) defined risk (in their work on Solvency II) in relation to private companies as: *'Risk that adverse publicity regarding an insurer's business practice and associations, whether accurate or not, will cause a loss of confidence in the integrity of the institution. Reputational risk could arise from other risks inherent in an organization's activities. The risk of loss of confidence relates to stakeholders, including inter alia, existing and potential customer, investors, suppliers and supervisors* (cited from Eckert 2017).

The author is not familiar with a parallel definition of risk in the public sector, but Frandsen et al. (2016) found that reputation and crisis management de facto is widely disseminated into the municipal sector in Denmark, but neither entirely institutionalized nor strongly coupled. With the growing globalization and the far-reaching development of social media in WEB 2.0, economic scandals, environmental disasters, and

inappropriate conduct by key employees and politicians may have far-reaching and long lasting negative effect on city reputation and city brands.

This is fully demonstrated on an international scale in cities like Chernobyl, Ukraine, (leakage from a nuclear power plant), Bhopal, India, (gas disaster), and Seveso, Italy (release of dioxine). The images of these cities will for decades and possibly centuries continue to be negatively connected with the disasters and the damaged environment. But they may also serve as an open opportunity for 'dark tourism' denoting the dissonance at contested heritage sites (Foley and Lennon 1996). Dark tourism sites most commonly include battlefields, cemeteries, assassination and terrorist attack sites, Holocaust memorials, and even natural disaster remnants. The most recent example of elaborated dark tourism is probably the HBO series '*Chernobyl*'.

As a comment to the prison in Horsens it should be mentioned that traditional prisons were not originally included as an element of dark tourism, and the word '*prison*' is not found in the index in Lennon and Foley's book on 'Dark Tourism' (Lennon and Foley 2000). Strange and Kempa (2003) question a too simplistic use of the expression 'dark tourism' in a prison context, while Stone (2006) suggests that dark tourism represents a fluid spectrum with the 'darkest' sites (places of suffering and death) to the 'lightest' sites (places associated with suffering and death). In the middle of his typology and thus representing a combination of education and entertainment he sees former prisons '*presenting bygone penal and justice codes to the present day consumer*' (Stone 2006).

A Danish example may well illustrate the consequences when the municipal reputation is jeopardized. The Bertelsmann Foundation nominated in 1993 the Danish municipality Farum (together with nine other municipalities within the OECD (Phoenix (USA), Duisburg (Germany), Christchurch (New Zealand), Quebec (Canada), Tilburg (The Netherlands), Braintree (England), Delft (Holland), Hämeenlinna (Finland) and Neuchâtel (Switzerland) to the foundations prize for 1993: 'DEMOCRACY AND EFFICIENCY IN LOCAL GOVERNMENT. The prize was shared between Phoenix and Christchurch, but the nomination was of high brand value for the mayor and the municipality in Farum. When it turned out that the mayor had been managing the municipal economy irresponsibly (he was later sentenced to 4 years in prison for malfeasance and breach of trust) he was excluded from his political party. The Bertelsmann Foundation excluded the municipality from the cooperation of the 10 cities (partly paid for by the foundation), the Ministry for the Interior took over administration, taxes were raised significantly to pay the depths caused by the mayors activities, and as part of the national municipal reform in 2006 Farum lost autonomy and was merged into another municipality (Pihl 2009).

The risk may grow from the process itself. Braun et al (2017) found that an open place brand process led to more conflicts among stakeholders thereby affecting place reputation negatively. A strategy where the communicated place image reflects the places identity had a strong direct effect on place reputation as well as positive mediated effects through place brand adoptions and reducing conflicts among stakeholders. But as pointed out by the authors, the study is based on perceptual information from respondents involved in place marketing, not established through factual data and information from stakeholders.

3.13 The contested city

Cities may be in trouble for several reasons as mentioned above and some may end up with a contested image among citizens, companies and authorities within city boundaries as well as outside. Gertner and Kotler (2004) point out, that '*Today's marketer must look at a place's image as a major influence on investors, new residents and visitors*'. They focus on the three distinct ways a place can correct a negative image: ignore it, turn negative elements into positive elements through reframing or repositioning or adding new positive attitude-building characteristics and use communication and branding tools to disseminate the message. A more far-reaching and probably unrealistic alternative might be to engage in direct de-marketing processes including '*no marketing, redirection/marketing alternative places, informational place de-marketing; restricting access; and pricing mechanisms*' (Medway et al. 2011).

Old prisons may be associated with a negative or predominantly negative image (as illustrated in Horsens) that may affect citizen's attitude to the place. Old and abandoned prisons have been converted to condominiums, hotels, museums, and tourist sites as part of city regeneration all over the world (Taylor 1994, Strange and Kempa 2003, Wilson 2008, Flynn 2011, Swensen 2014) and prison tourism has become a popular tourist experience in a number of countries (Walby and Piché 2011, Wilson 2004 and 2008, Hartmann 2014, Swensen 2014, Barton and Brown 2015).

Several authors like Gertner and Kotler (2004), Baker (2007), and Avraham (2004) have explored the strategies used to restore a negative image. The most recent study is Avraham's (2014) on actual campaign components and marketing initiatives used for *'turning a place's liability into an asset'* in the years 2009-2011. In a study on qualitative content analysis of advertisements and news reports from such campaigns he found two main categories *'situations in which negative past occurrences and events are used as tourist attractions'* and *'situations in which problematic place characteristics that usually hinder tourism are turned into assets to attract a specific target audience'*, and he found 10 strategies to improve a city's negative image: encouraging visits to the city, hosting spotlight events, turning negative characteristics into positive characteristics; changing the city's name, logo or slogan; cultivating the resident's local pride; solving the problem that led to the formation of the negative image; delivering counter-stereotypical messages; ignoring the stereotype; acknowledging the negative image; and geographic association or separation in the campaign. He emphasizes, however, that his study is pure content analysis research and *'there is no way to know if the use of this strategy was successful or not'*. None of his specific examples involve former prisons.

In a study of strategy of entrepreneurship and SME development, Hannibal (2008) found that images of places are hard to change when they involve elements with a negative appeal towards a specific audience. Tasci et al. (2019) studied changes in Brazil's image during hosting a mega-event (the 2016 Summer Olympics). They found no change in destination image over time and see this as an illustration of *'how difficult it is to change people's perceptions positively in a world filled with negative media coverage'*.

It is very difficult to find successful and well-documented examples of image changes where a negative image has been neutralized and/or changed to a positive image. I am only aware of two cases where there are relevant ex-ante and ex-post measurements to document change. The first case involves the Israeli city Holon (Herstein and Jaffe 2008). The objective for the city's management was to change the public's perception of the city from negative associations, being associated with crime and violence for almost two decades, to positive ones. The case study described here shows how marketing research is a key factor in both the diagnosis and image designing stages. Research was used to first determine the city's image among both residents and non-residents. Both groups viewed the city in negative terms. It was found that image could not be improved without first implementing significant changes in the city's infrastructure. *'Face lifting'* was accomplished by establishing cultural institutions mainly for children. This led to designing a brand: *'The Children's City.'* Subsequent research showed that these changes led to a significantly more positive image for the city'.

The second example is found in Jørgensen (2015) see chapter 7, demonstrating how the Danish city Horsens through a systematic effort on concerts and cultural events has created a new brand. 40-50 % of the citizens outside Horsens now connect the city's name with concerts and cultural events compared to 2% when the project started in 2000 (measured by annual Top of Mind Awareness). During this period the cognitive knowledge of the old prison stayed unchanged at the same level in TOMA, but the affective evaluation of the old prison turned from negative to positive as the prison was developed into a prison museum and a national event venue (Jørgensen 2019, see chapters 7 and 11).

Green et al. (2010) used an experimental design to study some of the media effects on the attitude to the Olympics in Beijing, and they found that exposure to negative media about the Beijing Olympic Games led

to a negative view of China and the games in Beijing among participants in the study. In a study of the image impact of hosting the 2012 Olympic Games in London, Kenyon and Bode (2018) found that the pre-event concerns about the potential to negatively impact the city's pre-established image were to a degree fulfilled. At the same time, the respondents perceived the Olympics as a successful event enterprise. These two cases resonates the conclusion that may be drawn from the two studies in Holon and Horsens. It is possible to create a new brand but part of the process will be to address the problems responsible for the negative image as illustrated for Horsens in section 1.2.

3.14 Brand extension

In product branding is the link between an established brand name and a new product described as an extended brand – instead of creating a new brand. This is a well known strategy for products, but as pointed out by Kim et al. (2019) in their experimental destination-to-destination brand extension project there is not yet an established body of research concerning destination marketing. In the essence the development of the old prison in Horsens into an event venue taking advantage of the well known prison image and the newly developed concert and event image (Jørgensen 2019) may be seen as such a brand extension.

3.15 Concluding remarks

This thesis is founded on 5 published papers. Three of these were published in 2015 and 2016. The intention of chapter 3 is to establish a framework around '*City Branding*' and how the scientific field has developed, inspired from private sector experience with marketing and organizational reputation management and (to a lesser degree) from public reputation management. It is mentioned how studies have tried to separate city branding from corporate branding and how recent studies try to link the two concepts again.

The chapter is also intended to demonstrate how the field of organizational reputation in the private sector, in the public sector, and in relation to city branding is full of conceptual ambiguity and overlap in vocabulary. However relevant and necessary this would have been, the purpose with chapter 3 has, however, not been to untangle this ambiguity but merely to illustrate the complexity and dynamic unfinished nature of the field and the overlap between sectors.

The idea of chapter 3 is finally to try to pick up on literature published from 2015 (after finalization of papers 1-3 in the thesis) and onwards particularly in relation to city brand studies, and the two general research questions. I have looked for analyses and studies that might influence the conclusions from study 1-3, and I have found no such cases in relation to the first research question (on politician's role). The need for a more systematic approach to data collection and monitoring (the second research question) has recently been addressed by Florek et al. (2019) in a paper published online in September 2019 (after submission of this thesis). The conclusions in their study are that '*Barriers to the development of a well-functioning measurement system include: too narrow understanding of what brand is, lack of knowledge or culture of measurement, conflicting political interests, reluctance to involve internal stakeholders, insufficient funding, complexity of the brand itself and more*'. A significant answer to research question 2 is still relevant.

Chapter 4 A stakeholder perspective

4.1 Private company stakeholders

Friedman (1962) defined the concept of shareholders in the private sector as: *'there is one and only one social responsibility of business – to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it (...) engages in open and free competition without deception or fraud'*. And Freeman (1984) defined stakeholders as: *'A stakeholder in an organization is (by definition) any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization's objective'*.

The stakeholder concept is developed within the private business sector and is by definition clearly developed in an organizational context. Today there are hundreds of different definitions (Miles 2011), and the word 'stakeholder' is widely used within the public sector and defined or used in many different ways. Stakeholders can be outside or inside in an organizational perspective, they can be outside or inside in a geographical perspective, they may be close to or further away from the epicenter of the issue, their participation may be major or minor and their importance for and influence on the issue will differ. Besides, as Friedman and Miles (2006) comment *'Contributors to the stakeholder literature have typically considered the stakeholder-organization relation as dyadic: a direct, linear relationship. This simplifies reality and ignores the impact of interdependent stakeholders and established networks. It also overlooks the roles of intermediaries as mediators, facilitators, campaigners, and as stakeholders in their own right, and in particular the role of the media as an intermediary'*. In a conceptual article Frandsen and Johansen (2015) define an intermediary as *'an actor; that is, an individual, a group of individuals, an organization, or a meta-organization, that belongs to a specific area in society (e.g., a specific industry, a specific organizational field, and/or a specific sector), and whose primary function or mission is to mediate; that is, to represent an organization and/or a specific stakeholder group, and/or to intervene in the relationship between them either by furthering or by impeding the interests and activities of the organization in question and/or its stakeholders in a specific situation or over time'*.

For comparison there are seemingly no shareholders in the public sector, but Klausen (2013) argue that *'in the public sector the most important shareholders are the politicians* (since they own the public sector on behalf of the citizens).

Hatch & Schultz (2003) state that *'The corporate brand contributes not only to customer-based images of the organisation, but to the images formed and held by all its stakeholders, including: employees; customers; investors; suppliers; partners; regulators; special interests; and local communities'*.

In the private sector there is a traditional top-down approach commonly demonstrated in the corporate world (Hatch and Schultz 2003) with an *'authority'* responsible for development and management of a corporate or product brands, to allocate resources, and if necessary to impose the brand on the employees as part of the organization's culture. Antorini and Schultz (2005) have demonstrated how this top-down starting point over time has developed into interaction and co-creation between organizations and stakeholders, but it runs through literature on corporate branding that there is a *'management'* above the brand manager who must act and align initiatives in the organization.

Clarke and Clegg (1998) and Greenly et al. (1997) found that company performance is linked directly to a stakeholder approach, and Hatch and Schultz (2008) argue that *'a successful corporate brand has a coherent identity on alignment between strategic vision, organizational culture and stakeholder desires'*. Jones (2005) proposes that stakeholders should be divided into two groups called primary and secondary stakeholders. Primary stakeholders are described as those, with whom there is a regular and stable

interaction, Fig. 4.1 may serve as one of several different illustrations of stakeholder groups in a private company and their relations to the corporate brand.




Fig. 4.1 A model of private company stakeholder equities as a tool for brand managers to assess the value of multiple stakeholders about the brand (Jones 2005).

4.2 Public sector stakeholders

The basic assumption is that stakeholder's requirements and expectations differ between the private and the public sector. Bjørnå (2015) suggest that municipalities have two crucial groups of stakeholders, those inside the municipality and those outside the municipality. She describes the '*insiders*' as the political constituency while the '*external*' are tourists and businesses interested in what this particular council can offer in comparison to others. In other words all citizens living within the municipality borders should be seen as internal, all others external. In a case study of Norwegian municipalities Bjørnå (2015) describes how the municipalities work with different targets groups for their communication. One municipality target tourists (= external stakeholders) while one target citizens in relation to transparency and what Carpenter describes as 'moral reputation' (= internal stakeholders).

4.3 Place and city brand stakeholders

In city brand context the view on stakeholders is broadened even though academia has not settled on a final definition of a city brand, and the literature that links city branding and stakeholders is rather fragmented (Merrilees et al. 2012). Stakeholder engagement occurs on various levels (Stokes 2008), and stakeholders may be looking at their ability to influence resource allocation (Ford et al. 2009) or they can influence the city's image (Gopalan and Narayan 2010). Sometimes they are seen as stakeholders, sometimes they are target groups (Kotler et al. 1993), customers (Merrilees et al. 2012, Zenker & Martin 2011) or consumers (Blichfeldt 2005). Blichfeldt (2005) finds that it is a prerequisite of a brand process to understand the perceptions of a city image among city consumers. Kavaratzis and Asworth (2005) argue that branding of a city should focus on how the residents are related to their city, how they make sense of it and what are their most valued physical and symbolic elements. Several authors support the notion that citizens and citizen participation play a central role in city branding (Hankinson, 2004, Kavaratzis, 2004 and

2012, Govers, 2011, Florek, 2011, Rehmet and Dinnie, 2013, Braun et al. 2013, Zenker et al., 2016). It is suggested that increasing stakeholder involvement will improve the place brand (Hankinsson 2010, Kavatzis and Hatch 2013); that an open process will allow stakeholders to influence the brand (Eshuis and Klijn 2012), increase word of mouth and support for the brand (Kavatzis and Hatch 2013), and that city branding should include bottom-up initiatives (Kavatzis 2012) in order to reduce resistance among residents, as identification with their place of living can be regarded as both an aim and facilitator (Zenker et al. 2016). Hereby, residents are seen to act as integral parts of the place brand, emitting symbolic messages about the city through explicit place representations and emblematic behaviors (Green et al. 2018), as ambassadors for the brand and as citizens and voters vital for the political legitimization for the brand (Braun et al. 2013). Braun et al. (2014) found that a large part of the communication of the city's image effectively occurs through physical characteristics and the perception of residents and visitors about the city. The use of slogans and logos did not have a significant effect on the perception of the city's image. Stubbs and Warnaby (2015) have pointed to the importance of engaging local citizens, not just by passively supporting, but positively engaged with the project. Happy and proud residents will be a central factor when the city's image is reinforced and they likely to communicate it to external audiences (Gilboa and Herstein 2012). Green et al. (2018) describe how residents explicit place representations and emblematic residential behaviors emit symbolic messages in interrelated ways. Govers (2018) sums up that *'People want to be part of a community that they can be proud of – that pride is increasingly influenced by how communities are being talked about outside, as opposed to how they are imagined within'*.

Zenker and Braun (2017) find that city branding involves much more complexity than is commonly thought. They propose a branded house strategy with an advanced brand management, including target group-specific sub-brands with adapted sub-brand communication under a shared city 'umbrella Brand' communication. This follows the proposal by Zenker and Bechmann (2013) that place branding research should focus more on the place brand perceptions among its different stakeholders and develop strategies for how places can deal with the specific place brand perceptions. Henninger et al (2016) compared stakeholder engagement in two post-industrial cities, Sheffield in the UK and Essen in Germany based on interviews with 20 different stakeholders in the two cities. They identified four different groups of stakeholders as described in table 4.1 but the authors state that the DMOs (Destination Marketing Organizations) in the two cities decide on the overall branding strategies and decide who will be the secondary, tertiary, and quaternary stakeholders but all within city borders. A different perspective is found in Zenker and Braun (2017), where they in a text on place word-of-mouth write *'This 'informal talk' between place stakeholders (between the different groups, e.g. between a tourist and a resident, or within the group) ...'* implying that tourists may also be seen as stakeholders.

Zavattaro (2013) on the other hand describe stakeholders who are active in the political and the administrative arenas as internal stakeholders while citizens, business owners, and tourists are seen as external stakeholders, and Hereznjak and Anders-Moravska (2015) mention *'major stakeholders'* without more specification. Looking at table 4.1 below it becomes obvious that the perspective of intermediates mentioned above probably will apply to a number of organizations described as primary and secondary stakeholders, but this perspective is not analyzed in the study by Henninger et al. (2016).

	Primary stakeholders	Secondary stakeholders	Tertiary stakeholders	Quaternary stakeholders
Identity	Governmental organizations, City Councils, DMOs, the Chamber of Commerce, Sheffield's Company of Cutlers, Essen's Wirtschaftsförderung	Festival organizations (e.g. Doc/Fest), the universities, museums, theatres, and business parks	Football and ice hockey clubs, restaurants, and hotels	Local individuals
Involvement	Create city branding strategy, enforce vision	Represent other stakeholder groups, execute strategy	Some try to be part of the branding project but are blocked by the primary stakeholders who classify them as 'unsuccessful' since they are neither nationally/internationally renowned nor have key attractions.	Primary stakeholders feel that they are of less benefit in terms of providing jobs or international exposure.
Own agenda		They only engage in city branding aspects that they are interested in – they only promote what benefits them.	Laissez faire approach	They play no part in the project. They are either not interested or represented through other organizations Lack of knowledge, lack of involvement, no confidence in the strategies

Table 4.1. An example of stakeholder stratification. From Henninger et al. 2016.

4.4 Place and city brand target groups

Kotler et al. (1993) see residents, business and visitors as the main target groups for place marketing and place branding and Boisen et al (2011) see places as highly complex and they cannot be understood as spatial entities within a closed hierarchical, territorial-administrative system. Places only exist when they have an audience. The notion of place branding implies market segmentation and a certain level of power to exercise control by selecting target groups, formulate policy and strategy, and undertake action.

Authors like Freire (2009), Florek (2011) and Warnaby & Medway (2013) support the view of local citizens as internal target groups, and Lucas (2005) recommended that at least 50 % of city marketing address internal target groups to increase their identification with the city. Eshuis et al. (2014) found that 2/3 of respondents among place marketing responsible in The Netherlands considered local citizens an important target group, and a German study in Bundesvereinigung City- und Stadtmarketing Deutschland e. V. (2016) found that almost all respondents considered the local citizens an important target group.

Figure 4.2 illustrates how different city brand target groups may be seen in an organized hierarchy, but the figure does not tell who the stakeholders are – if they are not the same. Figure 4.3 is an attempt (Boisen et al. 2017) to give a perspective on the relation between place marketing, place promotion and place branding and to the three target groups described in Kotler et al. (1993).




Fig. 4.2. Place branding target groups. Source: Invitation to International conference on 'Interregional Place Branding,' Lübeck, 3rd of March 2014.




Fig. 4.3. Organizational aspects of place promotion, place marketing, and place branding (Boisen et al. 2017) in the target group perspective presented by Kotler et al. (1993)

The perception of a city can differ strongly because of the different targets group's interests, perspectives and general knowledge (as illustrated in the difference between tourists and citizens, Zenker and Beckmann 2013), or the valuation of the city's heritage as it is perceived among citizens and outsiders, Henninger et al. 2016). Others have only found minor differences between tourists and local citizens (Gilboa 2015 and Cassia et al. 2018).

Only a few studies go deeper into the target group issue. Merrilees et al. (2011) used a two-stage quantitative study to compare two stakeholder groups (residents and resident business owners) and found that the two groups had different brand meanings associated to a city brand and each stakeholder group applied their own filter to interpret the meaning of the brand. The variation of target groups leads Zenker and Braun (2017) to propose a '*branded house strategy*' involving a shared city umbrella brand and several target group-specific sub-brands to address the complexity of different target groups, diverse place offerings and the various place associations among stakeholders and customers.

4.5 The city council and local politicians.

City branding is city politics (Braun 2011) and citizens and voters are vital for the political legitimization (Braun et al. 2013). But what is the position of the local politicians? They are described as primary stakeholders together with a number of other primary stakeholders in table 4.1 and as a target group in figure 4.2, but they play a different part too. They initiate and approve (Jørgensen 2016a) brand projects, are responsible for investments in city brand processes that are wholly or partly financed by tax money and orchestrated and managed by or in close cooperation with city administration. Projects are dependent upon lasting political support and intra-organizational resistance within the political arena may be critical to projects (Lundholt et al. 2019). Political responsibility fits neither the usual view of politicians as one of several groups of stakeholders nor the discussion of politicians as an ordinary target group. This coincides with the fact that infrastructure and landscape strategies are subject to political decisions, either with the city council as investor or as planning authority. Initiatives involving symbolic traits like culture and services are also political. In other words, city council plays a different (and more influential) role than any other part acting on the brand stage.

Without discussing the stakeholder perspective Kotler et al. (1993) took a clear position: '*under effective mayors, cities can often succeed in dramatically improving of their conditions*' and '*of course, the mayors rarely accomplish these changes single-handedly. They provide and inspire a vision, appoint agency heads and win the support of the many private sector actors whose participation is vital*'. The view is shared by Parkerson and Saunders (2005) in their study of Birmingham, where policy makers can support strategic brand programs by developing policies that underpin the brand program in the long term. A holistic strategic approach to branding and positioning the brand program close to the central decision making body will facilitate appropriate policy decisions. They see public policy impacts on a wide range of brand elements, from arts and culture to education, to safe streets, all of which are potential sources of brand equity and they find that '*The impact of the city council on brand elements is immense; it comes closest to being 'the organization' behind the brand. The city council also seems to be in the best position to manage the brand strategically*'.

The brand process is dependent on the ability to handle and manage the political structure of interests around the brand (Hornskov, 2007, Pedersen 2004, Stigel & Friman 2006), and political stability should be seen as a prerequisite for a successful campaign (Fan 2006, Youde 2009). Braun (2008) makes it clear that '*city marketing is part of urban governance and city marketing is part of the political process*', and that the '*city brand objectives should be included in the city's political priorities, programs and long-term vision*' (Braun 2011), and '*City governments cannot brand places on their own*' because '*place branding is a matter of governance in a network of actors, dependent on stakeholder input to address policy problems*'. Clearly it has implications for many different policy areas including business and education, tourism and the risk of social exclusion (Braun et al. 2017).

Zavattaro (2012) is critical to a top-down approach for place marketing, management and governance in cities and Kavaratzis and Hatch (2013) find that leadership in a brand process '*should not be thought of as the traditional, political leadership*'. They see stakeholders '*as groups that collectively produce the place*

brand under the facilitation by place brand managers’, while Braun (2011) see ‘city brand management as very much stakeholder management’. He finds that ‘Explicitly including the city branding objectives into the city’s political priorities, programs and long term vision significantly helps those responsible for the branding instead of competing as ‘outsiders’ with the city policies’. Braun et al. (2013) argue that: ‘only meaningful participation and consultation can produce a more effective and sustainable place branding strengthening the brand communication and avoiding the pitfall of developing ‘artificial’ place brands’. Their view is built on the premise that ‘residents chose their local government officials, have political power and participate in political decisions. This participation is simultaneously a right and an obligation for citizens, meaning that it is also the obligation of place authorities not only to guarantee such participation but also to provide opportunities for citizens to actively contribute to decision making’. Further that ‘communicate the brand requires local people support and assist in the process for place branding to be effectively developed’.

In their study of different roles of residents Braun et al. (2013) presuppose that place brand management is managerially isolated from political management. They find that *‘First local authorities have to explain, justify and defend their place branding-related actions against several types of political control’ and ‘place brand management urgently needs to strengthen the communication between residents and the city’s officials, as well as give more control to the residents themselves, planning for resident participation in every stage of the place branding process.’*

The same distance to the politicians is suggested by Pike (2012) in his chapter on the role of government, where political lobbying is important for destination management organizations to secure long-term funding security and influence policies. One of the lines of argument is presumably based on the assumption that place brand management is managerially isolated from citizens as well as from political management. They (Braun et al. 2013) mention that Wesselmann and Hohn (2012) see lasting and active support from political management as an essential success factor in city branding, and Trommer (2015) emphasizes the importance of charismatic and competent city management.

In her recent study on internal city branding in Bremen Rössler (2018) concludes: *‘So ist der städtischen Markenführung im Allgemeinen zu empfehlen, stets den Kontakt zur politischen Führungsspitze der Stadt wie bspw. dem Bürgermeister zu pflegen und diesen zu informieren und beraten, wie er der Stadtmärktenidentität vorleben und somit das Stadtmarkenwissen der Einwohner positiv beeinflussen kann’* and *‘dass das Vorleben der Stadtmarke sowie deren Identität durch die politische Führungsspitze der Stadt das Stadtmarkenwissen der Einwohner positiv beeinflusst’*. Still she recommends an organizational separation between the political level and the organization responsible for the city branding project.

The situation in Denmark in 2014 (Jørgensen 2016a) was the opposite. Most Danish city brand projects are managed by communication officers with direct access to and sometimes sitting next door to the mayor and/or the city manager. In the same study, Jørgensen (2016a) noted that *‘all brand objectives relate to the responsibility of mayors and politicians and lie within the frames for potential political action. Also the place development strategies are all found within areas where the council is investor, planning authority, or service provider to the public. However, one might ask if organizations, NGOs, or private companies in their own right could take action to address the challenges behind the brand objectives. The fact that they don’t do it in Denmark is perhaps the best help to understand that this is not an option’.*

In a Danish context, the city council represents the strategic level and is responsible for the strategic development of the city. *‘In the public sector the most important shareholders are the politicians (since they ‘own’ the public sector on behalf of the citizens’* (Klausen 2013). While there is a clear understanding of the differences between shareholders and stakeholders in a private company sphere, the shareholder perspective has been overlooked in city brand context (Jørgensen 2016a). The Danish mayor is elected leader of the council in the political leadership form described as committee-leader by Mouritzen and Svava (2002). The particular role of the Danish mayor has been analyzed in detail by Berg and Kjær (2005) in a

survey among all 271 Danish mayors in 2003 (before the municipal reform in 2006, response rate 79 %) and among all 1276 politicians in 80 municipalities (response rate 61 %). Several questions were related to the mayor's leadership. 91 percent of mayors and 89 % of the other politicians gave the mayor's ability to be visionary and formulate strategies for the future development of the municipality the highest priority along with *'securing good working relations within the council'*. The expectations embedded in the Danish mayor's job are thus very ambitious and inevitably include a proactive attitude confronted with the day-to-day competition. Danish mayors exercise more *'government than governance'*. The purpose of spending tax money on a non-statutory measure like branding is to compete with other cities and to strengthen and support their city – and eventually weaken the competing cities. To stay in Friedman perspective: Exercising political leadership in a shareholder perspective is to increase your city development and profit – if necessary at the expense of competing cities.

There are, however also critical voices on the political use of city branding. Frieden and Sagalyn (1990) term the mix of conference centers, markets, pedestrian streets, domed stadia, aquaria, up-market retail, concert halls and museums, *'the mayor's trophy collectio'*, and Jeong and Almeida Santos (2004) see festivals as a mean of providing a link between culture and politics and that festivals provide political power thus affecting the contested meaning of places to the degree that *'image making is power-making'*. Eisenschitz (2010) argues that *'place marketing should be regarded as a political activity that resonates with the dynamics of a particular class settlement'*. Others point to the risk of political inconsistency and instability. Parkerson and Saunders (2005) write about politicians that *'there is potential for the 'political dimension' to undermine long-term support'*, and Rössler (2018) recommends a close contact to the responsible political level, but as city marketing has to follow a long term and consistent strategy it may be jeopardized by changes in politicians and/or new political priorities and funding. Jørgensen (2016a) report how nine out of 25 cities in his study had experience with aborted branding projects due to change in political leadership, political conflicts, and a general loss of political support.

In a study of intra-organizational counter-narratives in Danish city branding Lundholt et al. (2019) found *'that mayors are aware of needs for continued political support for branding projects, but projects are nonetheless realized in spite of resistance if there is political support to it.'*

4.6 International differences

In spite of a joint nomenclature, city councils are elected and work under different conditions in different countries (Larsen 2005), while the shared title *'mayor'* refers to a job where function and political content vary significantly between countries – as does the political and economic room for maneuver in local politics in general. These significant international differences in local political reality have just recently been included in studies of reputation management, tourism and branding. In their meta-analytical review on the reputation of organizations Ali et al. (2015) stress, that one must *'exercise considerable caution when developing and managing the reputation of the organizations through the use of research evidence from various countries with different stakeholder groups and when employing diverse reputational measures'*. National differences are also an issue in the tourism industry. In a review of country classification, Vanderstraeten and Matthyssens (2008) show that *'within-country differences are deemed less significant than between country difference'* in Europe, and Grönflaten (2009), Björk and Kauppinen-Räsänen (2015) and Kornelissen and Greenacre (2018) found national differences in how information sources were interrelated, and that citizens and tourists from various countries differ in their search and use of information sources.

In a review of place branding and urban policy cases across Europe, Lucarelli (2018) identified two different governance approaches in city branding organization: (i) Branding embedded in a participatory process where citizens are seen as co-owners (Dutch cases, Eshuis and Edwards 2013) and (ii) a more performative

view where the brand regeneration process always is a matter of power and politics (Swedish cases, Lucarelli and Hallin 2017, Danish cases, Jørgensen 2016a, Lundholt et al. 2019). These cases address this empirical flaw, and add a perspective to the issue in light of the Nordic model of local governance. Several books and papers have commented upon and analyzed the Scandinavian or as later expressed “The Nordic Model” including recent books like Knutzen (2017), Bendixen et al. (2018) and Witoszek and Midttun (2018). The local political leadership in the Nordic countries has a strong tradition of consensual, corporatist style of decision making (Goldsmith and Larsen 2004), recently described by Pedersen and Kuhnle (2017) as consensual governance or by Knutzen (2017) as decentralized co-operative governance. The level of decentralization, the economic potential where the extent of municipal services and local political autonomy in Denmark are relatively greater compared to other European country (Berg and Rao 2005). It is interesting to notice that particularly the Danish cases (and to a lesser degree the Swedish cases) expressing power and politics take place in a political culture, characterized by extremely low power distance and low uncertainty avoidance (Mouritzen and Svava 2002)

In a study comparing Dutch and German brand managers Braun et al. (2017) found that Dutch and German respondents assess the conflicts among stakeholders differently. The German respondents report that conflicts among stakeholders are stimulated by an open place brand process and urban place reputation. The Dutch respondents do not see this effect. The authors believe, that a possible explanation could be that the consensual culture in the Netherlands is accompanied by a strong orientation on bargaining and dealing with conflicts, while the German political culture is accompanied by authority and a more top-down way of policy making.

4.7 Brand resistance.

Trueman et al. (2004) identified gaps in the official communication strategy in the city of Bradford, revealing conflicting messages between local government policy and different stakeholder groups. The study indicated that different stakeholders prioritized different aspects of the city, and at the same time the city did not succeed in creating positive visual evidence of change. Kavatzis (2012) argues that city branding should include bottom-up initiatives in order to reduce resistance among residents, and research generally acknowledges that city and place brands may be contested and/or take on a variety of meanings for different stakeholders (Zenker and Braun 2017), challenging the ‘official story’ (Jensen 2005).

Theoretically, brand resistance may occur as extra-organizational resistance, inter-organizational resistance, and intra-organizational resistance (Lundholt et al. 2019). There are only a limited number of studies of extra-organizational brand resistance and counter branding, and typically they are case-studies focusing on grass-root, bottom-up initiatives by local citizens. For example, Inch and Stuart (2015) interviewed local residents in Dunedin City, New Zealand (with a track record of unsuccessful city branding campaigns) and found four themes or factors leading citizens to disengagement with the city brand: Lack of brand awareness/knowledge, lack of brand identification, disapproval of local government actions, and cynical attitudes towards involvement when residents are disengaged from the city brand process. In Hamburg, citizens protested with the label ‘*Not in our name*’ against the city’s marketing activities as the successful attraction of the ‘*creative class*’ and tourists resulted in the gentrification of several city districts (Zenker and Beckmann 2012). When the organization responsible for marketing the city of Amsterdam introduced the ‘*I Amsterdam*’ brand, a group of residents responded with an ‘*I Amsterdamned*’ counter narrative (Braun et al. 2013). Recently, Vallaster et al. (2017) described how the German city Munich’s brand as an open and tolerant place was jeopardized by the refugee crisis when citizens’ collective actions co-created and eventually deconstructed the city brand.

In the Danish city Randers (locally seen as ‘the city of violence’) a municipal organized branding campaign led to a logo feud where the official branding logo (a capital R) was challenged by an alternative logo, the R with a junkie needle, beer bottles, a motor bike and dog dirt attached to it (Smidt-Jensen 2004). The anti-

branding logo was meant as a protest against what was perceived as a socially exclusive branding process by illustrating some of the 'silenced voices' and silenced issues in the city. The 'Bielefeld Conspiracy' forms a very special counter-narrative case. It relates to a running gag among internet users who state that the German city Bielefeld does not exist. This framing was generated by a student at the University of Kiel, 350 km. away in 1994 and was not a reaction to any organized branding campaign by the city, but has defined the city's reactions afterwards (Hospers 2010).

Resistance against what has been referred to as 'the official story' (Jensen 2005, 2007) has been discussed using terms such as 'brand alienation', 'brand resistance' and 'counter branding'. 'Brand alienation' is characterized by non-affiliation with the official story, while 'brand resistance' includes acts of resistance among citizens and other city stakeholders. 'Counter branding' may involve coherent and strategically orchestrated initiatives directly challenging the official brand (Jensen 2007). Particularly the introduction of urban transformations and mega-events as parts of branding strategies, have led to dramatic public resistance (Sanchez and Broudehoux 2013, Gray and Porter 2014, Maiello and Pasquinelli 2015). Conflicts and resistance may also develop in inter-organizational context between organizations involved in city brand management (Lucarelli and Giovanardi 2014). Inter-organizational resistance has attracted less attention but may also challenge a city brand process. Lucarelli and Giovanardi (2014) studied the regional brand building process of Romagna (an Italian territory belonging to four neighboring provinces). The special socio-political environment of the territory was seen as a constricting factor where local parochialism and competition from within deeply affects the branding process, and they see brand governance as a more disordered, fragmented and contested process. (Moilanen 2015) made a comparative study of 10 European cities and found nine major challenges faced by city brand managers including *'Large numbers of stakeholders with conflicting and parallel activities; conflicting opinions of key stakeholders and a lack of clear leadership'*.

Finally, Lundholt et al. (2019) identified how intra-organizational brand resistance is produced in the political arena as well as in the administrative arena within the city's organization. Brand resistance within the political arena relates to lack of political influence, lack of political ownership and identification, potential political competition, and reactions to counter-narratives among citizens. Although mayors are aware of the importance of continued political support for branding projects, the cases suggest that projects will be realized in spite of resistance if there is a political majority to take responsibility. Brand resistance among employees relates, among other things, to competition between departments and to general skepticism towards new branding initiatives. Furthermore, the high turn-over/replacement rates of politicians and staff are likely to affect organizational memory and should be taken into account when city brand initiatives are planned and executed.

In a perspective of organizational reputation, Salomonsen and Nielsen (2015) investigated the potential conflicts in the politics of reputation management in a survey sent to all 98 Danish local governments including all mayors, all chief operating officers as well as the persons responsible for strategic communication. The empirical data show *'that politicians and administrators seem to share the same interests or worldviews on reputation issues'*, for which reason the general conclusion from the survey is that reputation management is performed in practice as a 'complementary relationship' (Svara 2006) and in an *'alliance across partisan differences between politicians and the administration rather than in a process of vested conflicting interests and politics of individualistic maneuvering'*.

4.8 Concluding remarks

In the recent meta-study (Ravasi et al. 2018) see the formation of corporate reputation as a process between the focal organization and other actors, and Frandsen and Johansen (2015) has described and developed a theory of intermediaries, where *'An intermediary is an actor,... and whose primary function or mission is to mediate; that is to represent an organization and/or a specific stakeholder group, and/or to*

intervene in the relationship between them either by furthering or by impeding the interests and activities off the organization in question and/or its stakeholders in a specific situation or over time'. Frandsen and Johansen (2015) emphasize that the concept of intermediary as such is a 'relative' concept; *'that is, a concept that always will be apprehended from a specific perspective; either that of the focal organization or that of a specific stakeholder group'*.

Literature on place and city branding has not yet found a path for a systematic approach to the description of stakeholders including politicians, and has found no common ground for analysis of the relation between focal organization, intermediaries and stakeholders. Instead scientists see stakeholders in very different perspectives. Those, who are active in the political and the administrative arena, are internal, while citizens, business owners and tourist are external stakeholders. But stakeholders within the municipal geography may also be internal stakeholders compared to external stakeholders living outside the municipality. Stakeholders may be divided in primary stakeholders (with regular and stable contact) and secondary stakeholders (with a more loose contact). One study describes an instrumental hierarchy, where primary stakeholders are decision-makers in the brand process and that they carefully select secondary shareholders and utilize them as consultants. Tertiary shareholders are partially involved in the brand process and quarternary stakeholders are seen to play no part in the branding process (but may act as ambassadors for the brand).

In a private company perspective Freeman (1984) uses the concept of '*influencer*' to designate a category of extra-organizational stakeholders possessing either voting power, economic power or political power, but as pointed out by Frandsen and Johansen (2015) there is an unfinished discussion about '*influencers*' who are actually '*stakeholders without stakes*'.

In a city brand perspective wholly or partly tax financed based on political decisions, politicians do have something at stake. While it is routine to interview politicians in organizational context in Scandinavian countries like Norway and Denmark (see i.e. Berg and Kjær 2007, Frandsen and Johansen 2009, Frandsen et al. 2016, Lockert et al. 2019) politicians are rare visitors in city brand surveys as documented in a number of recent studies.

Hankinson (2010) interviewed 25 senior managers in place branding organizations, Hanna and Rowley (2012) interviewed 15 practitioners from 15 different Destination Marketing Organizations in UK, Klijn et al (2012) asked representatives from a variety of functions, differing from marketing and communication advisors to neighborhood managers, policy advisors, and city aldermen in The Netherlands – but seemingly not politicians. Maheswari et al (2014) used 14 the most senior stakeholders including 1 politician (the mayor of Liverpool), Torma et al. (2015) Bused brainstorming among experts in Hungary and Lithuania, Noronha et al (2017) conducted interviews with 15 experts in Town Center Management and Business Improvement Districts in UK, Moilanen (2015) interviewed 17 practitioners with direct responsibility for and actively engaged in city brand management in their cities in 10 different countries, Donner and Fort (2018) interviewed 13 representatives from main stakeholder groups including one regional council members (as the regional government is seen as brand owner) and Helmi et al. (2019) interviewed 39 senior-level representatives of Australia's national organizations.

Only two politicians are included in the 10 studies referred to above, and it may be difficult to find the right persons as demonstrated by Szejnberg and Giovanardi (2017) in their study of the ambiguity of consultants working with stakeholders. The consultants had great problems with finding the most relevant decision-makers in the municipal government in Rio de Janeiro. But the central perspective of the studies above is that they do not depart from the focal organization, but all apply a relative intermediary-centric position in line with Frandsen and Johansen (2015), where the intermediary concept is a '*concept that always will be apprehended from a specific perspective; either that of the focal organization or that of a specific stakeholder group*'.

The task of finding a position for politicians within this framework of 'focal' organization, intermediaries and stakeholders leads to the first research question: **'Is it possible to find a more appropriate definition of the role, local politicians play in city branding?'**

Chapter 5 Measurements and city brand equity

Measuring corporate reputation is well known and widely used. Fombrun (2007) studied corporate reputation ranking in 38 countries and found 183 different ratings, including 73 focused on workplace quality and 61 on general measures of reputation. Some systems involve a larger number of countries some are based on thousands of companies. Many methods are however questionable and Dowling (2016) points to the problem with '*defining A and measuring B*'. He proposes a combination of measures in a general estimation scale with a bipolar construct involving a score from negative to positive, a multiple estimation scale and a comparative scale. Many methods are contested due to lack of grounded subject theory or insufficient academic research (Khan and Digout 2018), and in a purely theoretical approach Pires and Trez (2018) found that the relationship between corporate reputation and performance is still an unsettled topic in the academic field. They suggest a solution by considering the judgment by stakeholders and periodical evaluations under different organizational perspectives. Bell (2016) proposes to apply corporate reputation to geographical entities, but on the other hand, realized the difficulties and differences associated with measuring both place branding and place reputation.

5.1 City brand measurements

A city brand process involves a number of steps (Prophet 2006, Hanna and Rowley 2011, Baker 2012, 2019 and others), and assessment and audit, understanding target audience and measurements are essential elements in management of the process. But this information is hardly ever presented to a broader audience or published in scientific papers. Kotler et al. (1993) were aware of the need for controlling any marketing plan but offered no strategy on monitoring, and Ashworth & Voggd (1994) note that monitoring the effectiveness in place promotion is very difficult and rarely performed in practice. Rainisto (2003) found that '*Places that set targets and measure and follow up the results are able to establish more successful place marketing practices than places without concrete targets and measuring*', but all of his success parameters relate to process, not to measurements and documentation of the impact of the brand process. In a meta-study of existing branding models, Hanna and Rowley (2011) describe brand evaluation, including audit and assessment, as the first stage in a specified place branding project, but also as a continual process in referring to processes undertaken to gather feedback on brand image and experience. However, their Strategic Place Brand Management model does not illustrate any feedback loops. Lucarelli (2012) suggests that city brand measures include qualitative, quantitative and multi-mixed methods, and Baker (2019) suggest that Brand Adoption, Community Pride and Brand Support, Co-operative Support, Customer Profiles, Customer Satisfaction, Brand Consistence, Media Coverage, Stakeholder Feedback, and Image and Attitude are among the criteria that should be monitored and evaluated.

During monitoring one should look for outputs, outcomes and impact of the brand project. The terms are often used to describe changes at different levels from the delivery of a service or a product to long-term, sustainable changes. The terminology is in common use but the terms are interpreted differently by different authors and organizations and depending on the scientific context. OECD developed a set of definitions (OECD 2010) for use in development politics, but they may also serve as a framework for the discussion of city brand measurements and city brand equity. OECD uses the following definitions:

Impact Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended.

Outcomes The likely or achieved short-term and medium-term effects of an intervention's outputs.

Outputs The products, capital goods and services which result from a development intervention; it may also include changes resulting from the intervention which are relevant to the achievement of outcomes.

Besides both impact, output and outcome may be measured in material as well as immaterial results.

In the following, a brief distinction is made between qualitative and quantitative methods, although this separation easily becomes artificial. Earlier measurements of outcomes in the form of purely quantitative line and minute counts in the mass media have evolved into far more complex analytical strategies, where the mass media and social media are both quantitatively and qualitatively analyzed, see for example Schatz and Kolmer (2010), Govers (2012, 2018), and Garcia (2017). However, it is still unclear to what extent such media outcomes will lead to impact in people's minds. In the two sections below the focus is on measurements of citizens' perceptions without being able to uncover how or where they have obtained that perception.

5.1.1 Examples of qualitative and quantitative methods

Recent studies have demonstrated a number of different qualitative analytical methods, but since questionnaires and questions differ, it is very difficult to draw more cross-sector and general conclusions from the studies as illustrated by the following examples.




Figure 4 Graphical representation of the different dimensions of the image of Granada.

Fig. 5.1 Illustration of resident's perception, Luque-Martínez et al. (2007).

Luque-Martínez et al. (2007) used nine different thematic themes to measure local citizens' impression of the Spanish city Granada, see fig. 5.1, and Zenker & Beckmann (2013) measured the brand perceptions of two different target groups living in and living outside Hamburg and illustrate how city brand perceptions differ between target groups. They propose that four dimensions could be used to establish a conceptual framework for future comparison of citizen satisfaction: Urbanity & diversity; nature & recreation, job opportunities and cost-efficiency.

Gilboa et al. (2015) identified factors that comprise a city's image (in this case Jerusalem Israel, Rome and Trieste, Italy) among residents and tourists in the three cities. Four factors identified by residents were

Municipal Facilities, Leisure, Security and Public Services while Caring, Tourism and Recreation, security, Public service and Leisure and Entertainment were identified among tourists. In other words residents and tourists shared three corresponding factors illustrating that they have similarities and differences in their perception of the cities.

In a study of city image of Hong Kong Chan & Marafa (2016) found a knowledge gap between visitors to Hong Kong and residents concerning the potential to brand Hong Kong by its green spaces, and Henninger et al (2016) saw how opinions may differ between insiders and outsiders. Outsiders had a negative impression of the historic coherence with coal and steel for the German city Essen and the English city Sheffield while the locals were proud of their industrial heritage.

Micera and Crispino (2017) analyzed the web reputation of the city destination of Naples, Italy using an online platform to listen to and analyze social media conversation in Italian and in English. The data were divided into positive, negative and indifferent sentiments around 7 thematic areas, and illustrates both the destination image and the online reputation of the city.

Cassia et al. (2018) have compared residents and tourist's perception of the same city image (Verona, Italy). They found that residents and tourists held similar perceptions except for the municipal facilities where the residents were more critical than the tourists.

Bonaiuto et al. (2019) studied city reputation indicators for two Italian cities (Rome and Cagliari) by using six focus groups with residents and non-residents to assess people's perception of a city. From a qualitative and textual analysis 12 main themes were extracted illustrating different aspects of the city reputation. These themes were then quantitatively tested and validated in a sample of inhabitants from the city Rome using a self reported questionnaire concerning their residential city. As pointed out by the authors the quantitative measurements refer to the reputation the inhabitants hold about their own city – and should be seen in a specific linguistic and cultural context (i.e., in Italy).

A classical quantitative method in product marketing is the Top-of-mind awareness (TOMA) defined by Farris et al. (2010) as: *'The first brand that comes to mind when a customer is asked an unprompted question about a category. The percentage of customers for whom a given brand is top of mind can be measured'*. While the method is routinely used in product brand surveys it is difficult to find studies where the method is used in place and city branding or in destination branding.

The functionality of the method in destination branding has been tested by Stepchenkova and Li (2014). The empirical data were obtained via a large survey of past and potential Chinese outbound tourists regarding how they view the U.S. as a destination. The results indicate that TOM brand association information may effectively capture a large portion of overall brand knowledge. TOM memory is generally assumed to represent a unique body of brand knowledge—it is the most easily retrieved portion of customers' brand memories. However, if marketers want to learn more about the niche images associated with the destination, this *'TOM only'* approach will not be valid, as the TOM response has lower richness compared to combined data. They argue that *marketers and researchers should be aware that when there are a large number of singletons and doubletons in the TOM data, most likely a fairly large number of niche images are missing in the TOM response'*.

When the TOM data are highly concentrated, favoring one or two distinct images, as was the case in their study with respect to the affective image data, the TOM may underestimate the frequencies of images ranking immediately lower the most popular ones, and that the second and third responses would have corrected for that underestimation. However, without empirical testing, this proposition shared by many scholars and practitioners remains unsubstantiated (Stepchenkova and Li 2014).




Fig. 5.2 Time - series of TOMA among citizens living outside Horsens. Data from Jørgensen (2015 and 2019).

The city Horsens has routinely used annual TOMA since 2000 among Danes living outside Horsens (see Jørgensen 2015 and 2019). The data from Horsens' include second and third responses. See study 1, chapter 7 and study 5, chapter 11 for a more elaborate description of TOMA responses. Fig. 5.2 shows a time series concerning three of the several different responses. The historic and stable cognitive awareness of an existing image (the prison in spite of closure in 2005) and the development of a new brand (music and events) are illustrated. Still a part of the Danish population simply doesn't know anything about the city (or hasn't heard of it).

5.2 Time series and longitudinal studies

Longitudinal studies and time series have rarely been reported in the tourism literature (Schultz and Schultz, 2004, Pike and Page, 2014) except for a few cases. Niedomysl (2004) made a survey among all 289 Swedish municipalities in 2002 to evaluate the success or failure in efforts to attract in-migrants based on a self-evaluation. 36 municipalities reported that they were definitely sure that they had been successful in attracting in-migrants. He found that actual migration statistics did not support this self-evaluation and that there was little evidence of any significant effects on inter-regional migration flow. In a later statistical analysis of the results for rural municipalities in particular, Niedomysl (2007) concluded that the results suggest no general evidence for a positive effect of marketing campaigns on in-migration, but in a few cases a positive impact cannot be ruled out conclusively. Tasci and Holecek (2007) reported a study of image change over time for the Michigan state based on telephone interviews with resident households in Michigan's primary tourist markets in neighboring states and Ontario/Canada in 1996, 1997, 1998, 2001 and 2002. They found statistically significant differences between the initial and later study periods for 9 out of 15 attributes. The conclusion is, however, followed by a certain reservation as *'The mean differences between image ratings of Michigan for the two time periods are very small, which one could suspect to fall within the margin of error, given the limitations of the study'*.

Herstein and Jaffe (2008) describe how marketing research is a key factor in both the diagnosis and image designing stages of the Israeli city Holon. Research was used to first determine the city's image among both residents and non-residents. Both groups viewed the city in negative terms. It was found that image could not be improved without first implementing significant changes in the city's infrastructure. '*Face lifting*' was accomplished by establishing cultural institutions mainly for children. This led to designing a brand: '*The Children's City*'. Subsequent research showed that these changes led to a significantly more positive image for the city' among citizens living in Holon and outside Holon.

Pike (2010) tried to track the effectiveness of an emerging destination's (Coral Coast, Australia) brand campaign from 2003 to 2007 using the Consumer Based Brand-Equity dimensions promoted by Aaker (1991, 1996) and Keller (1993, 2003). The key finding was that there was no change in perceived performance for the destination across the brand's performance indicators. Sainz (2012) analyzed the image of Bilbao among university students from Barcelona, Madrid and Santander ten years after the opening of the Guggenheim Museum and concluded that more than the spectacular landmark should be considered to create a new image.

According to Lemmetyinen et al. (2013) the Finnish city of Pori has a long history of event production that has positively affected the brand and contributes to the development of higher education provision in the city (Luonila and Johansson 2015). Jørgensen (2015) described how a long term brand process in the Danish city Horsens led to a significant and well documented change of image measured as 'Unaided Top of Mind Awareness' among citizens living in the rest of Denmark, and Getz and Page (2016) conclude in their meta-study on event-tourism that '*events have an image-change effect*'. But not all studies are consistent with this conclusion as demonstrated in the following examples.

Arnegger and Herz (2016) studied Azerbaijan's image in Austria (as a potential tourist source market) before and after the mega-event of the Eurovision Song Contest. They found that the nation's image improved significantly through the event, especially with young, cosmopolitan people, and it also improved even among people who did not watch the contest on TV, due to the extensive media coverage.

Community pride and sense of community reputation was increased in Maribor and among Slovenes during and at the end of the ECOS 2012 project (Fiser and Kozuh 2018), and Liu (2017) found that residents sense of place and pride was enhanced and persisted eight years after the ECOS in Liverpool in 2008.

Perceptions about the image of the city Guimaraes, Portugal, (European Capital of Culture 2012) had not changed significantly, when residents who were actively engaged in the event and only-attendees were compared before and after the event (Santos et al. 2017).

Chen et al. (2018) studied resident's perception of a recurring mass—participatory sports event (a marathon) in Hong Kong. Resident's level of involvement was a determinant of both positive and negative perception. Those who participated reported a significantly higher positive perception and significantly lower negative impact impressions than spectators and other residents.

Tasci et al. (2019) studied the Olympic Games' impact on the image of Brazil one month before and at three points (one month, three months and 13 months) after the games. They found no significant changes in destination image over time. They assume that one explanation could be that the positive stories about the Olympics had a difficult time because there was a lot of negative media coverage before and during the games. This may indicate how difficult it is to change people's perceptions positively in a world filled with negative media coverage, such as what Brazil received leading up to and during the Olympics.

In relation to destination marketing Pike (2017) studied the cognitive perception held of a competitive set of five destinations in New Zealand at two points of time over 14 years. The results indicated no change in the market position between the two samples in spite of the millions of dollars invested in campaigns. He

underlines the lack of research published about the temporality of a destinations competitive position while most studies tend to be snapshots of only one point of time. Pike et al. (2018) report a similar study of an emerging regional destination in the state of Queensland, Australia. They compare findings from a survey in 2003 and a similar survey in 2015 monitoring destination brand salience, image and resonance among residents in the state capital, Brisbane. There was little change in the market positions of the five destinations in spite of over a decade off branding marketing communications by the regional tourism organizations and their stakeholders and more recently, the mass-user generated travel content on social media.

5.2.1 Brand indexes and other indexes

Brand indexes and other indexes form a special group of time-series. Different initiatives have been developed to overcome the difficulty of comparability by creating annual indexes with qualitative and quantitative parameters and involving larger numbers of respondents in order to create benchmark and longitudinal series of data.

A well known international example is the **Anholt-GfK Roper City Brands Index** which is based on studies polling nearly 20,000 people in 20 countries each year, asking more than 40 questions about their perceptions of 50 cities. Published by GfK Roper Public Affairs & Media.

Another index is the **City RepTrak – Reputation Index**, a global survey, which ranks the world's most reputable cities based on levels of trust, esteem, admiration and respect, as well as perceptions regarding 13 attributes, grouped into three dimensions: 'Advanced Economy', 'Effective Government', and 'Appealing Environment', published by Reputation Institute. The reputation for 2018 (City RepTrak 2018) is based on 12.000 ratings from respondent somewhat or very familiar with evaluated city, (but you don't know if they are citizens there, tourists or has an alternative connection) There are 56 cities in the index, and the finding in 2018 are that: i) Fostering and developing an effective government is the most important priority for cities to attain a strong reputation foundation, ii) Cities must specifically promote safety, beauty, and leadership, which are the key attributes driving city reputation, iii) This year's pivotal switch between beauty and safety as the most important attribute is a sign of the current sociopolitical position.

As an example Copenhagen holds a grand total position as no. 3 in 2018 based on positions as #1 safest environment for residents and tourists, #2 well-developed political and legal institutions, #3 progressive policies.

Garcia and Puente (2016) have studied the link between city reputation and city performance in a sample of 78 Spanish cities with more than 100.000 inhabitants. A sample of citizens in each city (on average 116) is asked to rate their global satisfaction with their city, their city as a place to live, to work, to do business, to have fun and to visit. They are also asked the likelihood they would chose the city to live in and the social, economical, functional and physical aspects of their cities – and then rank them. The survey is supplemented with a number of analyses performed by experts involving a total of 250 parameters. This final expression of city reputation was then analyzed in relation to performance character like human capital, city size, economic activities, unemployment and net migration. Garcia and Puente (2016) find in contrast with earlier studies that a good reputation may increase or decrease the performance of cities depending on the configuration of other city characteristics and that the influence of city reputation on performance is marked by causal asymmetry.

Danish municipalities are familiar with the '*Local business Climate*' analyzed since 2010 by The Confederation of Danish Industries among member companies. The number of companies that assess their local municipality's business climate has increased from 2200 in 2010 to 7700 in 2018. The companies give their bid on how they experience, among other things consent management, traffic conditions, tax and tax level and the dialogue they have with the municipality. Corporate responses are combined with a large number of official statistical data on each individual municipality. The category '*The municipality's image*'

describes the municipality's position on questions about member satisfaction with the municipality's efforts to maintain and attract new citizens and new businesses to the municipality, and on four statistical indicators that describe the de facto success in attracting new citizens and companies. The Danish municipality Ikast - Brande has turned their win in eight of the nine years since '*Local Business Climate*' started in 2010 into the municipal brand (Jørgensen 2016a).

Anyway it is difficult to establish a clear connection between activities and initiatives taken in the individual city, and the resulting outcome and output in the index in question.

5.3 The value of a brand and brand equity.

Lucarelli (2012) found no common definition of brand equity in his meta- study on city branding, but several interpretations that promoted different models and tools for evaluation. He proposed a model for brand equity which included city brand elements, city brand measurements and city brand impact. City brand measurements include qualitative, quantitative and multi-mixed methods. From product branding Aaker (1996) suggests brand equity metrics should be sensitive enough to pick up change, be transferable across brands and reflect the construct being measured. Lucarelli (2012) suggested that city brand impact should refer to measurements of outcomes that branding efforts have on a city in 3 different categories – identity- image, socio-political and economic impact. He made no distinction between tangible and intangible metrics.

Ambler (2000) points out that many '*confuse the asset, brand equity, with what the asset is worth, the brand's valuation*' and sees value creation is a much more diffuse process focused on the value that the brand creates for a range of stakeholders. He calls this the '*total equity*' for the brand. He distinguishes the brand valuation in financial terms and the brand as an asset. He and Keller (2003) have called for a more holistic approach to the measurement of brand valuation. While value creation in a city brand project concerns profitability and growth it also includes other important parameters in the relationship between the investors (in Denmark primarily the politicians) and the society. Pike (2010) saw brand equity as the most common term used to present brand performance - measured in terms of a financial value on the corporate balance sheet, while Baker (2019) defines brand equity as the '*accumulated loyalty, awareness, and financial value of the brand that is accrued over time*'.

The lack of a common definition in city branding is parallel to the dilemma in the tourism industry where there is no commonly accepted definition of brand equity in destination marketing. Kim and Lee (2018) report 8 different definitions in classic studies on the definition of brand equity see their table 1. Four of these definitions include words relating to financial effects like '*higher revenues and margins*' (Baldinger 1990 and Kang 2001), '*cash flow*' (MacLachlan and Mulhern 1991 and Simon and Sullivan 1993) while Farguhar (1989) uses '*added value*', Aaker (1991) mentions '*value added*', Keller (1993) '*differential effect on consumer response*' and Yoo et al. (2000) mention '*differences in consumer choices*'.

Jørgensen (2015) proposed a City Brand Balance Sheet to describe a more systematic approach to measure the effect and impact in city branding from a shareholder perspective, using impact as described by Lucarelli (2012), but divided between material and immaterial impact and impact measured inside and outside the city. In this perspective value can be described, defined and measured and material and immaterial impact will form brand equity. This model was also used as a framework for the analysis of the municipal Key Performance Indicators in Jørgensen (2016b).

5.4 The documentation and monitoring dilemma

From a managerial point it is easy to agree with De Marco (1982) '*You can't control what you can't measure*' and Spitzer (2007) '*Everything is measurable in some way that is superior to not measuring at all*',

and Anselmsson and Bondesson (2013) found that *'managers of high performing brands in general measure equity to a greater extent than other managers and they focus significantly more on monitoring typical brand equity elements such as brand awareness, uniqueness, and feelings'*.

It is obviously not all about money, but investing in a city brand project means (usually and not only in Denmark) spending tax payers money on a non-obligatory initiative intended to protect or increase wealth in the local society at the expense of other cities and societies. But monitoring of output, outcome and impact from the individual projects seems to be problematic. Dinnie (2011) is very critical in his meta-study on place and city branding. He finds that there generally is a lack of measurements and documentation and most studies are qualitative and often not founded in scientific theory but bases on the personal attitude of different authors. Lucarelli (2012) conclude in his meta-study on brand equity that the evaluation and measurement of city branding is everything but consolidated, established, agreed upon and performed, while Pike (2012) found that *'little has been reported on the effectiveness of destination brand campaigns.'*

Zavattaro (2018) argue that *'Measuring the success of place branding investments remains elusive yet is vital for public sector accountability and transparency. If managers do not know why they are branding and marketing in the first place, or how those efforts are fairing, then scrutiny emerges regarding the time, effort and money spent in the first place'*. And Rössler (2018) found that *'die Effektivität der internen Markenführung von Städten ist bisher weder in der Wissenschaft ausreichend erforscht wurde noch in der Praxis etablierte Methoden zur Erfolgsmessung von städtischen Markenführungsaktivitäten existieren'*.

The evidence of how far flagship and major cultural projects contribute to a range of regeneration objectives is also contested, and *'measuring the social, economic and environmental impact attributed to the cultural element in area regeneration is problematic and the 'evidence' is seldom robust'* (Evans 2005). While Getz and Page (2016) as mentioned above found that *'events have an image-change effect'* they still conclude in their meta-study on event-tourism that *'the measurement of media effects remains a difficult problem for evaluations. Advertising-equivalence measures are predominant, with the major shortcoming of only considering quantity and content, not impact'*. In her study on the European Capital of Culture culture-led regeneration of Glasgow and Liverpool Garcia (2017) has made an in-depth media content analysis of three decades of press data. The findings led her to the assumption that *'Evidenceable and sustained change in media representations of place can be taken as tantamount to image change'*, but she found little evidence of a long-term sustained image change.

Getz and Page (2016) also find, that *'the rise of event tourism is generating a greater need for accountability, transparency, and comprehensiveness in evaluation of policies, strategies, investments and interventions'*, that *'full cost and benefit evaluations are rare, long-term evaluation, and leveraging and legacy effects is needed'* and another primary need *'is to focus attention on the bigger evaluation questions of what the event is worth, how to value events within a portfolio, and the relative value of permanent versus on-time events'*.

The lack of documentation may also force academia to rely on proxy data like Klijn et al. (2012), who analyzed data from 274 respondents from Dutch municipalities, tourist offices and different organizations involved in city marketing. In this self-evaluation respondents found that stakeholder involvement had a positive influence on the brand itself and on how professionals perceived the effect of brand effectiveness on attracting target groups. But as Klijn et al. (2012) stated: *'If we had had data about attracting target groups for each municipality, it would have been very hard to relate those to the marketing activities'*.

Without measurements marketers will simply not be able to improve over time (Stewart 2009), while Moilanen (2016) identified poor situational awareness resulting from poor monitoring as one of nine major challenges for city brand managers from seven European countries.

5.4.1 Why are data missing?

There may be several causes for this lack of documentation and data. In a study of branding practices in 12 English cities Hankinson (2001) found that most of his respondents attributed the minimal use of performance indicators to limited resources rather than the practical difficulties suggested in literature. To identify the issues of relevance to future place branding from the perspective of practitioners, Hankinson (2010) conducted an interviews with 25 senior managers in place branding organizations in the United Kingdom. Measurements and documentation strategy was not seen as a topic of relevance to future place branding. Hanna and Rowley (2012) asked 15 place brand practitioners working across 15 different geographical locations in the UK to elaborate on what they understood by '*place brand management*'. No one viewed measurement and documentation of results as part of the management issue.

Pike and Page (2014) suggest that the inter-sector position of city branding may be constrained. The constant observation from competing agencies and funding sources may develop reluctance for academic research that may prove critical and undermine arguments for further funding. Reviews and assessments may also remain confidential to the client and research into the governance, and destination marketing organizations have been limited due to the lack of access to inside information. Jørgensen (2016b) has assembled a number of specific explanatory statements for the lack of monitoring and data in Danish municipalities. They can be aggregated into three main categories: Lack of funding and political support, the uncertainty of methods, and the fact that cities and municipalities usually work in a non-scientific environment with no obligation or tradition to organize and publish data or other analytical information.

The dilemma has seemingly had little impact on practitioners. In their narrative meta-study on destination marketing Pike and Page (2014) among other things discuss performance management. They mention a number of studies that illustrate the lack of market research to monitor the outcome of marketing objectives in North America, Europe and Australia. Performance management is missing or reported ad hoc, visitor metrics are not systematically monitored, the relationship between advertizing and sales is not established in the literature, and public relations and publicity performance measurements are problematic. They highlight the lack of market research undertaken to monitor the outcome of destination marketing within the tourism industry and they find that the relationship between advertizing and sales has to be established in the marketing literature. They reflect over the political framework within individual destinations, involving competing politicians, public funding agencies and departments, bureaucratic cultures, competing entrepreneurs and different interest groups, the media and the host community. In other words, destination governance is challenged by taking place an intersection between different sectors (the private, the public and the community), (Ruhanen et. al. 2010).

Cleave and Arku (2017) have analyzed 39 different studies of impact of place branding on sense-of-place in some form. They conclude that '*there is a common thread of confusion around where the influence of place branding extends*' and that none of the examined current place branding studies are efficient. They find that '*considering efficiency (as a cost-earnings ratio) only allows each project to be evaluated within its own particular context*' and '*a study of efficiency would have to compare place management inputs with consumer decision making outcomes*'.

5.5 Concluding remarks

Corporate reputation has been measured for many years using different methods and in different contexts, but the methods are still disputed. City brand measurements have a much shorter history and is characterized by theoretical reflections on what could and should be measured where and how using qualitative, quantitative, and multimixed methods – and the noticeably lack of a systematic approach to data collection and time series in individual projects. This had led to a lack of accountability for brand projects as mentioned by Rössler (2018) and Zavattaro (2018).

Jørgensen (2016b) has pointed to a number of explanatory statements for the lack of data and data analysis in Danish brand projects, but a recent paper by Florek et al. (2019), published in *Journal of Place Management and Development* in October 2019, features a supplementary theme, the many different understandings of fundamental definitions. The paper is based on interviews with 12 experts from 8 countries in four continents. The study has in fig. 6 titled '*The understanding of the city brand concept - implications for respondents*' a description of how a city brand is understood and how it should be measured among respondents:

How city brand is understood and implication for what should be measured

Brand as communication	measuring marketing communication indicators
Brand as an image/set of associations	measuring main external associations and attributes of the brand
Brand as the identity of a place	measuring brand attributes as seen from the point of view of local residents
Brand as visual identification	examining the logo awareness among selected target groups
Brand as a determinant for 'consumer' choices/as the subject of transactions	measuring indicators related to, for example, tourism, participation in activities, investment decisions, etc.
Brand as a multiplication factor	measuring return on investment
Brand as an urban strategy/policy	resilience of the brand strategy as an indicator of its effectiveness

Chapter 5 demonstrates that there are operational methods sensitive enough to capture as well status as development in brand projects and that these methods are in daily use in other sectors. But as long as they are not applied here, city brand managers are cut off from the learning from numbers to improve and refine strategies and initiatives. Missing data is also a barrier to a more systematic approach to define the value of a city brand, the city brand equity.

Since place and city brand models have been unable to convey the fundamental need for documentation, other methods and models, traditionally used in private, public and non-profit organizations may help to close this gap and improve and structure performance management. The Balanced Scorecard is one such strategic planning and management system, originally developed within private companies (Kaplan and Norton 1992). The modern Balanced Scorecard is now used as a strategic planning framework going beyond its original focus on performance measurement and management, since moving into the non-profit and public sector organizations in the early 2000's. Government and nonprofit organizations align business activities to the vision and strategy of the organization and monitor organization performance against strategic goals (Kaplan and Norton 1996). This performance measurement framework has added strategic non-financial performance measures to traditional financial metrics to give managers and executives a more 'balanced' view of organizational performance, now as a third-generation Balanced Scorecard with the key components (Lawrie and Cobbold 2004):

The concept of Balanced Scorecard will serve as theoretical background and inspiration for the answer to the second research question: **Is it possible to propose a more systematic approach to data collection and monitoring in city brand projects?**

Chapter 6 Methodology

6.1 Introduction

This thesis is based on five published studies relating to city branding, below referred to as study 1 to 5. As mentioned in the introduction, these studies represent an iterative process where findings in one study including literature reviews and related questions lead to the next study. The consequence is that each study focuses on its own research question and that the research design has been planned according to the research question, but all research questions do somehow relate to the issues of documentation and political involvement in city branding.

Study 1 and 5 refer to single-case studies and study 4 is a multiple-case study. The scientific approach to case studies has been dealt with in detail by Yin (2018). He considers that a single-case study is an appropriate design under certain circumstances and with certain rationales – that is when the case has a critical, unusual, common, revelatory or longitudinal perspective. Studies 1 and 5 (see below) represent extremely rare longitudinal studies hardly found in branding literature, and therefore they may also be considered potential critical cases where a more detailed study may contribute to knowledge and theory building.

In a multiple-case study each case must be selected carefully (Yin 2018), so that the individual case studies either predict similar results (a literal replication) or predict contrasting results for anticipatable reasons (a theoretical replication). Study 4 (see below) involves 3 cities with different approaches to brand project development and where theory would have predicted contrasting results, but findings revealed similar results. One may criticize the small number of cases in this study, but the findings (the pre-conditional political support) support findings in study, 1, 2 and 5 while being in conflict with part of literature.

Study 2 and 3 are based on explorative surveys of Danish cities/municipalities working with city branding.

Study 1 is based on archival analysis, Top of Mind Awareness Analysis (TOMA) and the authors intimate personal knowledge (city CEO 1989-2007) of the brand process in Horsens (see also Jørgensen 2005, 2009), studies 2 and 3 involve standardized exploratory questionnaires and semi-structured face-to-face interviews conducted by the author, study 3 including some archival analysis, while study 4 is based on an interpretivist approach using a standardized explorative questionnaire involving open end questions asking for narratives and supplemented with archival studies. Study 5 combine archival analyses, a double interview based on a standardized explorative questionnaire, the city's TOMA and access to other survey data.

The author's long carrier as CEO in Horsens (service ended in 2007) and the fact that the Horsens case is a nationally well known brand project led to an early reflection whether this could interfere with the process and in any way bias the contacts and interviews. It is generally understood that confidence between interviewer and the informant is of outmost importance (Thagaard 2004, Andersen 2013), but also that the social distance between interviewer and informant is likely to be reduced, when the interview takes place in an environment well known to the scientist (Thagaard 2004). It is the author's absolute impression that no interviews were affected negatively by his Horsens connection.

First contact in study 2 and 3, were always made to the city CEO, often a former colleague, and it turned out that interviews generally were easy to organize and the interview itself easy to conduct. It was probably helpful that contacts were made through the CEO, signaling that the CEO supported the contact, but it must not be overlooked that the study was exploratory in character, and it is likely that an essential precondition for the successful process has been that there was no intention to evaluate or comment upon the individual city's project – and consequently upon the work of the individual respondent. The

interviewee was not in any way led to take a defensive position defending a slogan or regretting that there was no slogan or no data. In study 4 the author was familiar with all three mayors and two of the CEOs but in any case the CEO was used as first contact. In study 5 the chairman of the board is a former colleague from the administration in Horsens.

6.2 The individual studies

6.2.1 Study 1) 'Developing a city brand balance sheet – Using the case of Horsens, Denmark'

Jørgensen (2015)

This is a single-case study aimed at describing how a new brand – 'music and events' has influenced the image of the Danish city Horsens based on archival analysis of data collected by the city administration during the authors service in Horsens and the following years. This study is anchored in the city's time series of annual measurements of top of mind awareness (TOMA) of Horsens. Aker (1991) describes a brand name as being a 'file folder' in which all brand-related associations can be placed, and Aker (1996) suggests that brand equity metrics should be sensitive enough to pick up change, be transferable across brands and reflect the construct being measured. Keller (1993) found that the top-of-mind is the first unaided response given and therefore the most difficult for a brand to retrieve, and researchers assume that the first brand mentioned must occupy a favorable, and presumably unique, position in consumers' memories—the brand name appears to be more accessible and retrievable when the product category is given as a cue (Romaniuk & Sharp, 2004). It has been demonstrated that TOMA measured by unaided recalls is related to purchase preferences among competing brands (Axelrod 1968, Wilson 1981, Woodside and Wilson 1985). Pike (2002) consider that a tourist destination that comes to mind when a consumer considers a travel, must be a source of advantage, but there has been little research in the literature (Pike 2006). Stepchenkova and Li (2014) suggest that if the primary focus is to learn about a destination's most prominent image in large surveys, TOM brand association information may effectively capture a large portion of the overall brand knowledge. The three most common brand awareness measures are referred to as top-of mind, unaided and aided awareness (Romaniuk et al. 2017) but literature search before this thesis has not revealed other studies where TOMA has been used to monitor the development of a city brand.

In Horsens the TOMA has been carried out in 1997 and annually from 2000 and onwards missing 2005. The information has been collected by Nielsen AIM and later by AIM Create using a standardized Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing among a representatively selected segment of citizens living outside Horsens and with a sample size of 500. Respondents are asked what comes to their mind, when the interviewer says 'Horsens'. Responses are coded in a pre-coded list to ensure consistency between years, and Trine Wonsild, AIM Create, (pers. comm. 2019) has described the process of coding in this way: *'In the image surveys for Horsens, the respondents are asked to mention what comes to their mind when the interviewer says "Horsens". Practically, the coding is carried out continuously, as it is a telephone interview, during which the interviewer places the respondent's answer in the answer list he / she has available in front of him. The advantage of this is that the interviewer can ask in depth for the answer, so that the answer can be placed most correctly in the pre-coded list of possible answers. When the interviewer is in doubt - or does not have a place to place an answer, it is written literally in 'other' and these answers are coded during the data processing. Here, some answers could nevertheless be placed in the pre-coded list (when the interviewer has not been sure of this), but there are also other 'codes' where the answers can be placed under (e.g. Jutland is coded as 'city in Jutland'). The coding of this study is simple and objective. However, it is always ensured that, in the event of the uncertainty of an answer, it is held against previous years' similar answers and how it may be coded there, just as Horsens Municipality always receives data when the answers have been coded, whereby they approve/adjust to their perception. However, very few*

respondents usually change position in this process’. Authors comment as an illustration: If a respondent answers ‘the yellow,’ this is a synonym related to the local football team.

TOMA is usually used in a product context but statistics may also be relevant for the Horsens data. AIM Create provide information on the statistical uncertainty of the data. Trine Wonsild, AIM Create (pers. comm. 2019): *Using the table below, you can calculate how much statistical uncertainty is one percent. The safety limit is calculated based on the following formula, which applies subject to pure random selection.*

$$\pm 1,96\sqrt{\frac{p(100-p)}{N}}$$

In the formula, the letter "p" denotes the percentage one is interested in examining the uncertainty, and "N" denotes the size of the committee.

The table is used as follows: One knows from a market analysis based on 500 people that 35% have bought product A within the last month. You are now interested in knowing how much of the entire population can be said to have bought the product during the period in question with 95% certainty. This proportion of the population is expressed at an interval of about 35% from the sample. In the table's prediction, one chooses the percentage that corresponds to the proportion found in the sample, in this case 35%. In this horizontal line you read less than 500 people - which are in the table head - that the interval is called ± 4.2 . In the example, the proportion of the population who purchased product A within the last month would thus be 95% safe between 30.8 and 39.2 (35% ± 4.2).

Sample size Percent	100	200	300	400	500	600	700	1000	1500	2000	2500
5 or 95%	4,3	3,0	2,5	2,1	1,9	1,7	1,6	1,4	1,1	1,0	0,9
10 or 90%	5,9	4,2	3,4	2,9	2,6	2,4	2,2	1,9	1,5	1,3	1,2
15 or 85%	7,0	4,9	4,0	3,5	3,1	2,9	2,7	2,2	1,8	1,6	1,4
20 or 80%	7,8	5,5	4,5	3,9	3,5	3,2	3,0	2,5	2,0	1,8	1,6
25 or 75%	8,5	6,0	4,9	4,2	3,8	3,5	3,2	2,7	2,2	1,9	1,7
30 or 70%	8,9	6,4	5,2	4,5	4,0	3,7	3,2	2,8	2,3	2,0	1,8
35 or 65%	9,3	6,6	5,4	4,7	4,2	3,8	3,5	3,0	2,4	2,1	1,9
40 or 60%	9,6	6,8	5,5	4,8	4,3	3,9	3,6	3,0	2,5	2,2	1,9
45 or 55%	9,8	6,9	5,6	4,9	4,4	4,0	3,7	3,1	2,5	2,2	2,0
50%	9,8	6,9	5,7	4,9	4,4	4,0	3,7	3,1	2,5	2,2	2,0

6.2.2 Study 2) 'Place and city branding in Danish municipalities with focus on a political involvement and leadership'.

Jørgensen (2016a)

The main research question was to describe the national status-quo on the city and municipal branding in Denmark (in 2014) with a particular focus on political involvement and leadership. The study was planned as a survey with semi-structured personal interviews based on a standardized exploratory questionnaire, see the questionnaire below. According to the project plan all municipalities (apart from the largest cities Copenhagen and Aarhus) were contacted. A personal letter with project information was sent to the CEO asking for contact with the person responsible for any project in the municipality. It may seem a waste of CEOs' time, but as it turned out, the municipal CEO in many cases plays an important role in the project. In the case of no response to the first mail, there was a follow up by (sometimes several) phone calls and e-mails involving secretaries and other staff members. Twenty-two municipalities did not react to the different types of contact, see table 1 leading to a response rate of 77 %. The author is, however, not aware of any branding activities taking place within the municipalities not responding to the survey.

Figure Survey response from municipalities of different size.

Population size	Total number	Project dialogue	Site visit and interview	Ongoing branding project
100 - 200.000	5	5	4	3
60 – 100.000	17	17	10	7
30 – 60.000	49	41	18	11
10 – 30.000	21	11	5	4
Less than 10.000	4	-	-	-

The first project dialogue (mail or telephone contact) was used to assess the relevance of a site visit. Site visits were then used to identify the character of the municipal project and the first interview question often led to a discussion of project perspective and character. Municipalities without site visits did not have a brand project. Project dialogue with 74 municipalities led to site visits in 37 municipalities with potential brand projects to identify the character of the project. There is still a lack of consensus among scholars concerning the conceptual differences between different terms of usage of place branding, place marketing, urban marketing and place promotion (Skinner 2008; Hanna and Rowley 2008, Lucarelli and Brorström, 2013). Therefore the CEO/brand manager was asked whether he or she understood the project as a "brand image" project (Anholt, 2010), to affect the municipal reputation in the minds of its target audience within or outside the municipal borders. The question also helped to distinguish the brand project from city planning strategies, land selling activities, tourist board marketing etc. When this was clarified and confirmed the municipal project was included in the research material. Based on the interviews 25 municipalities with brand projects could be identified.

In two cases the CEO did not initially consider the project as brand projects (Bornholm and Ikast-Brandø), but after a dialogue with the CEO and a site visit, the two projects were considered de facto brand projects and included in the study.

The individual visits in the survey and the semi-structured personal interviews were carried out by the author with municipal CEOs and/or the brand responsible civil servants referred to by the CEO. Interviews lasted 1-2 hours (without voice recording), answers were noted and the completed questionnaires were afterwards sent to the interviewed for final confirmation. In some cases discussions developed outside the questionnaire, especially if there were experience with one or more aborted projects in the city. This paper deals with the information collected on brand objectives, place development strategies, financing and the character and extent of political involvement and leadership as experienced by the administration to describe the extent and character of political involvement and leadership in Danish city and municipality branding.

APPENDIX

Questionnaire for site visits

The questionnaire describes the sequence of interview questions, numbers referring to numbers in the text of the study.

The project role of the interviewed person

Has the municipality organized a brand project?

Does it have a name/slogan, logo and so on?

When was it started?

(1) What is the background for the brand project – the brand objective?

(2) Who was involved in the development of the project?

(3) What is the character of the political decision?

Did you do ex-ante analysis within the municipality?

Did you do ex-ante analysis outside the municipality?

Did you do ex-ante analysis within particular groups of people, organizations or companies?

Do you see your project perspective as image (Horsens) attraction (Billund), infrastructure (FredericiaC) or based on individuals (Odense) – or other perspectives? (Names in brackets are Danish municipalities well known for the project mentioned in the question)

(1) Do you have additional supporting place development strategies like local service innovation (Hedensted), town planning, (Ballerup), economic development (Farum) or others? (Names in brackets are Danish municipalities well known for the project in question)

(2) How is the project financed?

(3) How much and for how long and eventually with partners?

Who is the day to day manager of the project?

(1) Who do you see as ‘the owner’ of the project?

(2) Do you have external partners involved?

(3) How are the politicians involved?

How do you communicate around the project?

Who are your target groups?

Who do you see as your competitors?

Do you formulate specific targets for the project?

Have you performance measurements or defined KPIs?

How do you measure?

Do you develop time series, benchmark over time and eventually with others?

(1) How do you communicate results?

What did I forget to ask you?

6.2.3 Study 3) 'Key performance indicators in Danish place and city branding – proposal for a new brand strategy platform'.

Jørgensen (2016b)

The interview questionnaire in Jørgensen (2016a) contained questions relating to ex-ante and ex-post data collection about relation to the brand process including strategies on performance management and the use of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). Five cities reported having formulated KPIs and the research question in this paper is then to identify and analyze documented key performance indicators in the structure of the city brand balance sheet presented in Jørgensen (2015). Several informants reported on the problems with data collection and documentation leading to an embedded analysis of explanations for lack of data.

Information on KPIs was given at the interview and in printed material handed out and the author searched the five cities homepage's information on the brand projects to find eventual further information. They were evaluated and found essentially to be by the SMART criteria (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Time phased, Doran 1981) with the exception that the demand for time phased indicators are partly fulfilled in immaterial impact outside the city.

The city brand balance sheet adapted for KPIs.

City and place brand motive	Key Performance Indicators for city and place brand equity		
	1. Order - Effects	2. Order - Impact	
		Material Impact within the municipality	Material Impact outside the municipality
		Immaterial impact within the municipality	Immaterial impact outside the municipality

Questionnaire for site visits. * mark the questions of relevance for this paper.

The project role of the interviewed person

Has the municipality organized a brand project?

Does it have a name /slogan, logo, etcetera?

When was it started?

What is the background for the brand project – the brand objective?

Who was involved in the development of the project?

What is the character of the political decision?

**Did you do ex-ante analysis inside the municipality?*

**Did you do ex-ante analysis outside the municipality?*

**Did you do ex-ante analysis within particular groups of people, organizations or companies?*

Do you see your project perspective as image (Horsens) attraction (Billund), infrastructure (FredericiaC) or based on individuals (Odense) – or other perspectives? (Names in brackets are Danish municipalities well known for the project in question)

Do you have additional supporting place development strategies like local service innovation (Hedensted), town planning (Ballerup), economic development (Farum) or others? (Names in brackets are Danish municipalities well known for the project in question)

How is the project financed?

How much and for how long and eventually with partners?

Who is the day to day manager of the project?

Who do you see as “the owner” of the project?

Do you have external partners involved?

How are the politicians involved?

How do you communicate around the project?

Who are your target groups?

Who do you see as your competitors?

**Do you formulate specific targets for the project?*

**Have you performance measurements or defined KPIs?*

**How do you measure?*

**Do you develop time series, benchmark over time and eventually with others?*

How do you communicate results?

What did I forget to ask you?

6.2.4 Study 4) ‘Intra-organizational Brand Resistance and Counter narratives in city branding - a Comparative Study of three Danish Cities’.

Lundholt et al. (2019) Forthcoming

This is a multiple-case study based on an interpretive approach where empirical study aims to gain in-depth insight into the experiences and reflections of key 'insiders' in city branding projects. The study, therefore, does not seek to uncover any 'ultimate truth' about city branding projects, but tries to uncover various realities of these projects, based on key actors' meanings and understandings on social and experiential levels. The empirical material consists of six individual in-depth interviews with mayors and CEOs (in Danish) in three Danish cities (Odense, Kolding, and Horsens) as well as secondary data obtained from the city's home pages. The interviews were semi-structured and based on an identical interview guide (see appendix) for all informants consisting of questions regarding the following themes enabling exploration and in-depth discussions of the topic:

- Political ownership of the strategy
- Awareness of the strategy among stakeholders
- Communication of the strategy internal as well as external
- Resistance and counter-narratives among internal and external stakeholders

An interview team of three persons was established, authors MWL and OHJ and cand. negot. Marie Claire Andsager, and involved two persons in each interview. The interviewers and informants engaged in a formal interview with open-ended questions enabling the interviewees to freely express their views formulated in their terms. Each interview session involved two of the authors taking turns as interviewers. Interviews lasted between 60 and 90 minutes, were taped and afterwards analyzed, particularly emphasizing the recording and analysis of all examples of counter-narratives that arose during the interviews. All interviewers were well informed about the three cities. One was member of the advisory board in the project in Kolding, one had been employed in the Communication Department in Odense and the third was the former city manager in Horsens.

As mentioned in the introduction, this study aims to identify different types of counter-narratives emerging from key internal stakeholders in city branding processes and to analyze how they influence top management and political decision making. To ensure diversity and analytical generalizability of results, the selection of cases was based on a goal to both include cities with a top-down approach to city branding and cities with a bottom-up approach. To ensure the selection of relevant cases, 25 Danish city branding projects (for further information see Jørgensen 2016a) were initially analyzed using Arnstein's (1969) ladder of citizen's participation, subsequently leading the research team to pick three cities as the most relevant cases: Kolding, Odense, and Horsens.

The three cities were chosen because they all work intensively with city branding, but employ fundamentally different strategies and face very different challenges in terms of internal brand resistance. Kolding's brand motive is based on the aspiration to attract more citizens. For several years, the city has had a negative balance between people moving to Kolding and people moving away. The mayor aimed for high levels of citizen involvement in the process and more than 650 citizens took part in the process leading to the formulation of the city's new vision 'Kolding - we design life'. This vision was subsequently unanimously approved by the city council.

Odense represented a top-down process based on a decision by the council and was chosen as a case because there had been considerable political conflicts in the city council. Odense's brand motive grew from a loss of 40% of the city's industrial jobs during the international economic crisis in 2008-2009, a weakened economy, lack of self-confidence and an impression that 'nothing works in Odense' – (translated from Danish 'der går Odense i det'). In 2010 a strategy called 'New reality – New welfare' (available in

Danish on the city's homepage, www.Odense.dk) was introduced, known as New-New. The CEO described how many employees saw this as a euphemism for budget cuts and service reduction. In 2012, the council decided to pursue a revised strategy with five welfare targets and three growth targets, all based on three tracks – New welfare, Urban and mental transformation and Conditions for growth. Part of the third track was the establishment of a more visible city profile through a public-private partnership 'Odense Sport & Event'. At the same time a new slogan, ('Odense - daring for the future') was formulated.

Horsens was selected because it represents the only well-documented, long term successful Danish city brand project so far (Jørgensen 2014). Horsens' brand motive was a negative image predominantly based on strong and negative associations to the large state prison located in the city. More than half of Denmark's population related the city's name to the prison, and in the 1990s the city had a periodically stagnant or declining population. In 1998, the city council decided to invest in a branding campaign based on development and attraction of national and international events (Jørgensen 2014).

Before the final submission of the paper all respondents have read and accepted text as well as quotations without changes.

Interview guide

Intro:

- *Thank you for meeting us and have agreed to participate*
- *My name is...*
- *We are here today because you have agreed to participate in a research project in collaboration with the University of Southern Denmark. The research project is about understanding the counter-stories that circulate among a municipality's stakeholders, as well as handling it. We are interested in investigating whether increased knowledge of counter stories can strengthen the branding process.*

Form:

- *It takes approx. one hour*
- *The results will be used as research results. We will use this knowledge as a starting point for research articles.*
- *Based on our empirical data, we will return with results.*

The following interview guide is based on the narrative method that aims to identify narratives inside and outside the organization.

Questions	
<i>City branding – the vision</i>	<p>Do you want to tell about your work with the planning strategy, the basic story? How did you get started?</p> <p>Where is the goal of the work, where should it end as you see it?</p> <p>How have you been involved in the development of the basic narrative / plan strategy?</p> <p>Who has been involved?</p> <p>What do you think about it?</p>
<i>Knowledge and ownership</i>	<p>Is it important that all stakeholders (citizens, employees etc.) are aware of the transformation / basic narrative / plan strategy?</p> <p>Examples? Stories?</p> <p>Do you find that there is generally ownership of the basic narrative /</p>

	planning strategy? Examples of stories ... How have you worked to secure ownership? Political ownership? Your own ownership/Employee ownership?
<i>Target</i>	How do you measure your results? Do you celebrate successes? How do you make the goals operational? How do you / the employees make the planning strategy rational? Basic narratives?
<i>Communication</i>	How has the planning strategy / basic narratives been presented in general in the organization? How has it been accepted? What role has the City Council / Executive Board / Communications Department played? Do you find that there has been much dialogue / involvement?
<i>Resistance</i>	How have you worked with resistance from employees / citizens / companies? Examples of stories What could you have done? Do you have examples that you have changed behavior / decisions based on reactions? Do you have examples where you, despite great opposition to the plan strategy / basic narratives, have nevertheless held on to the decision?
<i>Final questions</i>	What could have been done differently? Is there something you miss?

6.2.5 Study 5) 'THE PRISON – From liability to asset in branding of the Danish city Horsens'.

Jørgensen (2019)

This study aims to present an empirical case of Nordic local place branding and heritage governance in a development context. The chapter chronicles the image regeneration of Horsens throughout the past decade and analyzes the factors influencing the political decisions behind the acquisition of the prison. One part describe the image transformation based on a longer time series of data showing the stability in cognitive evaluation of the prison element in city image, while the affective evaluation is changed during the regeneration process. Key information sources for this process are discussed. The second part will focus on political navigation through a local dispute and conflict until final decision to turn the prison into a flagship project.

This is a single-case study based on a mixed - method combination of quantitative data using the following sources:

National Aided Top of Mind Awareness analysis.

As mentioned above the city of Horsens has conducted aided TOMA analysis annually since 1997 (missing out 1998, 1999 and 2006) including the supplementary question to respondents mentioning the prison.

THE PRISON, Knowledge Analysis (Kendskabsanalyse) 2016 and 2018 (in Danish).

The author was given access to "Kendskabsanalyse 2016" and "Kendskabsanalyse 2018". The analyses are organized by THE PRISON to understand how people get to know THE PRISON and the offers from the institution. Analyses are based on elaborate questionnaires using the Analyse Danmark online DK-panel holding 30.000 citizens. Responses were collected from a web panel including 1026/1004 (2016 and 2018 respectively) representatively selected respondents at the national level and 1043/1011 representatively selected respondent from the Eastern part of Jutland at the regional level. The results are weighed according to gender, age, municipality and region to match Statistic Denmark's relative national distribution intending to give a representative picture of the population in Denmark (5,7 million) and the region (1,3 million).

Interviews with the CEO and the chairman of the board of THE PRISON.

The author carried out a semi-structured interview in April 2018 with the chairman of the board, Mr. Henning Nørbæk, and the CEO of the prison, Mrs. Astrid Søes Poulsen. The CEO was appointed in 2016, while the chairman of the board has been a cultural consultant and head of culture in the city since 1987, and has chaired the board since 2017. The interview followed a questionnaire with focus on process, strategy and narratives about THE PRISON.

The city councils signed annual budgetary agreements (Budgetaftaler) for the years 2007 – 2018 and decisions concerning the prison from the city council's protocol for the same period.

The electronic archive of the local newspaper Horsens Folkeblad

All issues of the newspaper covering 2007 were searched for letters to the editor concerning the future of the abandoned prison to find relevant keywords for a further electronic search. The words "World of Crime", Fængslet (the prison) and slottet (the castle, the local nickname for the prison) turned out to be key words and were used in an electronic survey of the newspaper from 2006 – 2011, and analyzed according to attitude to the future use of the prison.

Questionnaire for the double interview with chairman of the board Mr. Henning Nørbæk and CEO of THE PRISON Mrs. Astrid Søes Poulsen.

Questionnaire forwarded by mail in due time before the interview.

"The Prison" - from liability to asset.

The article is built around the special situation that, in the perception of the outside world, the prison is increasingly perceived as positive, primarily apparently developed from the group of "neutral / do not know", but I have to analyze a bit deeper - and the research theme is focused on whether it is possible to explain this change, which is important for the outside world's perception of Horsens.

At the interview I will be concerned with the transition from 2007 - 2013 and what has happened after the municipality's takeover

The prison was emptied in 2007 - What happened along the way to 2013?

Who did what?

What was the discussion in town?

Do you know if there was a discussion outside the city?

The municipality bought in 2013 - was there a discussion up to the purchase? Which one?

What was the formulated strategy with the purchase?

Has it changed - What is the strategy today?

What goals do the prison pursue?

Which activities are fixed?

According to which criteria are selected activities

How to reach the audience - communication strategy

Is there a strategy for documentation and analysis?

Here are the examples from the five extracts from the analysis from 2016.

When we look at the actual measurement results, what are your feelings / assessments about the citizens' changed attitude - which already starts in 2011 - preferably illustrated with examples, "stories" or data in general.

What makes a difference?

What have I forgotten?

Information on strategy, the board of directors, communication, area information etc.

Before final emission, the text has been read, and conclusions, as well as quotations have been accepted without change by the two respondents from the interview

Chapters 7 – 10

Published studies



Case Study

Developing a city brand balance sheet – Using the case of Horsens, Denmark

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served as CEO in Horsens 1989–2007. He holds a Masters Degree in Biology from Aarhus University and a Graduate Diploma in Business Administration from Copenhagen Business School. His present research interest is urban governance, impact of city branding in relation to urban governance and the involvement of citizens and volunteers in city planning. Earlier papers have been on, for example, bird migration and biology, chemical residues in bird eggs, water quality planning and development of management.

ABSTRACT After a traditional brand campaign was aborted in the late 1980s, the Danish city Horsens has, over a 10-year period, been able to change its negative image of a city dominated by a prison, to one representing culture, large events and concerts, which has been documented in annual analyses of unaided top-of-mind knowledge among people living in Denmark outside Horsens. The process was initiated by the city council and is founded on close cooperation between politicians, the municipality, private businesses and volunteers, and the project has been financed by a combination of taxpayer money and private funding. The Horsens case makes it evident that investors in the city brand process (in Horsens, the town council and private companies) act as shareholders and that there is a need for a more developed understanding of brand equity as a return on investment. The author introduces a new model for a city brand balance sheet to describe brand equity from a shareholder perspective, including return on investment with focus on impact in relation to tangible and intangible assets inside as well as outside the city.

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Keywords: brand equity; city brand balance sheet; shareholder perspective; return on investment; intangible assets; tangible assets

INTRODUCTION

During the late 1980s and early 1990s, local politicians and key CEOs of private companies complained about the image of the Danish city Horsens (population of 83 600). Horsens State Prison, the oldest (built in 1856) and one of the largest state prisons in Denmark, gave the city a 'prison image' and an alleged reputation for a high level of crime. Negative stories in national newspapers, lack of industrial development, no growth in

population and a high unemployment rate, reaching over 16 per cent in 1993, created what is often called a burning platform or 'A sense of urgency' (Kotter, 1996) – primarily among politicians.

A very thorough and professional, but traditional, brand campaign called 'Horsens Flowering' and 'Horsens is not what it used to be' was planned and implemented in the period 1984–1988 with the purpose of attracting new companies to the city. In 1988, Horsens City Council had to realize

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substantial cuts in its budget and the campaign was closed down without effect (Jørgensen, 2005).

A new image campaign was initiated in 1995 resulting in a successful and well-documented change of image, which will be dealt with shortly in this article introducing a shareholder perspective in city branding and a proposal for a city brand balance sheet to describe shareholder return on investment.

The author, who is now a student at the University of Southern Denmark, was CEO of Horsens Municipality's administration from 1989 to 2007, and has firsthand knowledge of the process including access to unpublished data and documentation.

THEORY

Brand equity

In commercial organizations there is increasing awareness of the balance sheet value of brands, referred to as brand equity. The value of a brand cannot be brought to the balance sheet unless they have been acquired for financial consideration (James, 2007). However, in literature about place and city branding, place attributes and impact from the branding process is mixed in brand equity. From the product brand equity definition by Aker (1991), Papadopoulos (2004) has proposed that place brand equity should encompass 'real and/or perceived assets and liabilities that are associated with a place and distinguishing it from others', while Baker (2007) defines brand equity as 'The accumulated loyalty, awareness and financial value of the brand over time'. In his 7A destination model, Baker (2007) suggests performance measuring including brand adoption by stakeholders, community pride and brand support, brand consistency, media coverage, stakeholder feedback and attitudes toward the place. He also refers to physical attributes (tangible) and people (intangible) brand elements in the assessment and audit component.

Gaggiotti *et al* (2008) suggests that infrastructure and industry should be seen as tangible, whereas heritage, natural environment and people should be seen as intangible attributes.

On the basis of the work of Baker (2007), Cai (2002), Gaggiotti *et al* (2008), Hankinson (2004) and Kavaratzis (2004), Hannna and Rowley (2011) divide infrastructure into tangible (infrastructure and landscape strategies) and intangible (symbolic traits such as culture and services) place attributes, but these attributes are not seen in relation to city policy and politicians.

Jacobsen (2012) finds that 'Tangible place brand attributes are linked to the possibilities of operational brand management, especially the application of marketing mix instruments. Accordingly, tangible place brand attributes include quality, impression, promotion, while intangible place brand attributes include awareness, heritage, image, personality, reputation and confidence'.

Lucarelli (2012) points out that 'there is no common definition of brand equity but several interpretations that entail different models and tools for evaluation', and, from a study of 217 articles dealing with city branding from 1990 to 2009 he proposes a brand equity model including city brand elements, city brand measurements and city brand impact. Events and activities, history and heritage, artifacts and spatial planning, process and institution and graphics, and symbols are seen as city brand elements. City brand measurements includes qualitative, quantitative and multi-mixed methods, and city brand impact refers to measurements of outcomes that branding efforts have on a city, where he finds that impact can be seen in three different categories – identity-image, socio-political and economic impact. His Table III refers to a number of measurements of city brand impact relating to identity, socio-political and economic impact without the distinction between tangible and intangible metrics, and he does not include socio-political impacts such as collaboration, social cohesion and creativity among different actors (Grangsjø von Friedrichs, 2003; Sim *et al*, 2003; Julier, 2005) in the model on brand equity.

Zenker and Martin (2011) point out that non-monetary place brand equity metrics (especially image analysis) are already common for success measurements. 'However, place

marketing practice needs an improvement in its tracking systems in order to identify central brand value drivers for each target group, and capture the complexity of a place'. They find resident satisfaction and other related concepts as commitment or identification that should be integrated into the success measurements. Pike (2012) finds that 'little has been reported on the effectiveness of destination brand campaigns', and he proposes a model for consumer-based brand equity operationalized by measuring brand awareness, associations, resonance and loyalty.

Image and image change

The formation of image has been described by Reynolds (1965) as the development of a mental construct based on a few impressions chosen from a flood of information, and place image was first defined by Hunt (1971) as the total set of impressions of a place, or an individual's overall perception. In the perspective of consumers and tourists, the image of a place is generally accepted to be based on attributes, functional consequences (or expected benefits), and the symbolic meanings or psychological characteristics consumers associate with a specific place (or service), and the image influences positioning and ultimately behavior toward other places (Anholt, 2007). Govers and Go (2009) find that 'Images are personal constructs, the sum of beliefs, ideas and impressions in the minds of individuals on the demand side'.

It is generally accepted that peoples' perceived place image is formed by two (Baloglu and McCleary, 1999) or three (Gartner, 1993) distinctly different but hierarchically interrelated components: cognitive, affective and (according to some) conative (Gartner, 1993). 'The cognitive evaluations refer to beliefs or knowledge about place attributes, whereas affective evaluation refers to feelings toward or attachment to it' (Baloglu and McCleary, 1999). The conative component, on the other hand, 'is the action component which builds on the cognitive and affective stages' (Dann, 1996).

However, since images only have a tenuous and indirect relation to fact (Reynolds, 1965), and

whether an individually perceived image is correct is not as important as what the consumer actually believes to be true (Hunt, 1975), images become more important than reality (Gallarza *et al*, 2002) and the place image projected in information space will have a great influence on the place images as perceived by consumers, or 'perception is reality' (Pike, 2012).

Gertner and Kotler (2004) point out that 'Today's marketer must look at a place's image as a major influence on investors, new residents and visitors', and they focus on the three distinct ways a place can correct a negative image: ignore it, turn negative elements into positive elements through reframing or repositioning, or adding new positive attitude-building characteristics and use communication and branding tools to disseminate the message.

Govers and Go (2009) propose a taxonomy of procedures for measuring place image based on a number of authors and they see 'assessing place image pre-visit and evaluating alternative methods for doing so' as 'major gaps in existing research'. Their taxonomy does not include the top of the mind awareness method used by Pike (2002a) to measure competitive advantage for short-break holiday destinations, and in Pike (2002b), this method is only used in five (none of which describe induced image) of the analyzed 142 papers on destination image (but with no relation to city image). Moreover, as pointed out by Hakala *et al* (2012) 'Top-of-mind awareness is not an indicator of the intention to purchase, or of an actual brand choice'.

Jacobsen (2012) considers image to be an intangible place brand attribute, but since images can be changed or developed, the resulting image will be an impact of the brand project.

Shareholder perspective

The shareholder perspective hardly occurs in city brand literature. Braun (2008) finds that 'city marketing is part of *urban governance*, and city marketing is part of the political process involving multiple stakeholders with different objectives'. However, he does not see the city representatives (the politicians) as shareholders, and the word

shareholder is not mentioned in Lucarelli (2012), Pike (2012) and Niedomysl and Jonasson (2012). The role and intention of private companies that invest capital in city brand projects is also neglected.

The level of decentralization, the economic potential and the extent of municipal services and local political autonomy in Denmark are relatively higher than in almost any other European country (Berg and Rao, 2005), but still immediate and direct comparison to the political and managerial situation in cities in other countries may be relevant.

In a Danish context, the city council represents the strategic level and is responsible for the strategic development of the city. 'In the public sector, the most important shareholders are the politicians (since they "own" the public sector on behalf of the citizens)' (Klausen, 2013).

The understanding of the specific interest and the active role of politicians, and of this political shareholder perspective in city branding, is absent in recent literature like Braun (2008, 2011, 2012), Govers and Go (2009), Hanna and Rowley (2011), Jacobsen (2012), Lucarelli (2012), Niedomysl and Jonasson (2012) and Zenker and Martin (2011) – in spite of the point of Braun (2008): 'It appears that the combination of the political responsibility for city marketing and the position of city marketing in relation to other (functional) policy areas, programs and projects is one of the most important factors'. The specific roles and options for politicians in the branding process have not been dealt with. Neither has the influence of a well-branded city on a political carrier – or whether the project fails to be a success within an election period.

On the contrary, critical attitudes toward key decision makers of a city branding process are found. Frieden and Sagalyn (1990) term the mix of conference centers, markets, pedestrian streets, domed stadia, aquaria, upmarket retail, concert halls and museums, 'the mayor's trophy collection', and Jeong and Almeida Santos (2004) see festivals as a means of providing a link between culture and politics, and that festivals provide political power, thus affecting the contested

meaning of places to the degree that 'image making is power-making'. Eisenschitz (2010) argues that 'place marketing should be regarded as political activity that resonates with the dynamics of a particular class settlement'.

According to Pike (2012) in his chapter on the role of government, political lobbying is important for destination management organizations to secure long-term funding security and influence policies. Kavaratzis and Ashworth (2008) find that the creation and promotion of place images has become part of place management and urban policy rather than of place marketing, while Skinner (2008) finds that place branding continues its links with the tourism and urban policy domain. Braun (2011) is the first author to focus fully on the fact that 'the implementation of city branding takes place in the context of urban governance', and he points out that city branding is subject for political decision making that cannot be isolated from politics, nor from administrative procedure – 'city branding is part of the political process'.

Even with the growing understanding that city branding is part of urban governance, Kavaratzis and Hatch (2013) find that leadership in a brand process 'should not be thought of as the traditional, political leadership', and they see stakeholders 'as groups that collectively produce the place brand under the facilitation by place brand managers', while Braun (2011) sees 'city brand management as very much stakeholder management'. He finds that 'Explicitly including the city branding objectives into the city's political priorities, programmes and long-term vision, significantly helps those responsible for the branding instead of competing as "outsiders" with the city policies'. There is, however, no reference to the fact that infrastructure and landscape strategies are subject to political decision, either with the city council as investor or as the planning authority – and the same goes for symbolic traits like culture and services, and that they will always be made from a shareholder perspective.

From a public management point of view, investments in a city brand process initiated by

city councils, wholly or partly financed by the taxpayer, orchestrated and managed by or in close cooperation with city administration, and being dependent upon political support and engagement, have politicians as shareholders, and the return on investment should be accountable for and found in the city brand equity.

Stakeholders and residents

Increasing attention has been paid to the importance of stakeholders, stakeholder engagement, stakeholder relations, stakeholders support and strategic interests in order to avoid stakeholder resistance (Hanna and Rowley, 2011; Gaier, 2011; Zenker and Seigis, 2012; Zenker and Beckmann, 2013). Kavaratzis (2012) concludes that effective place brands are rooted in the involvement of stakeholders, and Braun *et al* (2013) have analyzed the literature concerning the importance of residents in place branding. They argue that the existing residents should be prioritized as they form the most prominent audience for place branding. They see residents in three different roles – as an integral part of the place brand through their characteristics and behavior, as ambassadors for their place brand, and as citizens and voters. Focus is on involvement in the process, securing political legitimacy and preventing any ‘counter-branding’ campaigns.

Still, it is not clear to what degree local residents eventually take part in co-creation (Pralhad and Ramaswamy, 2000) or in participatory branding (Kavaratzis, 2012), or they eventually volunteer into a position as ‘brand partners’ (Schau *et al*, 2009). There is a need to understand how they create value in the brand process and how this value is measured and included in brand equity.

THE HORSENS CASE

Strategy and organization

With the city economy slowly recovering, the newly elected mayor decided to take a number of initiatives in 1994, including an attempt to change the city’s image. Experience from

a successful Landsstævne (the largest sports event in Denmark, which takes place every 5 years) in 1990 with 27 000 visitors, and from hosting the Europeade (largest European Festival of Folk Culture) with 3000 international dancers in 1993, the Cultural Department created and organized a European Medieval Festival in 1995, which later developed into one of the largest annual festivals in Denmark with 80 000–100 000 visitors over a period of 2 days. This led to the city council making a decision in 1996 on a future strategy for large events with a primary focus on local citizens.

In 1997, The City Public Relations Committee was set up. The committee consisted of key representatives from the city’s cultural department (who later took over the daily management of the committee), a journalist from the CEO’s office, the CEO of Business Horsens, the head of City Horsens Retail, the head of the city’s Tourist Organization, the chairman of the city’s sports association and professional communication experts who assisted for the first 3 years. In the first 2 years, the committee was chaired by the town’s CEO, the author of this article.

In 1998, the committee proposed a new strategy that was approved by the town council:

To increase the number of new citizens and new private businesses by creating a positive image.

From 2003 to 2007 the strategy was reformulated:

To strengthen the idea of Horsens as an attractive city for citizens and for the establishment of new private businesses, and to maintain and further support the positive development of the city’s image. The target groups were citizens, businesses and educational institutions already present in Horsens, Businesses and institutions in other parts of Denmark considering moving to Horsens, and citizens all over Denmark – especially students and business employees living outside the city who might consider moving to Horsens. The means were Concerts and Festivals.

The politically decided strategy led to development of a concert and event concept starting with a very intimate and successful concert

Table 1: Large events in Horsens 1992–2010

<i>Concerts in cooperation with HNT and Friends, later Horsens and Friends</i>		<i>Annual events with national and international participation, developed by Horsens Cultural Department</i>	<i>Other events</i>
Bob Dylan	2000	<i>Medieval Festival</i>	<i>Europeade (Folklore festival)</i>
Robbie Williams	2002	Since 1995, 2 days, 80 000 – 100 000 visitors	1993, 2000, 2007
Jose Carreras	2003		
Elton John	2003		
Paul McCartney (two concerts)	2004	<i>Holmboe Festival</i>	<i>The European Challenge Tour (golf)</i>
Danish leg of the Eurovision Song contest	2005, 2007, 2008	Since 2000, classical music, 3 days, 1000 – 1500 visitors	2002, 2006
Westlife	2005		<i>Giro d'Italia</i> , third stage (cycling) 2012
Alanis Morissette	2005		
Mark Knopfler	2005	<i>Horsens Theatre Festival</i>	<i>Hosting Danish Presidency of the Council of the European Union</i> (shared with Copenhagen) 2012
Roxy music	2005	Since 2001, performing arts for young audiences, 2 days, 12 000 tickets	
Katie Melua	2005		
R.E.M.	2005		
Duran Duran	2005		
Andrea Bocelli	2005	<i>Krimimessen, Horsens</i>	
Madonna	2006	Since 2001, Crime novels and authors, 2 days, now 5000 visitors	
The Rolling Stones	2006		
Dolly Parton	2007		
Mamma Mia Musical	2008		
Beach Boys	2008		
Iron Maiden	2008		
Neil Young	2008		
Blue Man Group	2008		
Judas Priest/Mega Death	2009		
Simply Red	2009		
Enrique Iglesias	2009		
Depeche Mode	2010		
AC/DC	2010		
U2 (two concerts)	2010		
Metallica	2010		

in 2000 (Bob Dylan in Horsens New Theatre with an audience of 500) and developed over the years as seen in Table 1. At the same time, the Cultural Department developed own new concepts for events, also shown in Table 1, and have, in cooperation with Horsens and Friends and local hotels, been responsible for 'Other Events', also as shown in Table 1.

The brand project has been financed by an extra tax on private businesses, as proposed by the Chairman of Business Horsens, and adopted by the city council. Funding for the musical events came partly from the aforementioned tax, and partly through funds generated by the company Horsens New Theatre and Friends.

In 2007, Horsens and Friends was established as a public limited company with an investment of €2 million, 1/3 from the city and 2/3 from 20 local private companies. Since then, up to 100

private companies have paid €8 000 annually as sponsors. Horsens and Friends is a non-profit organization aimed at arranging events for present and future citizens in Horsens.

During the process, and without any influence from Horsens, the Danish government decided in 1998 (personal communication by the former Justice Minister Mr Frank Jensen) to build a new prison in the countryside outside the city limits, name it State Prison East Jutland, and then the old prison was closed down.

The old prison is still owned by the Danish State, but in 2010 the buildings and surroundings became available for different events. An open air Metallica concert within the prison walls in 2010 had 40 000 visitors, and from 2013 the Medieval Festival took place at this venue. To support the development of musical events and other events according to Horsens' political strategy, the

city council invested in the following necessary venues:

- 2000: Lunden – Renovated open air scene with room for 3000 spectators.
- 2000: Forum Horsens (indoor), 2500 spectators for sports, 4000 for music.
- 2007: Casa Arena Stadium (soccer): 8 000 seats for soccer because the local soccer club, AC Horsens, advanced to the Superligaen, but this venue is also suitable for open air concerts with up to 25 000 spectators (like AC/DC in 2010).

Another initiative was related to the reframing and repositioning of the prison and the crime image. First of all, detailed analyses were made to reveal whether Horsens *de facto* had a high crime rate. Data covering several years documented that crime in Horsens was at a lower level than comparable cities, and when the data were systematically communicated to national and local media, the negative media discussion on the topic ended.

RESULTS

It has not been possible to get an exact overview of the total investment made by the town council in the period. An estimate based on investments in facilities and including the annual business tax amounts to some €30–40 million for the 15-year period. Information on private investments for the same period are not available.

Apart from the systematic unaided top-of-mind awareness measurement, only scattered data are available to document impact from the project, and time series are generally missing.

In the first 5 years of the project (from 1998–2003), numbers of newspaper lines and TV and radio minutes were counted and analyzed for quality, and more than 100 annual press releases were presented concerning initiatives by the city administration (not political messages) in order to support the idea of an ‘open window’ of information (Jørgensen, 2005). As soon as the concert and event concept developed, the individual concerts and events were marketed

and the city’s name would only occur as ‘in Horsens’. In a way, the city’s name became the logo. Detailed analysis of the communication is not available, but induced communication as press releases leading to autonomous communication, direct primetime TV broadcasts from concerts and events, and the organic communication from visitors and local volunteers has undoubtedly played a major role in the restructuring of the city image.

The available data on return of investment can be divided into two categories – tangible (monetary) and intangible (non-monetary) metrics.

Intangible metrics

Everybody involved in management of the project was focused on the development of the unaided top-of-mind awareness in Denmark (respondents not living in Horsens), which was measured annually using the same method (AIM AC Nielsen TeleBus*), see Table 2.

Focus has been on four themes:

★*The state prison*: The old brand champion holds its position. Numbers show that almost half the +18 population in Denmark relate the city name Horsens to the prison.

★★*Sports*: Soccer is important in Denmark. The local soccer club, AC Horsens, played in the first division (Superligaen with a lot of TV coverage) from 2005 to 2009, and again from 2010 to 2013.

★★★*Concerts, culture, festivals, museums and so on*: Show the emerging new brand champion, where concerts and culture now has reached or exceeds knowledge of the prison. Notice the long retention time from the first initiatives until impact is registered (see Table 1).

★★★★*The ‘Open window effect’*: The total unaided top-of-mind awareness about Horsens shows a general increase over the years.

The brand project has resulted in a new brand champion for Horsens, the cultural and event image parallel to the prison image. After opening the old prison for concerts and events in 2010, the AIM Nielsen TeleBus was supplemented with a question about the old prison, and whether this

Table 2: Unaided top-of-mind awareness when the city Horsens is mentioned. Respondents living outside Horsens

Statement about Horsens	1997	2000	2001	2002	2003	2005	2005	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
*State prison	47	44	50	51	43	37	43	42	45	30	33	38	40	43
Family/friends in the city	8	10	8	12	8	9	9	7	10	9	13	12	15	11
**Sports	2	5	4	4	4	6	15	6	12	13	17	22	18	16
Good retail city	2	2	0	2	1	2	1	2	2	2	2	5	5	2
Nature, the Fjord/lovely city	3	1	2	3	3	1	2	5	5	5	5	7	5	6
Criminal/boring/dark city	2	1	1	2	4	2	1	2	2	3	5	2	2	2
***Culture/concerts/museums/festivals	1	2	5	8	17	23	19	53	42	39	52	45	48	42
Educational institutions	1	0	1	2	1	2	1	1	2	1	2	3	1	2
Industry/business	3	2	2	3	3	8	5	2	10	1	5	8	3	5
Something else	17	14	7	8	10	14	9	9	17	13	30	17	27	17
****Total – 'the open window effect'	86	81	80	95	97	104	105	126	147	116	164	159	164	146
Don't know	14	16	19	15	18	13	11	6	11	11	25	15	10	15

Notes: The AIM Nielsen Telebus is a quantitative study via telephone interview of 500 people over 18 years, picked randomly over the country outside Horsens and with the necessary statistics attached to it. The method is used routinely by a number of private companies to follow image and so on. The group 'Something else' refers to statements that do not individually add up to 1 per cent in the survey. If one respondent have several top-of-mind statements they are all registered.

Table 3: UToMA, respondents mentioning the prison are asked: 'You have mentioned the prison. Is this positive or negative?'

	2010(%)	2011(%)	2012(%)	2013(%)
Positive	23	36	44	53
Negative	16	11	14	9
Neutral/not known	60	53	41	37

is considered positive or negative for the city, see Table 3.

It takes more than one event to achieve results, illustrated by two unaided top-of-mind awareness measurements – one in the same week as the Bob Dylan concert in 2000, and one 3 months later. In the first analysis, 3 per cent of the respondents mentioned that Bob Dylan played in Horsens – 3 months later, Bob Dylan was not mentioned, but one individual believed that Mark Knopfler had played there (which he actually did years later).

A similar example is found in 2012 where the city council invested €1.8 million in one stage of Giro d'Italia. All respondents in the 2012 and 2013 analysis answering 'sport', see Table 2 (18 and 16 per cent, respectively), were then asked the question: 'You have answered that you think of sport. Could you be more specific?' In 2012, 4 per cent referred to Giro d'Italia and this figure dropped to 1 per cent in 2013.

The Confederation of Danish Industry makes an annual survey of the industrial climate in Danish cities and municipalities among its local members. The overall evaluation from the local members puts Horsens in 13th place out of 98 Danish municipalities (Dansk Industri, 2013). The survey includes a number of questions about the city image, understood as local member companies evaluation of the city's ability to attract new citizens and new businesses. In 2012 and 2013, Horsens' image came second and third, respectively.

In 2005, a survey among 500 citizens in Horsens showed that 92 per cent of the respondents were satisfied with the access to culture and sports, and 77 per cent felt that the investments in culture had made them proud of living in Horsens (the late mayor Jan Trøjborg, personal communication, 2005).

The concept of concerts and events could not be accomplished without the active participation of large numbers of volunteers as described by Mr Frank Panduro, CEO of Horsens and Friends, who, in an interview in Horsens Folkeblad (the local newspaper) on 23 July 2013, mentions that ‘the concerts in Horsens would not have been possible without the volunteers (up to more than 1000 at a Bon Jovi concert in 2011)’ and by a general acceptance from citizens, since all large concerts are heard over most of the city.

Citizen may influence the affective element in image by participating and sharing information and, since 10–15 per cent of citizens living outside Horsens have friends or family in the city (Table 2), good news travel fast – as will bad news, all of which influences the cognitive elements of the image. There is no available analysis of the character of volunteer participation, and whether they feel and act as brand partners in the project.

Tangible metrics

There are two different analyses of economic turnover at events in Horsens. In relation to the R.E.M. concert in 2005 with 23 000 visitors, the city completed an analysis based on 792 interviews with randomly picked visitors (Horsens kommune, 2005). On the basis of these interviews, it was estimated that the total turnover from the concert was ca. €2.3 million, and that the share spent in Horsens before and after the concert was some €0.8 million.

The turnover in relation to the two stages of Giro d’Italia in Herning and Horsens in 2012 has been estimated by Visit Denmark (2012) (the official tourist organization of Denmark) to be more than €14 million, of which more than €5 million was spent by people from abroad – and estimated 43 000 hotel nights were related to the event. It is not possible to isolate figures concerning Horsens, but it is believed that Horsens had only a minor share of the total turnover.

The number of hotel nights could have been included, but in Eastern Jutland, the distances between hotels is so small that the hotels are part of a larger network, which makes it difficult to get a detailed overview.

Concerning the investments of the private companies, Mr Torben Busk (CEO, Business Horsens, personal communication, 2013) has stressed that member companies consider sponsorships in Horsens and Friends to be a very relevant and rewarding way of extending business contacts within, as well as outside, the city, and sees it as an opportunity to support the city.

To analyze the citizen growth rate in a city is only meaningful if time series from the city and neighboring cities and towns are available. In 2006–2012, Horsens had a higher relative net growth rate of citizens than all neighboring cities. Still, when asked (surveys in 2004 and 2008), 79 per cent of people moving to Horsens had friends or family in the town, and more than 50 per cent of the new citizens point to geographical position, work and family/friends as decisive or very decisive for their decision, whereas only 1/3 refer to cultural activities/concerts as reasons to move to Horsens kommune (2004, 2008).

Owing to the economic crisis, the unemployment rate has been growing in Horsens in recent years, and no new companies have been reported established with reference to the change of image over the period (Mr Torben Busk, CEO of Business Horsens, personal communication, 2013).

A PROPOSAL FOR A CITY BRAND BALANCE SHEET

Niedomysl and Jonasson (2012) argue that ‘competition between places for capital is the very reason for the existence of – and thus the key factor in understanding – place marketing’, a view that is only partly valid even if capital is understood in the broadest possible sense. When the authors later in the article add ‘for simplicity, our definition disregards those measures undertaken to retain capital already in place’ they miss the initiatives taken by cities like Horsens, where the intent is to change a negative image. They also underestimate the political importance of intangible assets and overlook the fact that when an increased number of city councils engage in

marketing, the first motive to start a marketing campaign will eventually be to protect the capital already in place.

In spite of the scarcity of data and the lack of more time series and benchmark, the information available from the Horsens case points to the need for a more systematic approach to key factors for success in city branding not yet dealt with in detail in literature. For example, the understanding of city councils and private companies as shareholders in strategic city development with a return on investment perspective, the interest of politicians, understanding of the difference between tangible and intangible assets and, most importantly, the problems with documenting causality in relation to the different types of impact on the city. To bring this discussion further, the author proposes a new *city brand balance sheet*, see Table 4.

The investment perspective

The model is based on the assumptions that the purpose of investing in a city brand process is to create, protect, change or develop the brand of the city, and opposite to obligatory tax financed public activities like road building, running schools and taking care of the elderly, city brand processes – however necessary they might seem – are non-obligatory investments that compete with obligatory activities in legitimacy as well as in cash. Thus the key word is *investing*, and normally investments are made solely with taxpayer money or in cooperation between public and private investors. A city brand balance sheet must contain information about the money invested in the project over time, including investments in infrastructure and specific services by different investors, and investors should be considered and treated as shareholders.

Cost for *ex ante-facto* surveys, information and communication, mobilizing shareholders and stakeholders, auditing and citizen surveys in the project are natural elements in brand investment – and not part of the brand equity.

The investor part of the scheme is considered the domain of private and political shareholders (keeping in mind that the political shareholders

will answer to stakeholder voters on Election Day), while first-order effects and second-order effects (impact) will be of interest for shareholders as well as for stakeholders.

The first-order effects

The first results to be seen in a brand project will often be line counts from newspapers, counts of minutes and seconds from radio and television, number of hits on homepages, number of people asking for more material, number of members in social networks and so on. This must all be documented, but should be seen as first order effect with an uncertain impact. Obviously, the figures are of great interest to both shareholders and stakeholders but no project should settle by just having these figures. The list of examples in Table 4 is not exhaustive.

The second-order effects – Impact

The impact from the city branding process will occur and should be measured according to the character of the asset. Some assets will be tangible in the sense that they can be measured quantitatively and directly in monetary terms – or converted into monetary terms. Other assets cannot be measured in a meaningful way or converted into money and should, therefore, be categorized as intangible.

Some of those can be measured quantitatively, while others require qualitative methods, but the results will in all cases be hard to transform to monetary terms. Especially the intangible assets related to the participation of volunteers and the attitude of citizens in general should become visible in this part of the balance sheet. The themes mentioned in the balance sheet is for illustration but not intended to be complete.

It is, however, also important to take into account that impact and brand equity should be measured inside the city as well as outside. An illustration of the importance of this perspective is the Danish competition for the venue for the European Song Contest 2014, where the cities of Herning and Århus (with a distance of 90 km between the cities) decided

Table 4: The city brand balance sheet

Investments – Shareholder perspective		Return on investment – Shareholder and stakeholder perspective	
First-order effects		Second-order effects – Impacts	
Public money spent on brand project	Estimate of readers, listeners and viewers	Intangible assets within the city	Intangible assets outside the city
Private money spent on brand project	Line counts in newspapers and magazines and so on	Feeling of ownership, city pride. Storytelling among citizens	Top-of-mind awareness and associations toward the city – The city image
Investments in architecture, service and facilities in relation to the project	Minutes and seconds on TV and in radio	Volunteers involved in the process	‘Open window’ to new initiatives from the city
Necessary ex-arte surveys to clarify baseline position	Number of visitors to Websites	Residential satisfaction	Storytelling among citizens outside the city
Costs for auditing including citizens surveys and so on during the project	Size and quality of news stories	Network building	Top ranks in national or international ratings
Mobilizing stakeholders and shareholders		Tangible assets within the city	Tangible assets outside the city
Internal and external information during the project		Population increase	Development of branch companies from parent companies
		Changes in income (tax, private company turnover and so on)	Sale of hotel nights
		New customers to private companies	Increase in employment will typically also affect neighbor cities
		Changes in employment rate	
		Ability to attract Maecenases, private and public investment funds	

to work together in an application for the event, where Århus would deliver the necessary hotels, and Herning the concert facilities. Herning is getting the brand effect, Århus the sale of hotel nights. Again, the list of examples is not complete.

Finally, the need for time series of data planned for at the beginning of a project, and the quality of benchmark data must be emphasized in order to produce reliable results.

The city brand balance sheet is intended to add to marketing potential with increased credibility. It will also add information to probably the most crucial of all questions in city brand management – the causality between process and impact. It will also highlight and possibly give dimension to the importance of the intangible assets. Marketing professionals and city administrators may fear that the economic figures in the investment line will be well above the line of tangible results. Living and working in a political world, they will realize that the value of intangible assets in this way becomes visible – and that intangible assets may have a very strong political influence and induce the necessary political legitimacy.

CONCLUSION

The analysis has shown that the Danish city of Horsens over the years 2000–2013 has been able to successfully develop a well-documented new brand champion based on culture and events, and is in the process of rebranding the old champion, the state prison, as demonstrated by annual measurements of unaided top-of-mind awareness among citizens living in Denmark outside Horsens. During the same period, the brand project has increased the level of awareness of the city in general. As strategic responsible for the city’s development, the city council has acted as shareholders, investing tax money in the brand project alone and together with local private companies, and the council has also developed and financed the necessary public structures and venues to support the project. The project has successfully lived up to the goal put forward by the city council in 1996.

Apart from the image change and economic turnover related to individual events, it is, however, very difficult to document impact from the brand project in the city. Horsens has had a relatively higher net influx of citizens than all neighboring municipalities and cities, but among newcomers more than 50 per cent tell that geographical position, work opportunities and friends and family have been decisive or very decisive for their decision to move to Horsens, while cultural activities have only been decisive for 1/3 (Horsens kommune, 2004, 2008). Large number of local volunteers have participated in the brand process, but there is no data to describe the details in relation to cooperation with volunteers and the character and degree of possible co-creation in the process.

The case shows the need for systematic and more consistent measurements reflecting development in tangible as well as intangible assets, time series and benchmark to describe possible causality and impact of a brand project. Finally, the article proposes a city brand balance sheet to ease the process of analyzing and presenting the brand equity in shareholder and stakeholder perspective.

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Original Article

Place and city branding in Danish municipalities with focus on political involvement and leadership

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ABSTRACT Place branding is increasingly used by cities and municipalities worldwide. This article seeks to give a descriptive *status quo* of this current development in Danish municipalities in 2014. In doing so, the article describes the national status on city branding in Denmark with a particular focus on political involvement and leadership. From a dialog with 72 municipalities (out of a total of 98), 38 site interviews were performed with CEOs and/or brand managers and 25 brand projects isolated. In this regard, four questions were in the focus: (i) reasons for the branding initiative; (ii) the underlying place development strategy; (iii) the issue of project ownership; and (iv) project funding. A special emphasis was given on the political leadership of those projects. Data indicates that most projects were developed in narrow political circles including mayors, councils, municipal CEOs and semi-public organizations. This is because of the reason, that Danish mayors have the political as well as the formal administrative responsibility for the municipality. Thus, the data supports the view that local mayors and politicians in a Danish context act from a *shareholder's perspective*. Differences and implications of those findings are discussed.

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INTRODUCTION

Kotler *et al* (1993), Hall and Hubbard (1998) and others describe how place marketing has become more central to cities and municipalities, with increasing budgets set aside for image construction, communication and advertising. The context in which marketing and branding

became part of today's city management was the rise of the so-called 'entrepreneurial city', an expression first used by Harvey (1989). Entrepreneurialism captures the sense in which cities are being run in a more business-like manner; however, since cities and places are political entities, city branding and marketing is the subject for political

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decision making that cannot be isolated from politics, nor from administrative procedure – as for instance, Braun (2011) pinpoints that city branding is part of the political process. Today place branding or city branding is a well-known instrument in the public sector and a growing and widespread phenomenon, although it lags behind branding in the private sector in terms of budgets, experience and general knowledge of branding as pointed out by Klijn *et al* (2012).

In the current academic debate, the phenomenon in general and underlying research questions in particular, are mostly explored by using single case studies – an approach criticized by several researchers (for example, Gertner, 2011; Zenker, 2011; Lucarelli and Brorström, 2013). As exception, literature reports only a few examples of meta-surveys of city branding and marketing in a national or regional perspective. Hankinson (2001) studied 12 cities in the United Kingdom in order to explore the roles branding plays in the marketing of these locations based on qualitative interviews with key marketing personnel. In 2002, (Niedomysl, 2004) a survey was made among all 289 Swedish municipalities (220 respondents, response rate 76 per cent) to provide an overview of the municipalities place marketing efforts and to evaluate the success or failure in the efforts to attract in-migrants based on a self-evaluation. Eshuis *et al* (2011) analyzed the bottlenecks in place marketing and their effect on attracting target groups from data collected in the Netherlands in 2010. The data were derived from a Web-based survey sent to 541 professionals and city administrators (response rate 51 per cent) involved in the marketing of cities, towns and villages (there were some 430 municipalities in the Netherlands in 2010). Klijn *et al* (2012) analyzed the same material to find the influence of stakeholder involvement on the substance, strategic choices behind the brand, and the effect of the branding process (conceptualized as attracting stakeholders). Besides these expectations, larger national-wide studies are scarce but needed.

While the Dutch and Swedish surveys both relate more to general place marketing activities

(including place branding in the Dutch survey), the present study is focusing solely on municipal/city branding based on structured personal interviews. The main research question was to describe the national *status quo* on city and municipal branding in Denmark (in 2014) with a particular focus on political involvement and leadership. This article will deal with the information collected on brand objectives, place development strategies, financing and the character and extent of political involvement and leadership as experienced by administration in order to describe the extent and character of political involvement and leadership in Danish city and municipality branding.

RESEARCH METHOD AND SURVEY

The municipal reform in Denmark in 2006 reduced the number of municipalities from 298 to 98, the largest being Copenhagen with almost 600 000 inhabitants and the smallest the island Læsø with less than 2000 residents. The average population of Danish municipalities is 57 000. Apart from Copenhagen and Frederiksberg, all Danish municipalities consist of one (or more) cities or towns surrounded by rural areas. The word municipality refers to the organizational unit while city will be used indiscriminately, since the smallest Danish city (holding a cathedral) is Maribo with 6000 citizens. Thus, municipality describes here the administrative and political entity.

According to the project plan all municipalities (apart from the largest cities Copenhagen and Aarhus) were contacted. A personal letter with project information was sent to the CEO asking for contact to the person responsible for any project in the municipality. In the case of no response to the first mail, there was a follow up by (sometimes several) phone calls and e-mails involving secretaries and other staff members. Twenty-two municipalities did not react on the different types of contact (see Table 1) leading to a response rate of 77 per cent. The author is however not aware of any branding activities taking place within the municipalities not responding to the survey.

The survey was carried out by the author as structured personal interviews with municipal CEOs and/or the brand responsible civil servants referred to by the CEO. Within the interview schedule (see Appendix), key questions related to brand objective, place development strategies, financing, political involvement and leadership, *ex-ante* and *ex-post* data and documented result, if available. Interviews lasted for 1–2 hours and the completed questionnaires were afterwards sent to the interviewed for final confirmation. In some cases, semi-structured discussions developed and notes were taken, especially if there were experience with one or more aborted brand projects in the municipality.

Selection of municipalities for site visit and interview

Academic scholars highlight conceptual differences between different terms of usage of place branding, place marketing, urban marketing and place promotion (Hanna and Rowley, 2008; Skinner, 2008; Lucarelli and Brorström, 2013), while being concerned of the inconsistency in the usage of these different concepts. Also in practice, it often remains unclear what ‘kind of’ place branding is done and if, for instance, it is just a promotional focus or including other areas as well.

Therefore, the first project dialog (mail or telephone contact) was used to assess the relevance of a site visit. Project dialog with 74 municipalities led to site visits in 37 municipalities with potential brand projects in order to identify the character of the project.

To avoid the risk of semantic blind alleys (place and city are obviously not congruent words, and the same goes for marketing and branding), a practical approach was chosen. The CEO/brand manager was asked whether he or she understood the project as a ‘brand image’ project (Anholt, 2010), with the intention to affect the municipal reputation in the minds of its target audience within or outside the municipal borders. When this was clarified and confirmed the municipal project was included in the research material. In two cases the CEO did not initially consider the project as a brand project (Bornholm and Ikast – Brande, see later), but after a dialog with the CEO, the two projects were considered *de facto* brand projects and included in Table 2. The question also helped to distinguish the brand project from other projects like city planning strategies, land selling activities, or tourist board marketing.

Interview question 1: Background for the brand project (brand objective)

Since city and municipal branding in many countries and certainly in Denmark rely on public funding it seems reasonable to get a fair understanding of the background for the brand project, the fundamental argument or arguments for spending taxpayer’s money.

Some of the proposed strategic place brand management models (such as: Hanna and Rowley, 2011) neglect this key question. Middleton (2011) has however compiled a list of different arguments

Table 1: Survey response from municipalities of different sizes

Population size	Total number	Project dialog	Site visit and interview	Ongoing branding project
100–200 000	5	5	4	3
60–100 000	17	17	10	7
30–60 000	49	41	18	11
10–30 000	21	11	5	4
Less than 10 000	4	—	—	—

Table 2: Years of project start. The survey was carried out between August 2014 and February 2015 and ended up including two new projects from 2015.

Project start	1998	2004	2006	2007	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Number of projects	1*	2	1*	1*	3	4*	4	4	3***	2**

Note: Number of stars signifies the number of municipalities with one or more earlier and aborted projects.

for establishing a city brand – in this article – labeled *brand objectives* (see also: Dinnie, 2011):

- (1) Attraction of inbound investment,
- (2) Attraction of inbound tourism,
- (3) Credibility and confidence by investors,
- (4) Increase of political influence internally and externally,
- (5) Better and more productive partnerships with other cities, private or public institutions and private sector organizations,
- (6) ‘City of origin’ effect on products or services,
- (7) Civic pride,
- (8) Planning process advantage,
- (9) Execution advantage,
- (10) Image change (not mentioned by Middleton, 2011),
- (11) Attracting citizens (not mentioned by Middleton, 2011).

In the data, it was found that a number of Danish municipalities develop their brand activities based on motives from the presented list. For instance, the need for a better national political platform is the motive behind the projects in two municipalities: (i) *The People Meeting – Denmark’s Political Festival* on the island of Bornholm inspired by *Almedalsveckan* on the Swedish island of Gotland, and (ii) Morsø with its *Culture Political Festival*. In addition, local business climate has a high priority within Danish municipalities. The Confederation of Danish Industry (Dansk Industri, 2014) organizes an annual survey among its members to measure the satisfaction with the local business climate in Danish municipalities. This survey has been carried out for 4 years now and the results have an important impact on local municipal service development. One municipality (Varde) sees a low rank in the Dansk Industry-survey as a trigger for their brand project. On the other hand, the CEO in Ikast-Brandø, top rank municipality in 3 out of the 4 years in the survey, responded to the present author at first contact: ‘We don’t have a branding project, we have a pragmatic and professional approach to our work’. But the municipal homepage and e-mails systematically display the message ‘number 1 – Most business friendly municipality in Denmark’, as does the flag waving outside the town

hall (sic). Four municipalities were concerned with their image or discrepancy between image and local reality. One city had successfully changed a negative prison image (Jørgensen, 2014), while three were in progress of changing old but not necessarily negative images into new images reflecting a new municipal reality. For other (eight) municipalities branding was a mere defensive measure either to avoid further loss of citizens or private jobs or to deal with a situation of increasing population but a negative migrant – in-migrant ratio.

The data has, however, also added new perspectives to the objectives mentioned by Middleton (2011):

- (1) *Ripe fruits falling from the sky, or golden opportunities*: New opportunities were an important trigger for five municipalities. One example is a new regional hospital in Aabenraa, rearranging health sector jobs in the region and introducing 1600 new jobs (in a town with a population of 15 000) to the hospital, inspiring the brand strategy – ‘Healthy Growth’. Another example is the international company Danish Crown who decided to build an abattoir introducing 300 new jobs in Vejen (10 000 inhabitants), leading the small town to work hard to develop a brand to attract other food industries and subcontractors to the food industry.
- (2) *Reinforce coherence within the municipality after the municipal reform*: In the municipal reform in 2006 many smaller rural municipalities were integrated with the larger nearby city, and two municipalities – the new Viborg with 95 000 inhabitants (originally six municipalities) and new Næstved with 82 000 inhabitants (originally five municipalities) – see the brand project as a way to strengthen coherence within the new geography.
- (3) *A new political beginning*: In a survey among Danish mayors and council members, Berg and Kjær (2005) found that as well mayors as council members expected the mayor to encourage new projects and develop clear visions for the municipality. In three municipalities a new mayor and a change in political majority has initiated a brand project.

During the interviews, it became evident that a number of municipalities had problematic experience from earlier projects. Nine out of 25 had been involved in one or more aborted projects. Here a change of political leadership, political conflicts, or a general loss of political support had been detrimental to the earlier projects. Several of those projects had experienced that the new council wanted to change focus or communication.

Interview questions 2: Place development strategies

The need for place development has developed since the critical comment from Harvey (1989) about the 'serial production of world trade centers, waterfront developments, post-modern shopping malls, etc'. In addition, Ashworth and Voogd (1990) suggest what they term a geographical marketing mix defined as a combination of at least the following sets of instruments: *Promotional measures, spatial-functional measures, organizational measures and financial measures*, while Kotler *et al* (1993) sees four distinct strategies for place improvement: *Design, infrastructure, basic services and attractions*. Hall and Hubbard (1998) suggest a generic entrepreneurial model of city governance including: *Advertising and promotion, large-scale physical redevelopment, public art and civic statuary, mega-events, cultural regeneration and public-private partnerships*.

In a Danish contexts place development strategies are primarily managed by the city council either as investor, as planning authority or through building permits. Besides the council is responsible for the public service in a number of areas and the municipal organization is typically the largest organization within the municipality having a strong influence on local development. Many municipalities with recent brand projects were still in the process of discussing supplementary place development strategies. It is, however, possible to identify a number of specific initiatives with a high or potentially high profile based on local political decisions and involving municipal service, the municipality as authority or as investor. They all lie within the

array of strategies already been presented in literature.

Silkeborg and Vejle included service innovation in their project, Odense had a clear strategy for welfare technology and Hedensted and Varde involved citizens in service development and municipal planning using co-creation strategies. Architecture policy and city development plans exists in all municipalities but especially Odense and Herning see them as part of the branding process. *ProjectZero A/S* is the vision for creating a Zerocarbon Sønderborg by 2029 as a venture between the municipality and four private investors while *Capital of Children Company* is a joint investment by Billund and the Lego Foundation to develop Billund into an outstanding place for children. *Horsens* has organized a cooperation (*The Horsens Alliance*) with industry and local unions where an increase in local jobs will lead to a tax reduction on industry. Another perspective is developed by Kalundborg and six local companies (including the international companies Statoil, Novo and Novozymes). They have established an association *The Kalundborg Symbiosis*, which is an industrial ecosystem where the by-product residual product of one enterprise is used as a resource by another enterprise in a closed cycle. Danish National Parks are seen as an important part of the brand process in two municipalities, *Thy National Park – Denmark's greatest wilderness* (Thisted) and *The Wadden Sea National Park* (Esbjerg). Finally, three municipalities see international cooperation as part of their brand project – Vejle in *100Resilient Cities*, Esbjerg in *World Energy Cities Partnership* and Odsherred in *Global Geopark Networks*.

Interview questions 3 and 4: Project organization and ownership

Almost all municipalities had to some degree received process assistance from professional bureaus during brand development. Politicians had participated actively in the process leading to brand formulation and decision in 21 projects, in most cases in cooperation with selected partners, normally from semi-public organizations like business and tourism councils. In Denmark local

business and tourist councils are partly or completely financed by the local municipality (see also question 5). Surprisingly compared with literature, only three municipalities involved a larger number of citizens in the brand project. The CEO and the administration were responsible for development of three projects, while a communication bureau worked alone with one. The only systematic information extractable from the material is that local tradition and relations defined the partners involved. All projects were formally initiated and launched by the council.

There are two aspects of the ownership perspective, a formal and an informal aspect. The formal aspect describes the bodies receiving and approving the annual, biannual or other systematic reporting. In 14 municipalities there was a systematic reporting to the political level, while the other municipalities were either too early in their process to have a clear reporting system or reported to bodies including politicians and external partners. In five municipalities there was no reporting. The informal aspect describes brand project 'owner' in the view of the CEO/brand manager, since the person/group may very well differ from the formal body. The answers to the question of 'ownership' have more nuances. In 12 cases, the mayor, the council or council committees were seen as owners, in seven cases it was the CEO or the Board of Directors, two cases had committees consisting of the politicians and semi-public organizations as owners, and three cases had the council and private investors as owners. Finally one case had unclear ownership. In many municipalities, the brand responsible (brand manager) was physically placed next door to the mayor or the municipal CEO, underlining the close contact between the project and the political system.

Interview question 5: Project funding

Cities spend high and increasing sums on branding. The Eurocities Questionnaire in 2005, for example, revealed from 28 responses from 12 different countries that the average city marketing budget allocated for city branding

was €400 000 per city, ranging from €130 000 to €10 million per year (Seisdedos, 2006). Jacobsen (2009) refer to information from a German source (AG Stadtmarketing, 2004), showing an average for 2004 of €2.15 per citizen in eight German cities. In this study all projects were tax financed, ranging from €1 to more than €12 per citizen. There was a great deal of variation and some municipalities had only decided on budgets for 1 or 2 years at project start. Some municipalities had a budget for special projects and a budget for routine activities. Furthermore 4 of the 25 municipalities invested in public limited companies as part of their brand strategy. *MSC A/S* is event responsible in Herning and partly owned by Herning municipality, while the event responsible in Horsens is *Horsens and Friends A/S*, established by the municipality and 15 private investors. *ProjectZero A/S* in Sønderborg and *Capital of Children Company* in Billund are mentioned above.

DISCUSSION

Main findings

Even without information from Copenhagen, Aarhus and data from 22 smaller municipalities missing, this survey is considered to give a reliable status of current city and municipality branding *status quo* in Denmark 2014. Thereby, branding is understood as creation of a 'brand image' (Anholt, 2010) and brand projects researched are chosen accordingly. Summing up, some findings and perspectives differ from or supplement existing literature and theory.

Danish municipalities work with different *brand objectives*: 'better national political platform', 'improved local business climate', 'change of negative image', 'change of image due to discrepancy between image and local reality', 'to avoid further loss of citizens or private jobs', or 'to deal with a situation of increasing population, but a negative migrant – in- migrant ratio', reaction on 'ripe fruits falling from the sky/golden opportunities', 'reinforcement of coherence within the municipality after the municipal reform', or simply 'a new political beginning'.

Especially those last three motives were not named so far in the place branding literature.

Regarding the political leadership, politicians had participated actively in the process leading to brand formulation and decision in 21 projects, in most cases in cooperation with selected partners, normally from semi-public organizations like business and tourism councils. In Denmark local business and tourist councils are partly or totally financed by the local municipality. In the data, all projects were formally initiated and launched by the council and tax paid, costing between 1 and 12 Euros/citizen annually. Fourteen of the 25 municipalities had organized reporting systems and all reported to the politician, annually, biannually or more often. The question of 'ownership' led to a high variance in answers. In 12 cases, the mayor, the council or council committees were seen as owners, in seven cases it was the CEO or the Board of Directors, two cases had committees consisting of the politicians and semi-public organizations as owners, and three cases had the council and private investors as owners. One case had unclear ownership.

Many municipalities with recent brand projects were still in the process of discussing supplementary place development strategies. It is, however, possible to identify a number of specific initiatives on political decisions and involving municipal service, the municipality as authority or as investor. They all lie within the array of strategies already presented in literature like service innovation, welfare technology, citizen co-creation of service, architecture policy. Cooperation with private companies on society issues like *Project Zero A/S* (a vision for creating a Zerocarbon Sønderborg by 2029), *Capital of Children Company* (a joint investment to develop Billund into an outstanding place for children), *The Horsens Alliance* (with industry and local unions to increase the number of local jobs) and *The Kalundborg Symbiosis* (as an industrial ecosystem where the by-product residual product of one enterprise is used as a resource by another enterprise in a closed cycle). Danish National Parks are seen as an important part of the brand process in two municipalities and three municipalities see international cooperation as part of their brand

project – *100 Resilient Cities*, *World Energy Cities Partnership* and *Global Geopark Networks*.

Political leadership and the role of politicians

In literature, there are different notions of the role of local politicians and mayors in city branding and it was an important part of the research question to look into the character of political participation. Some authors present a critical perspective on politicians: Frieden and Sagalyn (1990) term the mix of conference centers, markets, pedestrian streets, domed stadia, aquaria, up market retail, concert halls and museums, 'the mayor's trophy collection', while (Jessop, 1998) in his discussion on the entrepreneurial city finds that place marketing has become more central to cities, with increasing budgets set aside for image construction and advertising but sometimes this involves little more than a search for electoral and political legitimacy by identifying local notables with flagship projects. Jeong and Almeida Santos (2004) see festivals as a means of providing a link between culture and politics, and that festivals provide political power, thus affecting the contested meaning of places to the degree that 'image making is power-making'. A contrasting point of view is taken by Kotler *et al* (1993, p. 41), referring to known examples they find that 'under effective mayors, cities can often succeed in dramatically improving of their conditions' and 'of course, the mayors rarely accomplish these changes single-handedly. They provide and inspire a vision, appoint agency heads and win the support of the many private sector actors whose participation is vital'. Also Braun (2011) points to the need for inclusion of the city branding objectives into the city's political priorities, programs and long-term vision, but on the other hand Kavaratzis and Hatch (2013) do not see leadership in a brand process as political leadership.

To illustrate this political reality Klausen (2014) describe local politicians as the most important shareholders in the development of a city, since they act as 'owners' of the public sector on behalf of the citizens. Shareholders as a concept refers to Friedman's (1962) definition: 'there is one and

only one social responsibility of business – to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it (...) engages in open and free competition, without deception or fraud'. In a narrow understanding of Friedman's definition Klausen's point of view may seem out of place since a city or municipality is tax financed. Any profit will be used to reduce taxes or increase service to the citizens – there is no third alternative (except deception and fraud). Still, the concept pinpoints the key issue of responsibility and leadership by local politicians.

The institutional context of local government in Denmark differs from almost all other countries and the degree of decentralization from state level to the municipal level, the economic potential and the extent of municipal services and local political autonomy in Denmark is higher than in any other country (Berg and Rao, 2005). Sixty per cent of the national economy in Denmark is managed by city and town councils.

It is also relevant to remember that in spite of the common title 'mayor', the function and political content vary significantly between countries – as does the political and economic room for maneuver in local politics in general. These international differences in local political reality is not considered in meta-analysis like Hanna and Rowley (2008, 2011), Gertner (2011) and Lucarelli and Brorström (2013) and may be an important explanation for seemingly contradicting points of view. The particular role of the Danish mayor has been analyzed in detail by Berg and Kjær (2005) in a survey among all 271 Danish mayors in 2003 (before the municipal reform in 2006, response rate 79 per cent) and among all 1276 politicians in 80 municipalities (response rate 61). A number of questions were related to the mayor's leadership. Ninety-one per cent of mayors and 89 per cent of the other politicians gave the mayor's ability to be visionary and formulate strategies for the future development of the municipality the highest priority along with 'securing good working relations within the council'. The analysis leads Berg and Kjær (2005) to a number of more general conclusions, one of which is that 'mayors exercise more government than governance'.

The expectations embedded in the Danish mayor's job are very ambitious and inevitably include a proactive attitude confronted with the day-to-day competition. Tax money are spent on a non statutory measure like branding in order to compete with other cities to strengthen and support their own city – and eventually weaken the competing cities. To stay in Friedman perspective: Exercising political leadership in a shareholder perspective is to increase your city development and profit – if necessary at the expense of competing cities.

In the cases analyzed here all brand objectives relate to the responsibility of mayors and politicians and lie within the frames for potential action. Municipalities that did not participate in the survey may meet the same challenges but have decided not to use the brand instrument. Also the place development strategies are all found within areas where the council is either investor planning authority or service provider to the public. However, one might ask if organizations, NGOs or private companies in their own right could take action to address the challenges behind the brand objectives. The fact that they do not do it in Denmark is perhaps the best help to understand that this is not an option. Finally, it should be mentioned that change of political leadership political conflict or general loss of political support has been detrimental to earlier projects in nine municipalities.

CONCLUSION

At least in Denmark, brand projects are developed and decided upon by mayors and the council or in close circles involving administration and semi-public organizations like business committees and tourist committees. Selected private companies and larger groups of citizens were only rarely involved in the process. Projects are managed by communication officers (or in smaller municipalities the CEO) with direct access to and sometimes sitting literally speaking next door to the mayor and/or the CEO. Annual or more frequent status reports are presented to the council, and council committees and brand responsible typically see the politicians (or the CEO) as

'project owners'. This intimate relationship with the political system also means a high sensitivity in relation to 4-year election periods and change of political leadership. General political conflict or lack of political support may also be detrimental to the projects as experienced in at some municipalities. Thus, the comprehensive understanding of the situation in Denmark is that mayors and local councils play a crucial role in city branding exercising their responsibility as shareholders for the city's development as they deliver political legitimacy for tax spending, political leadership and participation.

From a scientific point of view, it would be relevant to get a better understanding of the motivation for and character of the political involvement in brand projects – what are the drivers of their engagement and priorities in material and immaterial dimensions? The four examples of cooperation with private companies in public limited companies (Billund, Herning, Horsens and Sønderborg), as well as the environmental protection case in Kalundborg, represent interesting cases in this regards. Future research would be valuable to understand commercial as well as non-commercial strategies behind private company investments of this type. The same goes for analysis of output and outcome in material and immaterial dimensions and the potential influence and impact from private company experience into municipal brand processes.

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APPENDIX

Questionnaire for site visits

The questionnaire describes the sequence of interview questions, numbers referring to numbers in the text above.

The project role of the interviewed person
Has the municipality organized a brand project?
Does it have a name/slogan, logo and so on?
When was it started?

- (1) What is the background for the brand project – the brand objective?
- (2) Who were involved in development of the project?
- (3) What is the character of the political decision?

Did you do *ex-ante* analysis within the municipality?

Did you do *ex-ante* analysis outside the municipality?

Did you do *ex-ante* analysis within particular groups of people, organizations or companies?

Do you see your project perspective as image (Horsens) attraction (Billund), infrastructure (FredericiaC) or based on individuals (Odense) – or other perspectives? (Names in brackets are Danish municipalities well known for the project in question)

- (1) Do you have additional supporting place development strategies like local service innovation (Hedensted), town planning (Ballerup), economic development (Farum) or others? (Names in brackets are Danish municipalities well known for the project in question)
- (2) How is the project financed?
- (3) How much and for how long and eventually with partners?

Who is the day to day manager of the project?

- (1) Who do you see as 'the owner' of the project?
- (2) Do you have external partners involved?
- (3) How are the politicians involved?

How do you communicate around the project?

Who are your target groups?

Who do you see as your competitors?

Do you formulate specific targets for the project?

Have you performance measurements or defined KPIs?

How do you measure?

Do you develop time series, benchmark over time and eventually with others?

- (1) How do you communicate results?

What did I forget to ask you?



Case Study

Key performance indicators in Danish place and city branding – Proposal for a new brand strategy platform

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served as CEO in Horsens, Denmark in 1989–2007. He holds a Masters Degree in Biology from Aarhus University and a Graduate Diploma in Business Administration from Copenhagen Business School. His present research interest is urban governance, impact of city branding in relation to urban governance and the involvement of citizens and volunteers in city planning. Earlier papers have been on, for example, bird migration and biology, chemical residues in bird eggs, water quality planning, and development of management.

ABSTRACT The primary aim of this paper is to identify and analyze municipal performance strategies in Danish place and city branding and as a second aim also to analyze explanatory statements for the lack of data. Five municipalities had a performance management strategy with target setting and KPIs related to brand motives. KPIs were consistent with SMART criteria and directly related to brand motives. All first order indicators related to media and social media. Indicators relating to material impact within the municipality relied on available public statistics. Indicators for immaterial impact within or outside the municipality all require specific analysis.

The explanatory statements can be aggregated into three main categories: Lack of funding and political support, uncertainty of methods, and the failing obligation for cities and municipalities to organize and publish data or other analytical information.

Finally the aim is to propose a Brand Strategy Platform to support place and city brand investors in a more systematic approach to performance management.

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Keywords: KPIs in place and city branding; performance management; brand motives; brand strategy platform; balanced scorecards; city brand balance sheet

INTRODUCTION

New Public Management performance management and evaluation increases emphasis on improving organizational performance, defining organizational goals, setting performance targets, and subsequently holding responsible parties accountable to such targets, based on an evaluation of their measured performance achievements (Nielsen, 2014).

This development has not yet established a solid ground in place and city branding where the lack of hard data and documentation of effects is a well-known and often repeated issue – together with the lack of data-driven model development and theory building (Dinnie, 2008; Hankinsson, 2001, 2010; Niedomysl, 2004; Pike, 2012). But as place and city branding is part of urban governance (Braun, 2008) it must view itself as an

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integrated management tool (Ashworth and Voogd, 1994). As part of the political process (Braun, 2011) being partly or fully financed with taxpayers' money it increases the call for evidence-based measurement and documentation of impact, bringing into focus the efficient and effective use of taxpayers' money as pointed out by Jacobsen (2009) and Zenker and Martin (2011).

The classical problems with evidence-based evaluation of urban policy and practice still persists (Harrison, 2000). Lucarelli (2012) concluded in his meta-study on brand equity that the evaluation and measurement of city branding is everything but consolidated, established, agreed upon, and performed.

The gap between the growing demand to see documented performance measurements of tax-funded brand projects and the failing capability to find and agree upon strategies and methods is therefore increasing.

In a research project concerning status quo of city and municipal branding in Denmark with a particular focus on political involvement and leadership (Jørgensen, 2015), information was obtained about municipal performance management strategies and explanatory statements if strategies and data were missing. The primary aim of this paper is to identify and analyze documented performance strategies but as a second aim also to analyze explanatory statements for the lack of data. Finally, the data analysis has led to proposal of a model to support the strategic approach to performance management based on brand motive and brand equity in the framework of third-generation balanced scorecards.

MEASUREMENTS IN PLACE AND CITY BRAND MODELS AND THEORY

The importance of established standards is one of the lessons marketers can learn from the quality movement since standards are necessary as the basis for actions, accountability, and improvement (Stewart, 2008). It is also hard to disagree with DeMarco (1982) "You can't control what you

can't measure" and Spitzer (2007) "Everything is measurable in some way that is superior to not measuring at all." Without measurements, marketers will simply not be able to improve over time (Stewart, 2009). Even accepting the unique elements of development and innovation in each place brand project, there is a common demand for target setting and evaluation strategies to document accountability and performance over time. In fact, one of the greatest lessons learnt from the quality movement is that improvement over time requires systematic measurements and documentation.

Kotler et al. (1993) were already aware of the need for controlling any marketing plan. But they offered no strategy on how to monitor brand strategy in order to measure and document results. Ashworth and Voogd (1994) argue that monitoring the effectiveness in place promotion is very difficult and rarely performed in practice.

In spite of Proposition 12 in Rainisto (2003) "Places that set targets and measure and follow up the results are able to establish more successful place marketing practices than places without concrete targets and measuring," all of his success parameters relate to process – Planning group, Vision and Strategic Analysis, Place Identity and Place Image, Public Private Partnership, Political Unity, Global Marketing and Local Development, Process Coincidences and Leadership – not to measurements and documentation of the impact of the brand process. In a meta-study of existing branding models, Hanna and Rowley (2011) proposed a Strategic Place Brand-Management model, including Brand Evaluation at the initial stages of a brand process. They describe Brand Evaluation, including audit and assessment, as the first stage in a specified place branding project, but also as a continual process in referring to processes undertaken to gather feedback on brand image and experience. However, their Strategic Place Brand-Management model does not illustrate any feedback loops.

Baker (2011) differentiates clearly between "Assessment and Audit" and "Action and



Afterwards.” In his 7A Destination Branding Model, “Assessment and Audit” is the initial step relating to target audiences; while “Action and afterwards” includes brand-relevant indicators and criteria used to evaluate brands. Correlation and coherence between ex-ante and ex-post measurements is however unclear.

This dilemma is recognized among practitioners. To identify the issues of relevance to future place branding from the perspective of practitioners, Hankinsson (2010) conducted interviews with 25 senior managers in place branding organizations in the United Kingdom. The managers addressed the problems of funding the place brand’s development and roll out, but measurements and documentation strategy is not stated as a topic of relevance to future place branding.

Hanna and Rowley (2012) asked 15 place brand practitioners working across 15 different geographical locations in the UK, in various destination management organizations to elaborate on what they understood by “place brand management.” Apparently, none viewed measurement and documentation of results as part of the management issue.

Several analyses at meta-level conclude that the results of branding projects are unclear or uncertain – if not simply missing. In a study of branding practices in 12 English cities, Hankinson (2001) found that “collection of data relating to branding was more frequently associated with market research prior to the formulation of a strategy than with the construction of performance indicators to measure the success of the strategy.” Most of his respondents attributed the minimal use of performance indicators to limited resources rather than the practical difficulties suggested in literature.

Niedomysl (2004) made a survey among all 289 Swedish municipalities in, 2002 (220 respondents, response rate 76 %) to evaluate the success or failure in efforts to attract in-migrants based on a self-evaluation. 36 municipalities reported that they were definitely sure that they had been successful in attracting in-migrants. He found that actual migration statistics did not support this self-evaluation and that there was little evidence of

any significant effects on inter-regional migration flow. In a later statistical analysis of the results for rural municipalities in particular, Niedomysl (2007) concluded that the results suggest no general evidence for a positive effect of marketing campaigns on in-migration, but in a few cases a positive impact cannot be ruled out conclusively.

The dilemma still exists. Klijn et al. (2012) analyzed data from 274 respondents from Dutch municipalities, tourist offices, and different organizations involved in city marketing, and found that stakeholder involvement had a positive influence on the brand itself and how professionals perceived the effect of brand effectiveness on attracting target groups. But they also stated that it does not measure ‘hard’ objective effects. “If we had had data about attracting target groups for each municipality, it would have been very hard to relate those to the marketing activities.”

Pike (2010) tried to track the effectiveness of an emerging destination’s (Coral Coast, Australia) brand campaign from 2003 to 2007 using the Consumer-Based Brand-Equity dimensions promoted by Aaker (1991, 1996) and Keller (1993, 2003). The key finding was that there was no change in perceived performance for the destination across the brand’s performance indicators.

On the other hand, Jørgensen (2014) described how a long-term brand process in the Danish city

Table 1: Brand objectives as compiled by Middleton (2011) and Jørgensen (2015)

- (1) Attraction of inbound investment
- (2) Attraction of inbound tourism
- (3) Credibility and confidence of investors
- (4) Increase of political influence internally and externally
- (5) Better and more productive partnerships with other cities, private or public institutions and private sector organizations
- (6) “City of origin” effect on products or services
- (7) Civic pride
- (8) Planning process advantage
- (9) Execution advantage
- (10) Image change
- (11) Attracting citizens
- (12) “Ripe fruit falling from the sky,” or “golden opportunities”
- (13) Reinforce coherence within the municipality after the municipal reform
- (14) A new political beginning

Horsens led to a significant and well-documented change of image measured as ‘Unaided Top of Mind Awareness’ among citizens living in the rest of Denmark.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF BRAND MOTIVES

Hanna and Rowley (2012) propose a holistic strategic place brand-management model following a meta-study on different place branding concepts and models but they do not include or consider the relevance and importance of brand motives. Different brand motives involve a number of different target groups and these target groups will require different strategies and methods to create a brand – as illustrated by the list of brand motives in Table 1, taken from the compiled list by Middleton (2011) labeled *brand objectives* (see also: Dinnie, 2011) and supplemented by Jørgensen (2015). Time perspectives may differ and in some cases focus has to be on data and factual information while other target groups can be approached using narratives appealing to demand and emotional responses. As Zenker and Martin (2011) pointed out, place marketing practice needs an improvement in its tracking systems in order to identify central brand value drivers for each target group.

The dominant models of place and city branding have a strong focus on process and stakeholder involvement while the brand motive usually is more or less implicit. With so many optional brand motives, the need for a more strategic initial discussion on motive becomes imperative, and as a natural consequence, this discussion may produce a more stringent approach to performance management and measurement in relation to the different target groups.

THE VALUE OF A BRAND; BRAND EQUITY

Place and city branding is an investment intended to create value – to the stakeholders (everyone involved in or influenced by the project) and to the shareholders (the investors – in a Danish context typically municipal councils). And the

created value must be measured and related to the investment. In business value, creation is usually simply viewed as profitability and long-term growth; while value creation in a city also concerns profitability and growth, it also includes other important parameters in the relationship between the investors (the politicians) and the society. Value may occur in material as well as immaterial dimensions and can be measured using qualitative, quantitative, and multimixed methods involving economic, sociopolitical, and sociological parameters as illustrated by Lucarelli (2012) and Zenker and Martin (2011).

So far there is no consensus concerning the definition of brand equity. Pike (2010) saw brand equity as the most common term used to present brand performance – measured in terms of a financial value on the corporate balance sheet; while Lucarelli (2012) found no common definition of brand equity, but several interpretations that promoted different models and tools for evaluation. Based on his study of 217 articles dealing with city branding from 1990 to 2009, he proposed a model for brand equity which included city brand elements, city brand measurements, and city brand impact. City brand measurements include qualitative, quantitative, and multimixed methods, and city brand impact refers to measurements of outcomes that branding efforts have on a city. He found that impact can be seen in 3 different categories – identity- image, sociopolitical, and economic impact without any distinction between tangible and intangible metrics.

City brand elements and city brand impact is essential to value, while the city brand measurements should be viewed as costs and not as brand value in itself. Jørgensen (2014) proposed a City Brand Balance Sheet to describe the effect and impact in city branding from a shareholder perspective, using impact as described by Lucarelli (2012), but divided between material and immaterial impact and impact measured inside and outside the city. In this perspective, value can be described and measured and material and immaterial results will form brand equity. This model will be used as a framework for the analysis of the municipal Key Performance Indicators.



THIRD-GENERATION BALANCED SCORECARD

Since place and city brand models have been unable to convey the fundamental need for documentation, other methods and models, traditionally used in private, public, and nonprofit organizations may help to close this gap and improve and structure performance management. The Balanced Scorecard is one such strategic planning and management system, originally developed within private companies (Kaplan and Norton, 1992). The modern Balanced Scorecard is now used as a strategic planning framework going beyond its original focus on performance measurement and management, since moving into the nonprofit and public sector organizations in the early 2000s. Government and nonprofit organizations align business activities to the vision and strategy of the organization and monitor organization performance against strategic goals (Kaplan and Norton, 1996). This performance measurement framework has added strategic nonfinancial performance measures to traditional financial metrics to give managers and executives a more ‘balanced’ view of organizational performance, now as a third-generation Balanced Scorecard with the key components (Lawrie and Cobbold, 2004):

Destination statement: *A description, ideally including quantitative detail, of what the organization (or part of an organization managed by the balanced scorecard users) is likely to appear in at an agreed future date.*

Strategic Linkage Model with “Activity” and “Outcome” Perspectives: *A simplification of a 2nd Generation Balances Scorecard strategic linkage model – with a single “outcome” perspective, and a single “activity” perspective. Definitions are given for the strategic objectives and a set of outlines for each of the measures selected to monitor each of the strategic objectives, including targets.*

The process helps identify inconsistencies in the profile of objectives chosen (Lawrie and Cobbold, 2004), but this development simply involves the destination statement becoming the focal point of the Balanced Scorecard, not just an afterthought. Careful choice of category heading

during the design of the destination statement can be equally effective in selecting nonfinancial measures. A simple choice of “activity” and “outcome” objectives linked with simple causality removes debate about missing perspectives. Still the combinations of nonfinancial and financial measures play a huge part in driving the strategy (Coe and Letza, 2014). The inspiration from Balanced Scorecard is behind the City Brand Balance Sheet (Jørgensen, 2014) as a framework to understand and describe brand equity.

Applying a management framework requires relevant Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) linked to target values, so that the value of the measure can be assessed as meeting expectations or not. KPIs should traditionally be evaluated according to the SMART criteria (Doran, 1981). This means the measure has to have a Specific purpose for the business; be Measurable and to really get a value of the KPI, the defined norms have to be Achievable and the improvement of a KPI Relevant to the success of the organization.

Finally, it must be Time phased, which means the value of outcomes must be shown for a predefined and relevant period. The concept of Balanced Scorecard will serve as inspiration for the proposal of a Brand Strategy Platform.

DATA COLLECTION AND KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS IN DANISH PLACE AND CITY BRANDING

Jørgensen (2015) reports a survey of the national status quo on city and municipal branding in Denmark in 2014 with particular focus on political involvement and leadership based on personal interviews. The interview questionnaire also contained a number of questions relating to ex-ante and ex-post data collection in relation to the brand process including strategies on performance management and the use of Key Performance Indicators. The present paper reports the findings from this part of the survey. See appendix 1 for the full questionnaire.

All 96 Danish municipalities (leaving out Copenhagen and Aarhus) were contacted. A

personal letter with project information was sent to the CEO asking for contact to the person responsible for any project in the municipality. In the case of no response to the first mail, there was a follow up by (sometimes several) phone calls and e-mails, involving secretaries and other staff members. It often remained unclear as to what 'kind of' place branding was being undertaken. If, for instance, it was just a promotional focus or did it include other areas as well. Therefore, the first project dialogue (mail or telephone contact) was used to assess the relevance of a site visit. Project dialogue with 74 municipalities led to site visits in 37 municipalities with potential brand projects in order to identify the character of the project. The CEO/brand manager was asked whether he or she understood the project as a "brand image" project (Anholt, 2010), accordingly with the intention to affect the municipal reputation in the minds of its target audience within or outside the municipal borders. When this was clarified and confirmed, the municipal project was included in the research material. Based on the interviews, 25 municipalities with brand projects could be identified.

22 municipalities did not react on the different types of contact, resulting in a response rate of 77 % but the author is not aware of any branding activities taking place within those municipalities that did not respond to the survey.

FINDINGS

A number of municipalities had no analytical documentation whatsoever, others had a variety of ex-ante analysis, but not yet plans for ex-post

measurements. Some intended to rely on ordinary municipal statistics, but had no quantitative or qualitative target values and the most recent projects were still in an unfinished phase of reflection without decisions. Since cities and municipalities usually work in a nonscientific environment with no obligations to organize and publish data or other analytical information, there could be numerous reasons why data were missing. The interviews led to a discussion of the different problems related to data collection and produced a number of reflections and explanatory statements for the lack of data and data analysis as shown in Table 2.

Five municipalities represent a different and more systematic approach. Vejle (population 110.000, project start, 2014) Horsens (population 86.000, project start, 1998), Næstved (population 81.000, project start, 2007), Sønderborg (population 75.000, project start, 2007), and Odder (population, 20.000, project start, 2015) had explicitly described quantitative Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) as part of their brand projects.

Indicators vary between municipalities and The City Brand Balance Sheet (Jørgensen, 2014) is used as a framework to organize the indicators, see Table 3. The segregation in the City Brand Balance Sheet between First-Order Effects and impact is based on the assumption that First-Order Effects – typically based on media and social media – is of importance as communication channels, but that the extent of media coverage in itself is no expression of the impact from a brand project.

Table 2: Explanatory statements for lack of data or data analysis collected during interviews with Danish brand managers/CEOs

<i>No data collection</i>	<i>Data available</i>
*The project is in a start-up phase and there has been no time for a measurement strategy	*Measurements show no results
*Knowledge of relevant methods are missing	*Measurements do not show expected results
*Disagreements about choice of audience and methods	*Measurements are not relevant or related to strategy
*Lack of political or economical support to spend money on measurements,	*Measurements without ex-ante analysis lead to uncertain results
*Measurements are considered difficult to plan or data hard to achieve.	*Results are considered confidential and therefore not available for interpretation by outside analysts
*No tradition for measurements	*And then extremely few cases with relevant time series of data showing effects and development over time
*No request for measurements	

**Table 3:** Danish municipalities with formulated quantitative and qualitative Key Performance Indicators, 2014/2015.

<i>City and place brand motive</i>	<i>Key performance Indicators for city and place brand equity</i>		
Danish cities with formulated Key Performance Indicators. City and place brand motives in italics. Number of asterisks link municipality and performance indicator	First Order - Effects	Second Order - Impact	Material Impact outside the municipality
Vejle* (population 110.000) -more citizens and jobs, stronger education, and welfare development	***** + 1000 new followers on Facebook *****2500 unique visitors on newcomers meeting point at the town website with a rejection below 35 %	Material Impact within the municipality *To be one of 4 cities in the region with the largest growth in new jobs * To be one of four cities in the region with the relatively highest number of newcomers *500 new private jobs created annually *400 new students annually	
Horsens** (Population 86.000) -a dynamic city with cultural events and quality	***** 2 stories in national media, + 10 stories in regional media + 20 stories in local media *****150 new photos no Instagram	***1000 net new citizens in 2018 ***4.000 new jobs within focused areas before 2018. ***14% growth in tourism and number of visitors and hotel nights before 2018 ****The municipality will reach 50 % reduction of CO2 in 2020 and become CO2 neutral in 2029	
Næstved*** (population 81.000) -branding and habitation	***** More than 75 new participants not yet living in the municipality at every open town arrangement	Immaterial impact within the municipality *The municipality will rank 10 or better on the national list of local industry satisfaction with the municipality published annually by the Confederation of Danish Industry ***The share of adult citizens with self evaluated bad health is reduced to from 16 to 14 % in 2018	Immaterial impact outside the municipality **+40 of Danes relate the city's name to culture, festivals and events measured as top of mind awareness ** +75 % of Danes relate the cultural institution "The Prison" to the city. *****+50 % of potential newcomers in the target group should get a more positive view of the town
Sønderborg**** (population 75.000) -CO2 neutrality			
Odder***** (population 20.000) -Increased in-migration			

Number of asterisks refer to the individual municipality.

Impact on the other hand is the measured quantitative or qualitative outcome of the project. Impact may occur in material and immaterial form and may be found within the municipality or outside the municipality.

Vejle and Odder had just started their projects during the winter, 2014/2015 and had no results. Sønderborg has evaluated progress for the period, 2007 to 2014 (reporting a 30 % delivery on, 2029 targets) while Næstved was still in the process of evaluation. The project in Horsens (starting in, 1998) included a 15-year series of Top of Mind Awareness data describing the development of a new image (Jørgensen, 2014). This target is achieved and being

maintained while the target concerning "The Prison" is new.

DISCUSSION

The key perspective of the survey was to identify and analyze documented performance strategies including the use of KPIs. Only five municipalities had formulated performance strategies including specific quantitative KPIs. This is, of course, a limited number of cases but as far as the author is aware it includes all known Danish projects. Table 3 is a good illustration of the variety of indicators that are considered relevant by the municipalities and the material in

Table 3 supports a number of tentative conclusions:

First of all the KPIs are considered to be consistent with the SMART criteria (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time phased).

Secondly, the indicators relate to quantitative measurements and express some kind of development over time and they can all be organized in the framework of a City Brand Balance Sheet.

The KPIs mentioned under First-Order Effects are all related to media but it is unclear how a specific performance in social media will influence upon potential newcomers attitude toward the municipality.

Most of the KPIs under Material Impact within the municipality depend on available local, regional, or national statistical information while ProjectZero in Sønderborg follow the development toward, 2029 with annual progress reports.

The two examples of Immaterial Impact within the municipality relate to an annual survey carried out by the Confederation of Danish Industry among local members in the different municipalities and to the National Health Survey organized by regional and national authorities every 4 years. Especially, the national ranking made by Danish Industry is of significant local political importance and has great media focus. The same municipality has won the “competition” for the last 4 years and uses this position as a municipal brand platform. The three examples under Immaterial Impact outside the municipality all depend on analysis carried out by the municipalities on their own initiative and costs.

Thirdly, all indicators relate to the brand motive for the city. This is actually a key conclusion concerning the specific and necessary relation between brand motive and performance measurements. The interviews do, however, not give a detailed insight into the processes leading from brand motive to strategies and brand processes that eventually would support the KPIs. Still Horsens (Jørgensen, 2014) and Sønderborg (ProjectZero, 2015) represent de facto successful and documented cases.

Fourthly, there is reason to believe that the cooperation with private investors creates a more systematic approach to documentation and follow-up strategies. All 25 brand projects were tax financed by the municipality (Jørgensen, 2015). Four projects had additional private funding. Three of the projects (Herning, Horsens and Sønderborg) with private funding had been active for a number of years, covering more than one election period while the fourth project (Billund) had just been agreed upon in principle in, 2014. Horsens and Sønderborg had formulated Key Performance Indicators and could document results over time, while Herning had a time series of Top of Mind Awareness measurement with emerging results.

The second objective of the study – to get an understanding of the explanatory statements used in municipalities without performance management strategies – followed as a consequence of the interviews in those municipalities. The interviews illustrated the same problems with inaccessible hard data as described by Klijn et al. (2012) from Holland, but led to a number of explanatory statements for the lack of data, see Table 2. Missing funding and political support, the uncertainty of methodology, and the fact that cities and municipalities usually work in a nonscientific environment with no obligations to organize and publish data or other analytical information, partly explains the data problem. Bearing in mind that political leadership is found essential in relation to Danish projects (Jørgensen, 2015), the long-term process of place and city branding may be challenged by the 4-year election period for politicians. In addition to restricted budgets, political impatience to wait for results and reluctance to present data showing no effect may also be of influence. An additional risk is that politicians see the mere launching of a brand project as the Key Performance Indicator without paying much attention to later data collection and documentation and therefore being unwilling to pay for it.

Some of the methodological problems may be related to unclear or unspecified brand objectives since different brand motives will require different data collection strategies using a variation of




Figure 1: Place and city brand investors strategic process model – the Brand Strategy Platform.

qualitative, quantitative, and multimixed methods adapted to the motive in question. These methods may be difficult to develop and apply systematically and can be very expensive in use. They might also demand other analytical competences and tools than those normally expected from brand managers. This may explain why a number of municipalities have ex-ante data but hesitate to express targets relative to such data. Besides, it must not be overlooked that missing or unclear instructions for target setting corresponding ex-ante and ex-post data collection and performance measurements in well-known place and city brand models, also plays a role.

Nevertheless, the Danish cases illustrate that municipalities are willing to set targets and formulate relevant KPIs reflecting brand motives being consistent with the SMART criteria and readily communicated in public. In Horsens, the annual TOMA status of the city is for instance reported in the news media (Jørgensen, 2014).

The data analysis has demonstrated that the lack of funding and political support, lack of methodology, and lack of correlation between brand motives and target setting are essential

limitations to a further improvement of performance management and data-driven model development and also that it is possible to overcome these obstacles.

The third objective of this paper is therefore an attempt to combine the information from these two former objectives with the framework of third-generation Balanced Scorecards (Lawrie and Cobbold, 2004) into a model for a more strategic approach to a performance management based on brand motive and brand equity to be used as a Brand Strategy Platform.

Since problems with funding and short-sighted politicians seem to be key limiting factors, the investors (in Denmark the politicians) must be convinced that data collection and performance management is a necessary and meaningful precondition for a brand project and should be integrated in the strategic process from the beginning. But decision making should also be based on a sufficient description of the present situation including adequate ex-ante data as basis for definition of one or more relevant brand motives and outline a number of relevant and meaningful KPIs. In an attempt to bridge the

dilemma between funding and the data issue, the author finally proposes a strategic process model – a Brand Strategy Platform – as an approach combining the strategies defined by the brand motive in question with the logics of balanced scorecards. With relevant KPIs in a City Brand Balance Sheet framework this model will emphasize the data imperative already from the beginning, see Figure 1.

In a Danish context, Jørgensen (2015) found that brand projects were tax paid, developed, and decided upon by Mayors and the council, or in close circles involving administration and semipublic organizations such as business committees and tourist committees. Consequently, the strategy platform takes the view of the politicians, the investors – since the investors will have to invest in data collection as well as in the brand process. Therefore, the strategic process model could be used by investors in place and city branding to clarify the idea and intention behind the investment; the brand motive or motives, to establish a destination statement that will connect present ex-ante measurements with KPIs and measurement strategies.

CONCLUSION

In a research project concerning status quo of city and municipal branding in Denmark (Jørgensen, 2015) information was obtained from 25 municipalities about municipal performance management strategies and explanatory statements if strategies were missing. The primary aim of this paper has been to identify and analyze the documented performance strategies and as a second aim also to analyze explanatory statements for the lack of data. The analysis has led to introduction of a model for a more strategic approach to performance management based on brand motive and brand equity in the framework of third-generation balanced scorecards – a Brand Strategy Platform.

While the majority of municipalities had no strategy for data collection and performance management, five municipalities had a clear strategy including Key Performance Indicators.

These KPIs are analyzed according to the City Brand Balance Sheet framework, see Table 3.

KPIs are consistent with SMART criteria, relate to the local brand motive, implies quantitative measurements, and express some kind of development over time. The KPIs stated under First-Order Effects are all related to media. Most of the KPIs under ‘Material Impact within the municipality’ depend on available local, regional, or national statistical information. The two examples of ‘Immaterial Impact within the municipality,’ relate to an annual survey carried out by the Confederation of Danish Industry among local members in the different municipalities, as well as the National Health Survey organized by regional and national authorities every 4 years. Finally, the three examples under ‘Immaterial Impact outside the municipality’ all depend on analysis carried out by the individual municipality at own initiative.

All projects were tax funded and 4 municipalities had additional funding from private companies and three of these projects had well-established performance management strategies, while one project was recently started (Billund in, 2014). It is suggested that cooperation with private investors creates a more systematic approach to documentation and performance management.

A number of explanatory statements for the lack of data were collected and discussed during the interviews, see Table 1. The explanatory statements can be aggregated into three main categories: Lack of funding and political support, the uncertainty of methods, and the fact that cities and municipalities usually work in a nonscientific environment with no obligation or tradition to organize and publish data or other analytical information.

All Danish projects are tax funded and since political leadership is found essential (Jørgensen, 2015) the long-term process of place and city branding may be challenged by the 4-year election period for politicians. In addition to restricted budgets, political impatience to wait for results and reluctance to present data showing no effect may also be of influence. An additional risk is that politicians see the mere launching of a



brand project as the Key Performance Indicator without paying much attention to later data collection and documentation, and therefore being unwilling to pay for it.

Methodological uncertainty may be related to unclear brand objectives requiring different data collection strategies and a variation of qualitative, quantitative, and multimixed methods adapted to the motive in question. Methods may be expensive, difficult to develop and apply systematically and may demand other analytical competences and tools than those normally expected from brand managers. Besides it must not be overlooked that missing or unclear instructions for target settings, corresponding ex-ante and ex-post data collection and performance measurements in well-known place and city brand models, also plays a role.

Nevertheless, the Danish cases illustrate that it is possible to achieve political long-time support and funding. Municipalities are also willing to develop performance management strategies including relevant KPIs reflecting different brand motives based on the SMART criteria. The challenge is to make place and city brand investors understand that a brand project needs targets for impact in relation to brand motive, ex-ante benchmark, and relevant KPIs and that they must secure funding of a performance management system to evaluate the process.

Combining the strategies defined by the brand motive in question with the logics of Balanced Scorecards and relevant key performance indicators in a City Brand Balance Sheet framework, the data imperative will be emphasized already from the beginning. The author proposes a simple process diagram – a Brand Strategy Platform – to be used by city councils or private investors as a strategic platform, see Figure 1.

The Danish survey has shown the same reluctance for systematic data collection and performance management, reported by other authors. But it has also discovered examples of successful work with KPIs in relation to different brand motives. More research is needed to understand the reluctance and bridge the conflict between the insufficient and

unsystematic data collection and the demand for performance management in New Public Management.

Scholars should also look for more examples of practical use of KPIs in order to study how they are formulated and how they work in practice; how data are analyzed and construed; and how they are used in benchmarking, as well as in feedback loops to improve brand management. Studies of this character might also reduce constraints for those practitioners and investors still insecure with data collection strategies and performance management.

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APPENDIX 1

Questionnaire for site visits. * mark the questions of relevance for this paper

The project role of the interviewed person

Has the municipality organized a brand project?

Does it have a name/slogan, logo, etcetera?

When was it started?

What is the background for the brand project – the brand objective?

Who were involved in development of the project?

What is the character of the political decision?

***Did you do ex-ante analysis inside the municipality?**

***Did you do ex-ante analysis outside the municipality?**

***Did you do ex-ante analysis within particular groups of people, organizations or companies?**

Do you see your project perspective as image (Horsens) attraction (Billund), infrastructure (FredericiaC) or based on individuals (Odense) – or other perspectives? (Names in brackets are Danish municipalities well known for the project in question)

Do you have additional supporting place development strategies like local service innovation (Hedensted), town planning (Ballerup), economic development (Farum) or others? (Names in brackets are Danish municipalities well known for the project in question)

How is the project financed?



How much and for how long and eventually with partners?

Who is the day to day manager of the project?

Who do you see as "the owner" of the project?

Do you have external partners involved?

How are the politicians involved?

How do you communicate around the project?

Who are your target groups?

Who do you see as your competitors?

**Do you formulate specific targets for the project?*

**Have you performance measurements or defined KPIs?*

**How do you measure?*

**Do you develop time series, benchmark over time and eventually with others?*

How do you communicate results?

What did I forget to ask you?

Chapter 10 Study 4

Intra-organizational Brand Resistance and Counter-narratives in City branding – a Comparative Study of three Danish Cities.

Fra: Caroline Condron [mailto:ccondron@emeraldgroup.com]

Sendt: 18. november 2019 09:11

Til: Ole Have Jørgensen

Emne: Re. Manuscript status for QMR

Good morning Ole,

Thank you for your query, and my apologies for the delay in replying to you – I have been on annual leave for a few days. I have checked on the status of your manuscript, and can see that the Special Issue your paper was submitted to is allocated to an issue slot for early next year.

With best wishes,

Caroline

Caroline Condron

Content Editor | Emerald Publishing

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Structured abstract

Purpose: The aim is to contribute to an increased understanding of intra-organizational city brand resistance by identifying and discussing different types of counter-narratives emerging from the political and the administrative arenas.

Design: The empirical material consists of secondary data as well as six in-depth semi-structured interviews with Danish mayors and city managers in three different municipalities in Denmark.

Findings: Intra-organizational counter-narratives differ from inter-organizational counter-narratives but resemble number of issues known from extra-organizational resistance. Still significant differences are found within the political arena: lack of ownership; competition for resources; and political conflicts. Lack of ownership; internal competition for resources; and distrust of motives; play an important role within the administrative arena. Mayors are aware of the needs for continued political support for branding projects but projects are nonetheless realized in spite of resistance if there is a political majority for it.

Research implications: We point to the implications of city brand resistance and counter-narratives emerging from the 'inside' of the political and administrative arenas in the city, here defined as "*intra – organizational counter-narratives*".

Practical implications: It is suggested that politicians and municipality staff should be systematically addressed as individual and unique audiences and considered as important as citizens in the brand process.

Originality/value: So far little attention has been paid to intra-organizational stakeholders within the municipal organization and their impact on the city branding process approached from a narrative perspective.

Keywords:

Intra-organizational brand resistance, intra-organizational counter-narratives, inter-departmental competition, city branding, political arena, administrative arena, brand resistance.

Article classification:

Research paper

Introduction

Marketing and branding became part of city management in the rise of the so-called 'entrepreneurial city', a term first formulated by Harvey (1989) to depict how cities are administrated in more business-like manners. Today scholars like Braun (2011), Eshuis & Klijn (2012) and Kavaratzis & Hatch (2013) argue that place branding has become 'business as usual' for cities wishing to increase their attractiveness for various target groups and that city branding is an integral part of the political processes of cities (Braun 2011). Less attention has been paid to the points made by Baker (2012) who finds that branding essentially is a process of change management. Brand management or brand governance is often described as a rather linear straightforward and conflict-free situation but it actually does involve challenges and conflicts between different stakeholders and other groups involved in or affected by the process (Lucarelli and Giovanardi 2014, Moilanen 2015). Managers tend to underestimate the varieties of reactions to change and overestimate their power to influence those responses (Schlesinger and Kotter 1979). Such reactions often manifest themselves as resistance. Besides existing research on city and place branding generally acknowledges that city and place brands may be contested and/or take on a variety of meanings for different stakeholders (Zenker and Braun 2017). A number of authors argue that citizens and citizen participation play a central role in city branding (Hankinson 2004, Kavaratzis 2004 and 2012, Braun et al. 2013, Zenker et al. 2016), and that city branding should include bottom-up initiatives (Kavaratzis 2012) in order to reduce resistance among residents, as identification with their place of living can be regarded as both an aim and facilitator (Zenker et al. 2016). Hereby, residents are seen to act as integral parts of the place brand, emitting symbolic messages about the city through explicit place representations and emblematic behaviors (Green et al. 2018), as ambassadors for the brand and as citizens and voters vital for the political legitimization for the brand (Braun et al. 2013).

Resistance against what has been referred to as 'the official story' (Jensen 2005, 2007) has been discussed by means of terms such as 'brand alienation', 'brand resistance' and 'counter branding'. 'Brand alienation' is characterized by non-affiliation with the official story while 'brand resistance' includes acts of resistance among citizens and other city stakeholders. 'Counter branding' may involve coherent and strategically orchestrated initiatives directly challenging the official brand (Jensen 2007). Particularly the introduction of urban transformations and mega-events as parts of branding strategies have traditionally led to dramatic public resistance (Sanchez and Broudehoux 2013, Gray and Porter 2014, Maiello and Pasquinelli 2015). Even though these three concepts, in different ways, try to address how resistance is an integral part of city branding processes, they fundamentally define resistance as something that emerges 'from the outside' and opposes what 'the' political entity responsible for the brand project wants, hereby portraying the 'inside' political entity as harmonic and well-orchestrated. Conflicts and resistance may also develop in inter-organizational context between organizations involved in city brand management (Lucarelli and Giovanardi 2014).

Little attention has so far been paid to the fabric of potential resistance emerging from internal stakeholders who are active in the political and the administrative arenas within the city organization. Internal stakeholders are people working directly for governmental entities while citizens, business owners, and tourists are seen as external stakeholders (Zavattaro 2013). This study reveals that brand leadership may be challenged by an *internal* organizational perspective involving politicians as well as municipality employees. Very little is known about these challenges and the character of such internal brand resistance. The article introduces the concept of 'intra-organizational counter-narratives' to address such internal resistance and how it affects the city's political and administrative leadership and how this may influence

management and directions of city branding initiatives. Thus the aim of this article is to contribute to an increased understanding of internal resistance processes by identifying and discussing different types of counter-narratives emerging from internal stakeholders (in this article defined as local politicians and municipality employees).

Based on these findings, the article analyzes how these narratives influence the city's top management and political decision making as integral parts of a city branding process. The paper concentrates on brand resistance and counter-narratives emerging from within the political and the administrative arena, both seen as internal arenas. Findings relating to the external arena will only be mentioned when they more directly affect processes in the two internal arenas; e.g. when residents' counter-narratives are acted upon in these two arenas. Thus an important contribution of the paper is the introduction of 'intra-organizational counter-narrative' as a concept that can contribute to better understandings of resistance and counter branding as integral parts of the more political dimensions of city branding processes that take place in the two internal arenas.

Literature Review:

Counter narratives and brand resistance

Zenker and Braun (2017, p. 275) define city brands as "network[s] of associations in the consumers' mind based on the visual, verbal and behavioural expression of a place and its stakeholders. These associations differ in their influence within the network and in importance for the place consumers' attitude and behavior". As a consequence, place branding is seen as identity-driven and represents an inside out approach that seeks to express selected values and narratives of the place (Boisen et al. 2017), casting the task of place branding as reputation management (Eshuis and Klein 2012, Hankinson 2015). Terlouw (2017) observes that the identity of a brand is frequently contested by both public and private stakeholders, and thus frequently becomes a topic subject to political debate. Such frequent contests may trigger both resistance and the emergence of counter-narratives.

One of the most cited definitions of counter-narratives is offered by Andrews' (2005, p. 1), who defines counter-narratives as narratives that 'only make sense in relation to something else, that which they are countering', accentuating that 'the very name identifies it as a positional category, in tension with another category' (Andrews 2004, p. 1). Accordingly, counter-narratives only exist insofar they counter a competing (and usually a 'master') story or account of events. As such, the master narrative is to be understood in a reciprocal relation with its counter-narrative(s) in the sense that the counter-narrative presupposes the existence of a master narrative (Lundholt 2017, Gabriel 2017). Bamberg depicts the master narratives as 'the back-drop against which counter-narratives can be drawn up' (Bamberg 2004). In its nature, this positional relation involves an asymmetric relation as counter-narratives are positioned against the master narrative (Lundholt 2017, Boje 2001). This implies that, at the outset, the master narrative is the story or account of events that is depicted as powerful. Power may also be related to the source of the story as pointed out by Nelsen (2001) who analyzed the stories of individuals and groups of people (such as Gypsies and transsexuals) who have been disempowered by dominant narratives perpetuated by people with the power to speak for them. As such, the emergence of counter-narratives may be related to an asymmetric relation among inter-actants.

Extra-organizational brand resistance involving external stakeholders

Although the term 'counter-narrative' has not been applied to city branding so far, we can trace some related terms depicting a conflict between the strategic vision of the municipality and various counter-reactions among stakeholders. For example, Jensen (2005) points to 'brand alienation' in situations, where

the city brand is disconnected from urban dwellers and local identities, leading him to define brand resistance as acts of resistance towards 'the official story'. However, to Jensen (2005, 2007), brand alienation is not coherent or strategically staged forms of opposition, but more un-orchestrated community voices speaking out in public about their disapproval, disengagement etc. Such disengagement, branding resistance or simply negligence may be found among citizens, companies, NGOs and other representatives of the local community. Whereas such resistance and negligence are traditionally seen as un-organized practices, more fundamental counter-branding initiatives can involve putting more concerted and organized narratives into circulation to counter the master narrative (Jensen 2005, 2007). Accordingly, acts of counter-branding such as strategic and deliberate circulations of counter-narratives are processes that challenge the master narrative.

There are only a limited number of studies of brand resistance and counter branding and typically, they are case-studies focusing on grass-root, bottom-up initiatives by local citizens. For example, Insch and Stuart (2015) interviewed local residents in Dunedin City, New Zealand (with a track record of unsuccessful city branding campaigns) and found four themes or factors leading citizens to disengagement with the city brand: Lack of brand awareness/knowledge, lack of brand identification, disapproval of local government actions, and cynical attitudes towards involvement when residents are disengaged from the city brand process. In Hamburg, citizens protested with the label 'Not in our name' against the city's marketing activities as the successful attraction of the 'creative class' and tourists resulted in gentrification of several city districts (Zenker and Beckmann 2012). When the organization responsible for marketing the city of Amsterdam introduced the 'I Amsterdam' brand, a group of residents responded with an 'I Amsterdamned' counter narrative (Braun et al. 2013). Recently, Vallaster et al. (2017) described how the German city Munich's branding as an open and tolerant place was jeopardized by the refugee crisis when citizens' collective actions co-created and eventually deconstructed the city brand. In the Danish city Randers (locally seen as 'the city of violence') a municipal organized branding campaign led to a logo feud where the official branding logo (a capital R) was challenged by an alternative logo, the R with a junkie needle, beer bottles, a motor bike and dog dirt attached to it (Smidt-Jensen 2004). The anti-branding logo was meant as a protest against what was perceived as a socially exclusive branding process by illustrating some of the 'silenced voices' and silenced issues in the city. The 'Bielefeld Conspiracy' forms a very special counter-narrative case. It relates to a running gag among internet users who state that the German city Bielefeld does not actually exist. This framing was generated by a student at the University of Kiel, 350 km. away in 1994 and was not a reaction to any organized branding campaign by the city, but has defined the city's reactions afterwards (Hospers 2010).

Inter-organizational resistance between external and internal stakeholders

Lucarelli and Giovanardi (2014) studied the regional brand building process of Romagna (an Italian territory belonging to four neighbouring provinces) based on a selection of official documents, web pages and promotional materials produced by the organizations involved in brand governance, and in-depth interviews with six representatives of the same organizations. None of the interviewees held political positions. The authors found that the brand governance emerges as a negotiated and contested mechanism and they identified five interpretive repertoires; 'Chaos and fragmentation'; 'The politics of scale'; 'Tension between public and private space'; 'Tension between inland and coastal area'; and 'The politics of memory'. The special socio-political environment of the territory can be seen as a constricting factor where local parochialism and competition from within deeply affects the branding process, and they see brand governance as a more disordered, fragmented and contested process.

In a comparative study of 10 European cities (Moilanen 2015) interviewed 17 key informants representing the main organizations in charge of city brand management (but only 4 interviewees represented the local government authority). He found nine major challenges faced by city brand managers: 'Large numbers of

stakeholders with conflicting and parallel activities; a limited understanding of branding within the network of stakeholders; insufficient buy-in from public sector organizations including political support, the private sector and citizens; securing funding; slowness and time related issues; conflicting opinions of key stakeholders and a lack of clear leadership; operational brand management; formulation of strategy of the brand; and monitoring and poor situational awareness’.

Intra-organizational brand resistance involving internal stakeholders

It is generally accepted that branding is a part of the political process (Braun 2011, Jørgensen 2015) but there are different views on the role of local politicians and mayors – ranging from Kotler et al.’s (1993) notion that “under effective mayors, cities can often succeed in dramatically improving of their conditions”, to Kavaratzis and Hatch (2013) who do not see leadership in a brand process as political leadership and the view of Braun et al (2017) “city governments cannot brand places on their own”. On the other hand, Eshuis et al (2011) point to a necessary focus on political brand leadership due to organizational resistance. Eshuis et al. (2011) made a web-based survey with professionals and city administrators involved in branding of cities, towns and villages in order to study bottlenecks in place marketing in The Netherlands. A key finding was that coordination of city marketing activities within the municipality and the embedding of city marketing in place development were considered to be more problematic than development of city marketing content. The respondents did not consider political support as a key bottleneck, but found the most important bottleneck to be that budgets for city marketing were too low. The survey included as well external professionals and consultants working for the city as internal employees within the city organization and politicians. It indicates that the political and administrative arenas contain a series of challenges for city branding that are not addressed by the studies that emphasize counter-narratives originating from the external arena. This finding is contradicted by Moilanen (2015) in his comparative study of 10 European cities. Practitioners in 9 out of the 10 cities were challenged by the lack of political support from the public sector and city hall contradicting the findings from The Netherlands. Jørgensen (2015) describes how Danish mayors are deeply involved in city brand projects developed in close circles involving the city council and administration and semipublic organizations. Jørgensen (2015) mentions how nine out of 25 cities in his study had experience with aborted branding projects due to change in political leadership, political conflicts and/or a general loss of political support.

A Danish municipality is organized with a unity of command and a power of direction set by the council and executed by the City Management in a ‘top down’ or top management structure where the master narrative represents the strategic brand vision of the city council, which is anchored with the mayor and the local politicians. But master narratives in the form of brand visions and values are not ‘set in stone’ and therefore, counter-narratives may arise among internal stakeholders challenging the master narratives and giving rise to brand resistance. At the same time, counter-narratives existing among external stakeholders may influence internal stakeholders and decision makers insofar such external counter-narratives are enacted, and acted upon, by politicians and municipality employees. In situations where there is a strong opposition among residents or other external stakeholders, the counter-narratives from the external arena may be subsumed within the internal arena and internal stakeholders such as politicians in opposition may simply adapt and engage the external counter-narratives and let them work for their agenda.

The political arena in Danish municipalities is formed by the city council and the committees. The council is chaired by the mayor who is elected by and among the members of the city council and is the formal head of both the political and the administrative organization. Local politicians occupy a bridging position to citizens in the sense that they are local residents but politically elected and therefore responsible for the city’s economy and for the employees working for the city. The council allocates funds to, among other purposes, branding, in competition with other public priorities and hereby provides city brand projects with political legitimacy. In that sense they have a decisive influence on the master narrative and are responsible for transforming and converting the master narrative into action in an environment supported by the strong tradition of consensual, corporatist style of decision making in the Nordic countries including

Denmark (Goldsmith and Larsen 2004). This 'Nordic model' has recently been described by Pedersen and Kuhnle (2017) as consensual governance or by Knutzen (2017) as decentralized co-operative governance. In a specific Danish context Klausen (2009) use the word 'shareholders' to describe the political responsibility to the development of the city, since they act as 'owners' of the public sector on behalf of the citizens. This places the politicians in a different position compared to internal (employees) as well as external stakeholders, and it is unthinkable to imagine a Danish city brand project without political involvement and support (Jørgensen 2015). Besides city branding projects are often managed by communication officers with direct access to and sometimes sitting next door to the mayor and/or the city manager.

The administrative arena is led by the city manager, who is a civil servant employed by the council to be the daily head of administration in close collaboration with the mayor. Together the two can be defined as 'the top management in the city' in what Berg and Kjær (2005) describe as a 'shared leadership' or 'partners in a complex joint venture' as concluded in a pan-European survey (Alba and Navarro, 2006). Even though civil servants in the administrative arena might also be residents, they are in a different position compared to non-employees since they work for, and represent, the political organizations responsible for, and investing in, city branding projects. They are expected to be loyal to the strategic vision of the city council to ensure that city branding is characterized by authenticity and is not 'purely cosmetic'. Still, they may feel alienated with the whole idea of branding, disagree with the political priorities or simply dislike the choice of brand values. Nevertheless, they are in a different position than the external stakeholders since it is usually difficult for them to express their attitudes publicly. Instead they may find ways to communicate their critical attitude internally in the organization.

The literature accounted for above points to a number of examples of open city brand resistance among local citizens and indications of intra-organizational resistance, Insch and Stuart (2015), Smidt-Jensen (2004), Zenker and Beckmann (2012), Braun et al. (2013), and Vallaster et al. (2017). There are also examples of more subtle inter-organizational unsolved resistance involving public administration and the political level (Lucarelli and Giovanardi 2014, Moilanen 2015). But knowledge about the character and origins of intra-organizational brand resistance and counter-narratives in the political and the administrative arena within the city organization and ways in which they may affect the political and administrative brand leadership is both sparse and needed.

Methodology

Based on an interpretivist approach, the aim of the empirical study is to gain in-depth insight into the experiences and reflections of key 'insiders' in city branding projects. The study therefore does not seek to uncover any 'ultimate truth' about city branding projects, but tries to uncover various realities of these projects, based on key actors' meanings and understandings on social and experiential levels. The empirical material consists of secondary data as well as six individual in-depth interviews with mayors and CEOs (in Danish) in three Danish cities (Odense, Kolding and Horsens). The interviews were semi-structured and based on an identical interview guide (see appendix) for all informants consisting of questions regarding the following themes enabling exploration and in-depth discussions of the topic:

- Political ownership to the strategy
- Awareness of the strategy among stakeholders
- Communication of the strategy internal as well as external
- Resistance and counter-narratives among internal and external stakeholders

An interview team of three persons was established, authors MWL and OHJ and cand. negot. Marie Claire Andsager, and involved two persons in each interview. The interviewers and informants engaged in a formal interview with open-ended questions enabling the interviewees to freely express their views formulated in their own terms. Each interview session involved two of the authors taking turns as

interviewers. Interviews lasted between 60 and 90 minutes, were taped and afterwards analyzed, particularly emphasizing the recording and analysis of all examples of counter-narratives that arose during the interviews. All interviewers were well informed about the three cities. One was member of the advisory board in the project in Kolding, one had been employed in the Communication Department in Odense and the third was the former city manager in Horsens.

As mentioned in the introduction, the aim of this study is to identify different types of counter-narratives emerging from key internal stakeholders in city branding processes and to analyze how they influence top management and political decision making. To ensure diversity and analytical generalizability of results, the selection of cases was based on a goal to both include cities with a top-down approach to city branding and cities with a bottom-up approach. In order to ensure the selection of relevant cases, 25 Danish city branding projects (for further information see Jørgensen 2015) were initially analyzed using Arnstein's (1969) ladder of citizen's participation, subsequently leading the research team to pick three cities as the most relevant cases: Kolding, Odense and Horsens.

The three cities were chosen because they all work intensively with city branding, but employ fundamentally different strategies and face very different challenges in terms of internal brand resistance. Kolding's brand motive is based on the aspiration to attract more citizens. For a number of years, the city has had a negative balance between people moving to Kolding and people moving away. The mayor aimed for high levels of citizen involvement in the process and more than 650 citizens took part in the process leading to the formulation of the city's new vision 'Kolding - we design life'. This vision was subsequently unanimously approved by the city council.

Odense represents a top-down process based on a decision by the council and was chosen as a case because there had been considerable political conflicts in the city council. Odense's brand motive grew from a loss of 40% of the city's industrial jobs during the international economic crisis in 2008-2009, a weakened economy, lack of self-confidence and an impression that 'nothing works in Odense' – (translated from Danish 'der går Odense i det'). In 2010 a strategy called 'New reality – New welfare' (available in Danish on the city's homepage, www.Odense.dk) was introduced, known as New-New. The CEO described how many employees saw this as a euphemism for budget cuts and service reduction. In 2012, the council decided to pursue a revised strategy with 5 welfare targets and 3 growth targets, all based on three tracks – New welfare, Urban and mental transformation and Conditions for growth. Part of the third track was the establishment of a more visible city profile through a public-private partnership 'Odense Sport & Event'. At the same time a new slogan, ('Odense - daring for the future') was formulated.

Horsens was selected because it represents the only well-documented, long term successful Danish city brand project so far (Jørgensen 2014). Horsens' brand motive was a negative image predominantly based on strong and negative associations to the large state prison located in the city. More than half of Denmark's population related the city's name to the prison, and in the 1990s the city had a periodically stagnant or declining population. In 1998, the city council decided to invest in a branding campaign based on development and attraction of national and international events (Jørgensen 2014).

In table 1, the most relevant background information of the three cities is summarily introduced based on both secondary data and information retrieved from the mayors and city managers during the interviews.

Table 1.

	Odense	Kolding	Horsens
Population	200.000	90.000	87.000

The mayors party	Social democratic	Liberal	Social democratic
“Reason to launch”	A strong sense of urgency – based on an earlier impression that “Der går Odense i den” (“Nothing works in Odense”), the fact that the city was below average in almost everything in the region and due to a 40 % loss of jobs in the local industry during the economic crisis (extract from review with the city manager)	More citizens moving away from than into the municipality (extract from interview with the mayor)	A negative image dominated by a large state prison (Jørgensen 2014)
Strategy	An urban transformation plan including planned and expected investments for 4 billion Euros over the next 10 years, attraction and development of high tech industries, welfare-tech, support to entrepreneurs and a more visible city profile. (the latter organized in the public private partnership “Odense Sport & Event”) (extract from interview with the mayor)	<p>“Together we will design the possibility for a better life through entrepreneurship, social development education and knowledge – using design processes to improve quality of municipal service”</p> <p>(translation from Danish as found on the city’s homepage, https://www.kolding.dk/om-kommunen/vi-designer-livet/vision-kolding-vi-designer-livet/kolding-kommunes-vision)</p>	Music and great events, organized by the public private partnership “Horsens and Friends” in close cooperation with the city administration (Jørgensen 2014)
Annual investment in branding, Euros per capita	13	2	10

<p>The character of citizen involvement in formulation of brand and brand articulation.</p> <p>The description is based on information collected as responses to the question “Who were involved in development of the project?” from the questionnaire mentioned in Jørgensen (2015)</p>	<p>The Odense-project was decided upon by the city council (extract from interview with the mayor)</p>	<p>The city council invited 650 citizens representing institutions, organizations and active citizens to a Vision Forum with interviews and creative workshops where they have worked with alternative future scenarios for Kolding. The city council decided to follow the proposed vision from the citizens https://www.kolding.dk/om-kommunen/vi-designer-livet/vision-kolding-vi-designer-livet/kolding-kommunes-vision</p>	<p>The project in Horsens was originally initiated by the city council and eventually developed into a public-private partnership with private companies and involving hundreds or even thousands of volunteers in supporting the individual events</p> <p>(Jørgensen 2014)</p>
Project start	2012	2012	1998
Program for effect measurements	yes	no	yes

Table 1. Background information of the three cases extracted from interviews with mayors and city managers, city home pages and literature.

As shown in table 1 brand motives vary across the three cases, but they share a motivation emerging from negative trends and tendencies. Also the articulation of initiatives varies. Odense and Horsens have formulated very concrete plans: urban transformation and events respectively, whereas Kolding’s vision is more abstract as it concerns the implementation of design processes. The budget for annual investments in the brand are high in Odense and Horsens (13 and 10 Euros per capita respectively), but relatively low in Kolding (2 Euros per capita). Also with regards to the longitude of the city branding process the municipalities stand out. Kolding and Odense initiated their city branding activities in 2012, whereas Horsens took the first steps in 1998. Despite the very different premises and focus of attention, the three cases share some common counter-narrative thematic constructions as will be illustrated in the following.

Findings

As mentioned in the introduction of the paper, political leadership may be challenged within the political arena (politicians) and the administrative arena (employees within the municipality). The following analysis

reveals that some challenges are experienced by all three municipalities whereas others are unique and only experienced by one or two of the cities. This can mainly be explained by the different situations of the municipalities, their various motivations behind the city branding projects, diverse budgets, and the dissimilar nature of the strategic visions of the cities. Despite the various prerequisites of the branding projects, the material points to central challenges municipalities may experience within city branding processes. The presentation of these challenges is structured so that it reflects the political and administrative arena respectively. It includes statements made by the mayors and city managers in relation to brand resistance and counter narratives while reflections and findings across cases will be dealt with under the sub heading 'Discussions'. The findings described below are depicted in short form and compared to the literature reviews on extra-organizational and inter-organizational brand resistance in table 2.

Counter-narratives within the political arena

Common for all three cases is the awareness of a need for continued political support to city branding projects. In Kolding the mayor estimated that support for the vision in the political arena is almost non-existent despite the fact that the council had unanimously adopted the citizen proposal 'Kolding – we design life' four years earlier. He reflected that 'they are not against it ('it is really fine, this design-thing') but only very few fight for it'. This view is supported by the recently appointed city manager, who observed that 'We do have ambassadors among our politicians', but at the same time, 'we have some politicians who hardly identify themselves with the strategy'. Some politicians are uncertain and worried, which is reflected in questions like, 'What does it mean for the care of elder people or the policy for disabled citizens?' According to the city manager, the city management had 'not been able to describe the potential to the politicians'. This conclusion is supported by the mayor who claimed that 'Some politicians do not see the purpose; some may feel that they have lost influence to the citizens in the process'. This last point reveals some of the dynamics at stake between politicians and citizens. Thus one reason for the lack of political ownership was according to the mayor the initial bottom-up process putting a lot of effort into the involvement of citizens. This observation was supported by the city manager who made the following observation: 'But I can be unsure as to whether the very engaging process made the politicians feel that they were involved. Only citizens and businesses were involved but what about the politicians?' When asked how he would have handled the branding process, knowing what he knew now, the city manager responded that he would have involved the politicians in the start-up process.

However, our three cases also reveal that it is not a question of either focusing on politicians OR citizens, but rather a question of understanding the dynamics between those two stakeholders. According to the mayor of Kolding, the citizens play an active role when it comes to getting buy-in from the politicians. He observed that 'When the citizens experience a value of the vision, then there is a value in it for them [i.e. the politicians] as well'. The mayor explained that this is due to the politicians' motivation for getting votes'. As such there is a reciprocal relation between the buy-in of the citizens and the buy-in of the politicians. In that sense, these two stakeholders seem to be decisive to the overall buy-in of the strategic vision and should therefore be considered key target groups with regards to the strategic communication.

Unfortunately the follow-up communication with the citizens had, according to the mayor of Kolding, been inadequate. He experienced the vision as a 'well-kept secret within the organization'. The mayor supported this observation with self-critical reflections such as 'We have also become aware that we have not informed enough about what is going on'; 'We have become too introvert', and 'We have completely forgotten that there is also something called citizens'. As the citizens have not been continually exposed to the strategic communication of the vision, they seem to lack the understanding of the vision. This has a negative impact on the support of the politicians. After proof-reading and accepting his comments the

mayor has informed the authors that the city has changed the 'slogan' to 'Together we design life' and the city vision is made more extrovert and targeted.

The reciprocal relation between the citizens' and politicians' ownerships of the brand vision also played a key role in the branding process in the municipality of Odense. The transformation of Odense was defined by city top management as more than 'just' a city branding project. The regeneration plan includes not only brand visions, but also a series of tangible, infrastructural changes; among other things a change of harbor functions and closure of a central road through the city. According to the mayor, many of the proposed changes were criticized by citizens to an extent where 'People in Odense were furious'. The mayor explained that he has "been scolded so much" and 'They [i.e. the citizens] sometimes stood in front of the City Hall shouting at me'. These reactions had an impact on the processes taking place within the political and administrative arena. One consequence of the public protests was according to the mayor that the liberal party decided to change political position on some of the infrastructural issues. The mayor described how the political conflict eventually became a key issue in the municipal election in 2014. The election was won by the mayor and his Social Democratic party. He considered this result as a de facto public support for the project and for the transformation in general. The council is still divided but the transformation of the city continues. The mayor justified this decision by arguing that 'You should listen – but you must also decide', 'You must take political leadership' and 'As a politician you cannot serve everybody's wishes' pointing to the need for political brand leadership in spite of eventual reactions from arenas outside the political arena.

The mayor of Horsens was also aware of the importance of political support but did not articulate the reciprocal connection between citizens and politicians. This may be due to the fact that he experienced full support by the politicians: 'the project is supported unanimously by the city council' and that his 'colleagues from the Socialist People's Party, who used to be against the project, have turned 180 degrees'. The mayor was more concerned about whether the prioritization of tax money would be a potential issue as illustrated by his following comments: 'When 'Horsens and Friends' has been in need of money I sometimes heard reactions such as 'Is it wise to go in and support them?'. He has also 'met companies who thought it was better to spend money on asphalt than on developing the old prison'. Finally, he mentions that a prerequisite for a continuous support of the project is an adequate level of welfare. With this comment he indicated, that it would be problematic to argue for economic support of the city branding project, if the citizens experienced a decrease in social welfare. The mayor of Odense pointed to similar concerns as he initially experienced challenges from the liberal party which he overcame: 'we can get more teachers for this amount of money'. When asked about this challenge, the mayor in Kolding did not recognize the problem but did acknowledge that it typically is a challenge. This could be related to the fact that Kolding is the municipality with the lowest city branding budget.

A final observation only identified in Horsens relates to new citizens. The mayor of Horsens raises a specific concern regarding the longitude of the branding project as it has a long prehistory, starting with an aborted city marketing campaign in the 1980ies. Within the city branding period – initiated in 1998 - the city image has changed from a former dull industrial city with a prison to an image recognized for its national and international events. The mayors reflection was that newcomers and younger generations may not find the image of the city as extraordinary if they are not acquainted with the history of the city and its prior image. Thus he found it 'important to tell them the story of the city'.

Counter-narratives within the administrative arena

The administrative arena concerns the internal stakeholders in the municipality, i.e. the employees. The counter-narratives related to this arena mainly consist of issues pertaining to these employees' involvement in, and understanding of, the city branding project. The mayor in Kolding explained the

importance of buy-in from within the organization as follows: 'If we do not have the top of the organization with us [...] we will fail'. He experienced an increasing support to the project in the organization but is also aware of the fact that there still were leaders and employees within the organization, who do not see the value of a creative design process 'that eventually will lead them to a conclusion already known beforehand', as they explained it according to the mayor. According to the mayor, these 'resistant' leaders and employees would only see the value when working with the design process themselves. As such, it is not important to the mayor whether the employees know the vision, what is most important is that they experience the value of the vision.

A similar reflection can be identified in the interview with the city manager of Odense municipality as he posed the question: 'Should every employee (there are 14.500 in the city) know the story?' and added the following elaboration: 'I do not think they should be instructed. They will take on their own opinions in dialogues with their neighbors, those who live in the municipality'. However, the aim of a unison brand message was still an ideal being pursued by the mayor who asked the following question: 'Can we develop a story in the organization that we can lean on so that we speak more strongly with one voice?'. It should be mentioned that the economy in Odense has been very tight over a number of years and there have been a series of spending cuts. As a consequence, the administration developed a strategy 'New reality – new welfare' in 2010-2011. The city manager stated that 'these 'New-New' initiatives were considered by the employees as framed as innovation but experienced as budget cuts, and as a consequence, top management lost credibility within the organization'. Therefore the employees had been skeptical about the new city branding project and the unison message has been challenged. However, according to the mayor, the attitude had recently been changing towards more positive reactions.

The city manager in Horsens experienced a dilemma within the municipal organization in spite of the success of the brand project. 'I experienced that the whole city was engaged but that employees at city hall were more reluctant' he said, and 'Internally in the organization there was a little jealousy especially between the technical department and the cultural department', and he described it as a 'conflict between granite and entertainment'. After a change in management there is now full support among the directors. This illustrates how individuals may be resistant and that political ownership in itself will not guarantee organizational support. The city manager added: 'I am sure that I can find individual employees who think this is a waste of time' and his personal reflection was that 'sometimes I can get an uncertainty inside myself, is the event and concert theme going to last?' But then I am corrected – 'the position is so strong in the system it is almost self-suggestive'. On the other hand he mentioned a situation, where there was a request for good stories from the schools. The responsible director reflected that 'we should be careful because at least one teacher would then come out and tell about something that went bad', which is also an example of how self-containment may lead to attempts to control bad news from jeopardizing the brand.

Table 2

	Extra-organizational resistance	Inter-organizational resistance	Intra-organizational resistance, politicians (left) and administration (right)	
Lack of knowledge	X			X
Alienation	X			X
Non-affiliation	X			X
Disengagement	X		X	X

Negligence	X		X	X
Disapproval	X		X	X
Direct countering activities	X			
Brand deconstruction	X			
Chaos and fragmentation (particularistic attitude of stakeholders)		X		
The politics of scale (multilevel governance)		X		
Tension between private and public space		X		
Tension between different geographies		X		
The politics of memory (experience of collaboration in the past)		X		
Political conflicts – may be seen as parallel to direct counter-activities from citizens			X	
Lack of ownership			X	X
Administrative and political competition for resources and attention			X	X
Distrusting motives				X

Discussion

The political and the administrative arenas

City branding is part of urban politics but the roles of politicians is disputed as some authors see politicians – especially the mayor – as important for the branding process, while others do not. National differences in political and administrative organization may partly explain these differences. A comparative study of European mayors in 20 countries showed that Danish mayors combine strategic orientation with authoritarian exercise of power to a higher degree than mayors in any of the other studied countries. These findings are corroborated by our three cases, as all three mayors demonstrated strong personal and political ownership, and spoke enthusiastically and in great details about ‘their’ branding projects. As chairmen of the city council, they were all very conscious about the general political attitudes and (or lack of) support in the city council. Political ownership was an essential issue whether it was in Horsens where all council members now support the brand project, in Kolding where a number of council members felt alienated from the project, or in Odense, where the project led to a deep political conflict, dividing the council and turning the dispute into an election theme. Bringing the dispute into the election process is probably the most comprehensive and far-reaching expression of resistance within a democratic framework and this may be seen as a parallel to the concerted and organized extra-organizational counter

narratives mentioned in literature. The resistance is made visible in all arenas and to everybody and can be contested compared to the master narrative. In Odense, the voters supported the master narrative which is now maintained by the council majority. This is the only example of open political conflict in our cases. However, across the three cases, there are a number of more subtle counter narratives that may influence the brand process. Subtle narratives exist within the political and the administrative arena and they are normally unknown to the public, but these 'silent' intra-organizational counter-narratives' can be very influential. An interesting perspective from the political arena was mentioned in Kolding. If part of the council may feel that a potentially successful brand project is 'hijacked' by individual politicians or a particular party, it could lead to resistance in the political arena no matter how the project is understood, organized and/or accepted by the citizens. Furthermore, disengagement, non-affiliation and lack of ownership were key issues in Kolding in spite of – or maybe because of – the high levels of citizens' involvement in the process. The council unanimously supported the brand vision proposed by the citizens, but nevertheless did not feel empowered in their political work and were not ready to bear the consequences of the project.

Within the administrative arena, employees are in a different position compared to citizens in general because they work for and represent the political organizations responsible for and paying for the branding project. Since municipalities in Denmark are large organizations with thousands of employees any brand project would obviously benefit if they could be convinced to be ambassadors in the project. From a political point of view this could be very attractive as mentioned in Odense, but none of the city managers had that perspective in mind. Lack of authenticity and lack of affiliation with the brand were found in both Odense and Kolding, but in both cities the city managers felt that this was a 'matter of time' and that support was growing within the organization. In spite of the unanimous political support in Horsens there had been conflicts inside the administration.

Table 2 is an attempt to categorize the different types of intra-organizational resistance and relate them to external and inter-organizational resistance. In the political arena disengagement, negligence, and disapproval may be compared with external stakeholders (in spite of earlier formal political accept) while lack of knowledge, alienation and brand deconstruction are not. Open political conflicts may be compared to countering activities from external stakeholders. Intra-organizational resistance shares a lot of issues with external resistance but there are some important differences. In the political arena lack of ownership, competition for resources and political conflicts are essential while lack of ownership, internal competition for resources, and distrust of motives play an important role within the administrative arena.

A brand project is a long-term process but the turnover of politicians and employees is likely to affect the organizational memory as well as attitude in both the political and the administrative arena. The Danish election period at municipal level is 4 years, and 43 % of local politicians were changed during the election in 2013 (Brandsen and Petersen 2013). Furthermore, the average annual staff turnover in Danish municipalities exceeded 21 % in 2016 (VIVE 2016). To avoid that lack or loss of knowledge should be seen or perceived as acts of resistance politicians and employees should be understood and treated as individual and unique audiences where intra-organizational information and communication must be repeated frequently to new politicians and employees.

Theoretical implications

The findings in this study show that influential resistance and counter narratives emerge from the political and the administrative arena within the city organization itself. We suggest that these counter-narratives should be labeled as *intra-organizational counter-narratives* to separate them from external stakeholders and inter-organizational counter-narratives. Intra-organizational counter-narratives differed significantly from inter-organizational counter-narratives in this study. Intra-organizational resistance shares a lot of issues with external resistance but there are important differences, see table 2. In the political arena lack of

ownership, competition for resources and political conflicts are essential while lack of ownership, internal competition for resources, and distrust of motives play an important role within the administrative arena. The study underlines the significance of political support demonstrated as political governance or if necessary as political government. When the council has decided upon a specific project, branding is a long-term project, and political interest and support must be maintained over years. It is suggested that the political and the administrative arenas should be addressed as individual and unique audiences just as important as citizens in the brand process, not least due to the high turnover of employees as well as politicians. Besides, the findings have pointed to an area hitherto rather unexplored. As internal stakeholders municipal employees work on municipal institutions, drive municipal cars and may even wear municipal uniforms. In other words, they 'communicate' the municipality to the citizens. But as mentioned above their role is uncertain and not well understood.

Limitations and further research

This study is qualitative and limited to three municipalities in one country. The Danish examples should not be seen as a definitive list of origins and manifestations of intra-organizational counter narratives, as political and administrative arenas differ between countries. Further research is therefore needed in different political and administrative settings. The role of politicians and city councils in brand governance is disputed in literature and the authors find that this theme should be given more scientific attention in the future since city brand projects usually rely on public funding. Further studies are also needed to understand how the rapid turnover of politicians and employees may influence the intra-organizational support to a brand project. Besides, the findings have pointed to an area hitherto rather unexplored. The municipal employees work on municipal institutions, drive municipal cars and may even wear municipal uniforms. In other words, they "communicate" the municipality to the citizens. But are they non-combatants, ambassadors for the brand project or are they free to have whatever attitude they wish?

Conclusions

Brand resistance occurs as extra-organizational resistance, inter-organizational resistance and intra-organizational resistance. The aim of this exploratory study is to investigate intra-organizational brand resistance and counter-narratives in the political and administrative arenas in Danish municipalities and how this affects city branding initiatives. The study indicates that brand resistance is produced in the political arena as well as in the administrative arena within the city's organization. Brand resistance within the political arena relates to lack of political influence, lack of political ownership and identification, potential political competition and reactions to counter-narratives among citizens. Although mayors are aware of the importance of continued political support for branding projects, the cases suggest that projects will be realized in spite of resistance if there is a political majority to take responsibility. Brand resistance among employees relates, among other things, to competition between departments and to general skepticism towards new branding initiatives. Furthermore, the high turn-over/replacement rates of politicians and staff are likely to affect organizational memory and should be taken into account when city brand initiatives are planned and executed. All of these issues points to the necessity of further investigations into the phenomenon of "*intra – organizational counter-narratives*" among politicians and within the municipal organization.

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Chapter 11

Study 5

THE PRISON – From liability to asset in branding of the Danish city Horsens.

A chapter in C. Cassinger, A. Lucarelli, & S. Gyimothy (Eds.). *The Nordic wave in place Branding: poetics, practices, politics*. Edward Elgar Publishing.
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Ole Have Jørgensen

Introduction

When the author moved to the Danish city Horsens many years ago, a colleague to his wife working in another city asked: 'How dare you move to Horsens with all the crime?' The image of Horsens (90,000 inhabitants in the municipality, budget 950 m Euro) was for years dominated by Horsens State Prison, in operation between 1853 and 2006 (Jørgensen 2014). The prison may be described as a non-iconic signature institution with a 20.000 m² complex of buildings, situated in a 12 hectare fenced area on a small hill in the outskirts of Horsens. Horsens was earlier perceived as violent and criminal, in the media described as the "Chicago of the North" and "The City of Fear" (Jørgensen 2017), and as the opening quote illustrates, still lingers among Danes. All in spite of the fact, that local crime rate was documented lower than in comparable size cities (Jørgensen 2005), and all prisoners left the prison in 2006.

The abandoned buildings give home to a collection of 15.000 prison and prisoner artefacts (the largest collection of its kind in the world), which was seen as a potential foundation for a prison museum. After a period of significant political and local discussion and resistance to municipal involvement, the city council finally decided to purchase the empty institution from the state in 2015 and turned it into a flagship project named THE PRISON. At the present stage THE PRISON entails different business areas: the Prison Museum (owned and run by the city), events (where THE PRISON serves as venue), landlord for an incubator house for SME's and entrepreneurs, SleepIn (a hostel), and meetings and conferences. Since 2012 THE PRISON has had between 60.000 and 160.000 annual visitors, (excluding The Prison Museum with a total of 280.000 visitors from 2012-2017).

A number of old and non-operational prisons all over the world have been converted to condominiums, hotels, museums and tourist sites (Taylor 1994, Strange and Kempa 2003, Wilson 2008, Flynn 2011, Swensen 2014), and prison tourism has become a popular tourist experience in a number of countries (Walby and Piché 2011, Wilson 2004 and 2008, Hartmann 2014, Swensen 2014, Barton and Brown 2015). Such contested heritage sites may be associated with a negative or predominantly negative image (as illustrated in Horsens) that may affect citizen attitudes towards the place. There is ample research on branding strategies to restore negative place image (Gertner and Kotler 2004; Baker 2007; Avraham 2013), and Avraham (2014) has even conceptualized various approaches of turning a place's liability into an asset. Yet, these processes are not described in a longitudinal manner and little is known about situated practices of regeneration interventions, where a contested local feature constitutes the center of the re-Imagineering.


The aim of this study is to present an empirical case of Nordic local place branding and heritage governance in a development context. The chapter chronicles the image regeneration of Horsens throughout the past

decade and analyzes the factors influencing the political decisions behind the acquisition of the prison. One part describe the image transformation based on a longer time series of data showing the stability in cognitive evaluation of the prison element in city image, while the affective evaluation is changed during the regeneration process. Key information sources for this process are discussed. The second part will focus on the political navigation through local dispute and conflict up till a final decision to turn the prison into a flagship project. The analysis is based on data derived from the municipality's annual Top of Mind Awareness Analyses (TOMA), information from the city's administration, local media monitoring data, citizen surveys in relation to the prison, and semi-structured interviews with the PRISON's CEO and the chairman of the board.

Image transformations of Horsens

Horsens has conducted aided TOMA analysis annually since 1997 (missing out 1998, 1999 and 2006). This analysis is based on telephone interviews with 500 citizens representative for the national population in age, gender and geography but all living outside Horsens. The annual TOMA is reported to the council and published and commented upon by the mayor in local media. Figure 1 depicts the 'prison' response in the annual TOMA since 2000 illustrating how people living outside Horsens still remember the prison despite the fact that the last prisoner left in 2006, supporting the point made by Fakeye and Crompton (1991) 'An image, whether positive or negative, may continue long after the factors that molded it have changed'. There is some variation between years, but since the 95 % confidence interval on annual figures is $\pm 4,2$ it is difficult to draw a final conclusion on statistical changes over time from figure 1. From 2010 all respondents who mentioned the prison were then asked: "You have answered that you think of the prison. Is this in a positive or a negative sense?" Table 1 also shows that there is a major change in citizens' attitude to the prison. Over the period citizens' perceptions have grown significantly positive, while the share of neutral / don't know shows a significant decline. The proportion of negative attitudes is statistically unchanged over the period. The change in affective evaluation of the prison (table 1) has had significant influence on the politician's later decision to buy the prison.

Figure 1: The 'prison' response in the annual aided TOMA since 2000 illustrating how people living outside Horsens still remember the prison despite the fact that the last prisoner left in 2006. Annual sample size is 500 with minor variation between years. The 95 % confidence interval on annual numbers is $\pm 4,2$. In short this illustrates how cognitive evaluation may be stable over a long period of time.



Based on responses about the prison, see fig. 1, the interviewer continued: 'You have answered the prison, is this negative or positive?' % responses in each category, 95 % confidence interval max. +/- 5,5

Year	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017
Positive	23	36	44	53	52	56	49	60
Negative	16	11	14	9	11	9	13	13
Don't know/neutral	60	53	41	37	37	35	38	27

Table 1. Aided TOMA analysis among people living outside Horsens. The growth in “positive” and the decline in “negative/don’t know” are both statistically significant at p less than 0,0001. In short this illustrates the change in affective evaluation over time.

The image source analyses of 2016 and 2018 kindly provided by the PRISON’s management provide some indications about how people know THE PRISON and its experience offerings. Analyses are based on elaborate questionnaires using the Analyse Danmark online DK-panel holding 30.000 citizens. Responses were collected from a web panel including 1026/1004 (2016 and 2018 respectively) representatively selected respondents at national level and 1043/1011 representatively selected respondent from the Eastern part of Jutland at regional level. The results are weighed according to gender, age, municipality and

region to match Statistic Denmark's relative national distribution intending to give a representative picture of the population in Denmark (5,7 million) and in the region (1,3 million).

Table 2. Data from "Knowledge Analysis" 2016 and 2018". Responses to the general question about knowledge of THE PRISON followed by responses to the close end multiple choice question: "How did you learn about THE PRISON"? National respondents (n = 1026/1004) and regional respondents (n = 1043/1011). *marks a statistically significant difference (95 % probability) between years.

Question: Do you know that Horsens State Prison is closed down as a prison and today is used as a culture, conference and event venue named THE PRISON.	National response, 2016/2018 in % of total number of respondents	Regional response, 2016/2018 in % of total number of regional respondents
	77/83*	95/96
From above followed by: How did you learn about THE PRISON ?	National respondents 2016/2018 in % of total respondents	Regional respondents 2016/2018 in % of total respondents
From friends who have visited "The Prison"	31 / 36*	38 / 42*
From TV	37 / 36	32 / 29
From printed press and newspapers	37 / 29*	33 / 28*
I know "The Prison" because of the museum	14 / 18*	26 / 31*
From postings on Facebook including shared or sponsored postings	14 / 14	13 / 16
I have been to a concert at "The Prison"	11 / 11	14 / 16
I have been to a cultural event at "The Prison"	6 / 8	15 / 18
From search on the internet	12 / 12	10 / 12
I have been to a meeting or a conference	2 / 2	4 / 4
I know people working at "The Prison"	4 / 1	4 / 4
Something else	9 / 8	8 / 6
Don't remember	5 / 5	3 / 4

As seen from Table 2, there are three main sources of citizens' knowledge about "THE PRISON", both nationally and regionally: "From friends who have visited prison", "from television" and "from the press".

Social media and web image sources are getting surprisingly few responses bearing in mind that all respondents are members of an online panel.

Besides there seems to be regional as well as national development, where influence from friends increase while the influence from especially the newspapers and printed media is reduced. Geographical proximity conditions a higher knowledge of the museum and previous participation in events.

Image impact factors

Boisen et al. (2017) refer to the task of place branding as reputation-management, while Cleave and Arku (2017) point to the awareness of the place brand and it needs to create a positive image in the minds of those the brand interacts with to create a strong sense-of-place. It is generally accepted that perceived place image is formed by two distinctly different but hierarchically interrelated components, the cognitive and the affective component (Baloglu and McCleary 1999). The cognitive evaluations refer to beliefs or knowledge about place attributes, the brand awareness, whereas affective evaluation refers to feelings toward or attachment to it, the brand image. Image and reputation are influenced through several channels of image formation agents (Gartner, 1993) and it is believed that actual visitation creates an image more realistic than the image existing prior to visitation (Gunn 1972). In addition the so called solicited and unsolicited organic images are the stories that people share with each other either face - to face or more and more online on request or spontaneous (Tasci and Gartner 2007). While satisfied tourists are more likely to recommend a destination to others (see further references in Prayag et al. 2017), dissatisfied tourists are likely to engage in negative word-of-mouth (Chen and Chen 2010)

There are very few examples of time series of data that illustrate image change over time but in her study on the European Capital of Culture culture-led regeneration of Glasgow and Liverpool Garcia (2017) has made an in-depth media content analysis of three decades of press data. The findings led her to the assumption that "Evidenceable and sustained change in media representations of place can be taken as tantamount to image change", but she found little evidence of a long-term sustained image change.

The present case illustrates a situation, where the cognitive component, the awareness, is stable at a high level see figure 1, but the affective component, the image, has changed over time. The negative response remains at the same level, the indifferent response is reduced significantly and the number of positive respondents is growing significantly. The prison-part of the city's brand has been changed and the most natural explanation would be that people already knowing the prison, are informed about the new activities from one or several information sources. But this question was newer posed to the respondents in TOMA. Instead the two Knowledge Analyses, see table 2, may be consulted. These surveys reflect statistically representative samples of the national (and regional) population, and may be used to deduce the key sources of information leading to the changed attitude to the prison (and consequently to the city). The change from prison to cultural conference and event venue is nationally well known and regionally extremely well known, table 2. Three main sources to this information dominate in both measurements at the same level and markedly higher than all other sources: "Information from friends who have visited THE PRISON", "TV", and "Printed press/newspapers".

The first source illustrates the importance of word of mouth (and mouse), the solicited and unsolicited organic images, the stories people share with each other (Gartner 1993). del Bosque and Martin (2008) showed that affective images influence word of mouth as an outcome of brand loyalty to a destination suggesting a direct connection between affective image and word of mouth which might be supported by the Horsens case. Prison Museum in a prison, metal music and a medieval festival are all well synchronized with a prison atmosphere leaning against "dark tourism", and appeal to cognitive as well as affective senses with potential photo and sound opportunities to be distributed on social media. THE PRISON pays attention to elaborate storytelling and untraditional initiatives to achieve editorial attention instead of spending

money for traditional marketing and communication (Henning Nørbæk and Astrid Søs Poulsen). They also pointed to situations where THE PRISON is venue and where the organizers of the event in question are responsible for marketing the event. Thus a large part of the information from TV and printed press/newspapers originates from the event organizers. Even though the media monitoring may be inadequate at the moment, the analysis above shows how significant events (concerts) as well as permanent offers (the museum) are significant contributors to the overall media coverage but also that there are a large number of other sources.

TV, printed press and newspapers play an equally important role originating from secondary communication from THE PRISON or the event managers taking advantage of the high national level of knowledge of the venue. It is a well known fact that newspaper circulation is diminishing (national and regional newspaper circulation dropped 42 % from 2005 to 2015 in Denmark, Albrecht 2015) and the drop continues. TV is also an important secondary communication where the visual identity of THE PRISON is repeated again and again.

At reasonably lower level we find knowledge of the Prison Museum and the organic images from visits and personal participation in concerts and other cultural events are more important as regional than as national information source which is understandable because of the distance. Shared or sponsored postings on Facebook and search on the internet indicate a surprisingly low impact from these sources.

Monitoring impact

Examples of documented systematic impact monitoring are scarce in spite of the findings of Anselmsson and Bondesson (2013), where “The systematic monitoring and follow up of brand performance separate high-performing brands from their low-performing counterparts”. Klijn et al. (2012) analyzed data from 274 Dutch respondents involved in city marketing, but the study did not measure ‘hard’ objective effects. “If we had had data about attracting target groups for each municipality, it would have been very hard to relate those to the marketing activities”. The evidence of how flagship projects and major cultural projects contribute to a range of regeneration projects is also limited (Evans 2005). Bell and Jayne (2006), Richards and Palmer (2010) and Smith (2012) mention no examples of well documented brand impacts in relation to events and urban regeneration. The European Capital of Culture (ECOC) program is often seen as a leading example of culture-led regeneration intervention of host cities, but little evidence has been gathered to determine long-term sustained image change in these cities (Garcia 2017). In his study on actual campaign components and marketing initiatives used for “*turning a place’s liability into an asset*”, Avraham (2014) emphasizes that his study is pure content analysis research and “there is no way to know if the use of this strategy was successful or not”. In their meta-analysis of quantifying the effectiveness of place branding, Cleave and Arku (2017) mention a number of potential measure strategies but report no time series and do not refer to any examples of quantitative documentation of a qualitative affective evaluation. On the other hand, Jørgensen (2014) illustrated how the Danish city Horsens through a systematic effort on concerts and cultural events has changed image so that about 50% of the citizens of the country today connect the city's name with concerts and cultural events (compared to 2% when the project started in 2000).

A contested re-imaginering process: Nordic brand governance practices

In a recent review of place branding and urban policy cases across Europe, Lucarelli (2018) identifies two different governance approaches: (i) Branding embedded in a participatory process where citizens are seen as co-owners (Dutch cases, Eshuis and Edwards 2013) and (ii) a more performative view where the brand regeneration process always is a matter of power and politics (Swedish cases, Lucarelli and Hallin 2017, Danish cases, Jørgensen 2015, Lundholt et al. 2018). A third, comparative aspect (fundamental national differences in regional and local government structures) has barely been touched upon as mentioned by

Braun et al. (2017). They found that German and Dutch assessment of conflicts among brand stakeholders vary and suggested that fundamental international differences in regional and local political structure and culture may be of significant importance, when governance approaches to branding are discussed.

The present case addresses this empirical flaw and perspectivates it in the light of the Nordic model of local governance. A number of books and papers have commented upon and analyzed the Scandinavian or as later expressed “The Nordic Model” including recent books like Knutzen (2017), Bendixen et al. (2018) and Witoszek and Midttun (2018). The local political leadership in the Nordic countries has a strong tradition of consensual, corporatist style of decision making (Goldsmith and Larsen 2004), recently described by Pedersen and Kuhnle (2017) as consensual governance or by Knutzen (2017) as decentralized co-operative governance. In a specific Danish context Klausen (2009) see the city council as shareholder in the city’s development on behalf of the citizen, and Jørgensen (2015) has illustrated how Danish city branding projects are managed by communication officers with direct access to and sometimes sitting next door to the mayor and/or the city manager. Nine out of 25 cities in his study had experience with aborted branding projects due to change in political leadership, political conflicts and/or a general loss of political support. In a study of intra-organizational counter-narratives in Danish city branding Lundholt et al. (2018) found that mayors are aware of needs for continued political support for branding projects, but projects are nonetheless realized in spite of resistance if there is political support to it.

The council and the citizens of Horsens were very concerned about the future of the old prison. The council saw a housing potential on the open space around the prison but had no interest in getting involved with the significant building stock. Eventually this view changed over time and was influenced by a number of factors. In 2006 the city’s PR-group (financed by the council and working from city hall) proposed to transform the old prison into an attraction named “World of Crime” where the collection of prison and prisoner artifacts and the high national level of knowledge could be the setting for a potential and unique flagship project for the city (interview with mr. Henning Nørbæk, at the time chairman of the city’ PR group, now chairman of the board of THE PRISON FOUNDATION). Contradicting to “World of Crime” the editor of the local liberal newspaper argued in 2007 to dismantle the prison to make an end to the prison image. Also in 2007 the newspaper made a survey among citizens from Horsens, where 77 % supported the idea of an attraction like “World of Crime”, while only 12 % were against it. But the idea of “World of Crime” triggered at least 79 different letters to the editor over the years 2006 – 2011. 61 were critical against any future use of the prison while 18 were positive and supported ideas of how the prison could be developed as an attraction. 31 of the critical letters were written by the same person and when he diseased in 2010 the overall production of letters ended. Interviews in the newspaper with 10 different council members in 2010 revealed that there was no political agreement about the prison future, and some argued that the city should in no way be involved in any project. The controversial concept “World of Crime” was officially abandoned in 2008 because it could be seen as a tivolisation or disneyfication of the prisoners as well as their victims (Henning Nørbæk).

Due to the financial crisis the sale project failed in 2008, and in the limbo that followed, the council accepted and partly financed a continued work by the city’s PR group to develop potential projects ideas in an iterative process similar to skunk work, well known in organizational theory as an “enriched environment that is intended to help a small group of individuals design a new idea by escaping routine organizational procedures” (Rogers 2003). The present chairman of the board, Mr. Nørbæk, was responsible for the process and activities with full support from the mayor even though the mayor himself was very skeptical about the potential. The prison was then opened for visitor groups and different activities to make local citizens acquainted with the place to adjust their traditional preunderstanding. This method had been used successfully by the council some years before when the city financed a new arena for sports and events. At that time there were local protests, but as literally thousands of citizens were taken through the building site and the unfinished constructions to create a form of sense making (Weick

1995) for the future perspective, many developed into ambassadors for the arena (pers. observation by the author who served as city manager in Horsens at the time). In cooperation with the property owner (the state company Freja Ejendomme A/S), small companies were invited in as tenants, the museum concept developed and the process stepped up in the autumn of 2011 (as illustrated in the budgetary agreement for 2012). Horsens had in cooperation with Copenhagen won the prestigious tender to host part of the Danish Presidency of the Council of the European Union in 2012, 40.000 tickets were sold to a Metallica concert at the prison in the summer of 2012 and Horsens hosted the third stage of Giro d'Italia 2012. It is a well known strategy for urban revitalization to organize different types of events (Richards and Palmer 2010, Smith 2012) and this strategy had been used successfully in Horsens since 2000 (Jørgensen 2014). The three abovementioned initiatives were in a planning phase in 2011 and inevitably produced an open window for investments. Especially the Metallica concert within the prison walls opened the local eyes for the potential of the buildings and structures. Eventually a large majority of the city council decided to see the prison as the key to a future focus on tourism and events and to work with the state owner to open the prison including the Prison Museum in 2012. During budget negotiations in the autumn of 2011 one million Euro was set aside for necessary structural changes, and the council decided to establish a commercial foundation "Fonden FÆNGSLET" – THE PRISON Foundation - with a long term perspective to develop a sustainable private company. In 2013 the local Medieval Festival was moved from the city center to the prison and in the autumn of 2014 the council almost unanimously decided to buy the buildings and the land for nearly four million Euros, and hand the buildings over to the commercial foundation FÆNGSLET. The initial focus on housing potential survives and still serves as a fallback position securing the city's investment if THE PRISON project may fail in the long run.

The political process and decisions behind initiatives of this character are hardly dealt with in literature. In Horsens the city council play a crucial role moving from positive, dubious or critical and negative attitudes to any municipal involvement in the beginning of the process in 2006 to see the future potential of the prison and to reach a unanimous decision to buy the prison in 2014. The first key decision was quickly to abandon the "World of Crime" concept, and it was also essential that the council, in spite of the political differences of opinion, accepted civil servants skunk work to go on for years at a time full of uncertainty. As such, the process illustrates the Nordic model for consensual governance (Pedersen and Kuhnle 2017) at work.

The first and very successful initiative in the skunk work was to open for visitor groups and organize different smaller activities to make them ambassadors for the potential of the prison. Another important initiative was the lasting interest in creating a Prison Museum using the objects from the prison. These activities can all be described as an important "pre-branding" exploratory phase, targeting local citizens and potential customers. Timing was also crucial. Preparations for large events may represent an open window of opportunity for other activities in the political sphere - and can be very efficiently used, but are usually very difficult to plan for. Undoubtedly the routinely collected data from TOMA where the positive affective evaluation of the prison increased over time (table 1) and a growing number of visitors developed a data driven reciprocity between project and council. Finally this study illustrates that turning a liability into an asset may be a long term project, in this case an 8 year project, where the first results documented by data showed up after five years.

Conclusion

This case represents a brand governance situation where the citizens as well as the politicians are well aware of the problem (the negative image effect from the prison) but disagree on solutions. At the end of the day it is the local consensual democracy within the council that decides with or without citizens' accept supporting the view of Lucarelli and Hallin (2017) and Lundholt et al. (2018). THE PRISON is a dominant element of the brand of Horsens among local citizens as well as in the outside world, and this element has

now changed from a liability into an asset. The change was brought about in a number of steps including “Nordic-style” consensual governance by the city council, a “pre-branding” explorative process to build local support, skunk work on content, timing, systematic documentation, - and time. The case illustrates the importance of a branding process involving communication on all available media platforms. Still it should be born in mind that the data in this case represent a “communication snapshot” in a time where the media world is changing (printed media dropping, TV developing and social media growing) making any comparison with older studies very difficult. Finally this case illustrates one of the extremely few examples from literature where the change of the affective evaluation of a city brand is well documented over time.

Notes

During this study the author has had access to the following additional information:

The city councils signed annual budgetary agreements (Budgetaftaler) for the years 2007 – 2018.

The administration’s subscription to media search from the company Retriever (for 01.01.2010 to 31.08.2018)

Search on “Horsens, Fængslet” (THE PRISON) gave 944 hits from printed media and 976 hits on edited webpages. Two concerts with Metallica (11% and 14 % respectively of all hits), concerts with Rammstein, Volbeat and Aerosmith (concert visitors totaling 150.000), and the Prison Museum, total 33 % of hits on print and 38 % of hits on the web. TV and radio is not monitored (Henning Nørbæk).

The electronic archive of Horsens Folkeblad (the local newspaper).

All issues of the newspaper covering 2007 were searched for letters to the editor concerning the future of the prison in order to find relevant keywords for a further electronic search. The words “World of Crime”, Fængslet (the prison) and slottet (the castle, the local nickname for the prison) turned out to be key words and were used in an electronic survey from 2006 – 2011 leading to 79 letters.

Interviews with the CEO and the chairman of the board of THE PRISON.

The author carried out a semi-structured interview in April 2018 with the chairman of the board, Mr. Henning Nørbæk, and the CEO of the prison, Mrs. Astrid Søs Poulsen. The CEO was appointed in 2016, while the chairman of the board has been cultural consultant and head of culture in the city since 1987, and has chaired the board since 2017. The interview followed a questionnaire with focus on process, strategy and narratives in relation to THE PRISON.

The present situation for THE PRISON (September 2018, Astrid Søs Poulsen)

THE PRISON communicates through the following channels with www.faengslet.dk as the center: Facebook (18.000 followers), LinkedIn (1200 connections), Instagram (low priority) and monthly newsletters to 5.000 subscribers. PR also includes some press releases and contacts to regional TV while national media are hard to reach. Some events do, however, hit the national media (like the concerts with Metallica and Ramstein).

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Chapter 12 Discussion

I have chosen a thematic discussion in a meta-perspective across the five studies instead of a discussion of the individual studies. The discussion will address the two research questions mentioned in section 1.3:

***Is it possible to find a more appropriate definition of the role local politicians plays in city branding?**

***Is it possible to propose a more systematic approach to data collection and monitoring in city brand projects?**

12.1 Is it possible to find a more appropriate definition of the role local politicians plays in city branding?

There is a general understanding in literature that city branding is city politics, but the role of local politicians is unclear, undefined and to some degree contested as described in section 4.1.5. Kotler et al. (1993) find that *'under effective mayors, cities can often succeed in dramatically improving of their conditions'*, Parkerson and Saunders (2005) see *'The impact of the city council on brand elements is immense'*, while Wesselmann and Hohn (2012) find lasting and active support from political management as an essential success factor in city branding. Trommer (2015) emphasizes the importance of charismatic and competent city management.

Another view is expressed by Kavaratzis and Hatch (2013) as *'leadership in a brand process should not be thought of as the traditional, political leadership'*, and Braun et al. (2013) find that *'First local authorities have to explain, justify and defend their place branding-related actions against several types of political control'*.

Andrea Lucarelli reflects over the perspective of political involvement in place branding in an interview published in The Place Brand Observer on August 22, 2019. He finds that *'In my view, place branding is a political process. Politics lay at its centre. Politics as form of power is acting into place branding, for example in a way that certain decisions or activities are being imposed'*. And further *'What's important is to keep in mind that place branding is a highly political process which – like all political processes – has the potential of alienating residents, building barriers and creating conflicts'*. Lucarelli points to dilemmas that must be addressed to find a more appropriate definition of the role of local politicians.

Freeman's (1984) definition of stakeholders has led to a comprehensive amount of literature on definition of stakeholders, analyses of different groups of stakeholders, strategic stakeholder management etc. (see i.e. Ackerman and Eden 2011, Davis 2014 and Winch 2017). Pre-conditional for the stakeholder analysis is, however, a clear definition of the *'focal organization'*, and to Friedman (1984) *'the focal organization'* is the firm, but he is ready to accept a pragmatic definition depending on the details of the situation. A fundamental premise of stakeholder theory is also that stakeholders differ from stockholders (shareholders) because the latter has a financial claim on the focal organization, by Pfarrer (2010) seen as *'capital market stakeholders'*. In a project perspective Winch (2014) has argued that the focal organization is the *'owners'* organization who raises capital for investment in a project, *'owns'* the assets generated and goes on to exploit it for the beneficial use to provide a return to the investors. In a public organizational context Winch (2017) see the taxpayers as stockholders, while Klausen (2014) consider the local politicians as shareholders on behalf of the taxpayers. In spite of the above-mentioned reflections Winch (2017) prefers to see financiers of projects as a special type of stakeholders rather than contrasting stockholders in project stakeholder management.

Winch (2017) has for practical reasons unfolded his reflections in relation to megaproject stakeholder management in a project management perspective, seeing the project stakeholder as *'any group or individual who can affect or be affected by the achievements of the project mission'*. But he finds that remarkably little attention has been given to the research on stakeholder management and to the distinctive characteristics of government, particularly national government, as stakeholders.

City branding projects are not megaprojects and they do not involve fixed assets, but they share in their own perspective some of the same characters. Politicians decide on projects and project organizations are set up or in other ways involved like Destination Management Organizations etc. And while Winch (2017) does not refer to his project organizations as *'intermediaries'*, they fall within the definition given by Frandsen and Johansen (2015).

Going back to Winch (2014), the focal organization is the *'owners'* organization who raises capital for investment in a project, *'owns'* the assets generated and goes on to exploit it for the beneficial use to provide a return to the investors. In the political arena and in a municipal context the municipality is the *'focal'* organization that raises capital to brand projects and will *'go on to exploit it for the beneficial use to provide a return to the investors'*, no matter whether the investors are seen as the taxpayers directly or the politicians acting on their behalf. But further questions in relation to politicians acting on behalf of the *'focal'* organization in city brand projects are: decisions on brand objectives; place improvement strategies; strategies for top-down or bottom up processes; and the significance of intra-organizational conflicts. The following sections will explore these questions aiming at an answer to the first research question.

12.1.1 Brand objectives and politics

Respecting that there are several different definitions of the noun *'brand'* and the verb *'branding'* I will here take the view that a *'city brand'* describe the cognitive and affective valuation of a particular city in a consumer/citizen/stakeholders mind. *'Branding'* is all types of communication, deliberate or not, that is being distributed from the city which, eventually, may have an impact on the consumer/citizen/stakeholders cognitive or affective valuation of the city.

In a city brand project the intention is to orchestrate the communication with a specific purpose, the brand objective. Literature has accumulated a number of objectives for city branding, see section 3.11 and Jørgensen (2016a): *Attract inbound investment and venture capital; Attract and retaining companies; Attract and retain skilled knowledge workers; Attract tourists and visitors; Attract students; Attract new citizens; Increase political influence at regional, national and international level; Increase chances to create partnerships with other cities, public or private research and higher education institutions and private sector organizations; Utilize the 'city of origin' effect on products and services; Marketing locally produced goods and services outside the city; Create civic pride and related ability to increase local harmony and confidence; Image change; Exploit 'golden opportunities'; Reinforce municipal coherence after municipal reforms; and A new political beginning.* They all demonstrate that city branding is about city competition and that the intention is to enhance the city's position and potential in competition with other cities. Several of these objectives are clear-cut political issues, while a few may be seen as cooperation issues between the city and local institutions or private companies.

In relation to the research question it is essential to analyze whether initiatives of this character only can be taken within a political arena or the politicians could be substituted with other actors. By a closer look it is difficult to point at any one of these motives and argue that a private company, an NGO or a citizen singlehandedly or in a group would decide to initiate and invest in a city brand project with one of the objectives alone and on behalf of the citizens without involving the city politicians. Private companies, local institutions and private citizens may for many reasons appeal to politicians to take action, and they may even participate with investments as it has been found in the Danish cases. But it is hardly imaginable that

they would embark on a journey of inter-city competition on behalf of local society but without political involvement and support.

12.1.2 Place improvement strategies and politics

Other political issues were already introduced by Kotler et al. (1993). They propose four building blocks for place improvement strategies (Urban design, Infrastructure, Public Services and Attractions), and particularly the attraction (and event) strategy has been given much attention in literature. Practical examples of these strategies are described in chapter 2 and in study 1 and 5. But essential for all four building blocks is that they predominantly depend on public investments (by the city, by regional or national authorities). The city council has influence as planning authority on urban design and infrastructure in most countries. Design and architectural quality will of course always grow from a dialogue between the owner and the city, where the city may put pressure on the owner. In cases where the city is the owner of a building, the council has all options to develop design and quality. The part of the infrastructure that is controlled by the city is also a political issue as is the city's public service. Taking Kotler et al. (1993) into an international perspective, there may be private investors involved but the four building blocks will not stand alone and without political involvement and support.

The degree of involvement may differ between countries, but it is all part of city politics and takes place within the political arena. Chapter 2 gives insight into the process in Horsens on urban design and public services, and the case studies from Horsens (study 1 and 5) shows how infrastructure and a systematic event strategy changed the city's image followed by the city's acquisition of the old prison (study 5) to turn it from an image liability into an asset as event venue. Urban design, infrastructure and attractions are also key issues in development of the brand of Odense as illustrated in study 4 on intra-organizational resistance.

12.1.3 Political ownership of brand projects

Politicians may also be difficult to work with. Moilanen (2015) studied city branding across ten European cities and found that lack of support from politicians/city hall was considered challenging in nine cities out of ten in the study, and differences in political accept and attitude may also lead to inter-organizational resistance (Lucarelli and Giovanardi 2014). Study 3 demonstrates how nine out of the 25 Danish cities had been involved in aborted projects due to shift in political leadership, political conflicts or a general loss of political support. Several projects had experienced that a newly elected council wanted to change focus or communication.

Political ownership of brand projects has been dealt with in study 2, 4 and 5. It is demonstrated that the politicians in 22 out of 25 municipalities took part in the process leading to brand formulation and decision, but the question of political ownership is more intriguing. In a formal perspective several projects had a systematic reporting to the political level, while others reported to other formal bodies including political members or were too early in the process. When CEOs/brand managers were asked who they saw as 'brand owners', they only mentioned the mayor, the council or a council committee, in 12 municipalities (out of 25). In other words, the political ownership is at its best questionable even if the politicians may personally have been enthusiastically engaged in the brand development process.

The political involvement looks good, city councils deliver legitimacy for tax spending to the project, but if the politicians see the mere launch of a project as their key performance indicator, political ownership turns out to be ritual and the political interest will be elusive. The study (study 4) of intra-organizational resistance demonstrated the three mayor's strong personal and political ownership. They spoke enthusiastically and in great detail about *'their'* branding projects. But as chairmen of the city council, they were all very conscious about the general political attitudes and (or lack of) support in the city council.

Political ownership is essential because political conflict may divide the council and eventually turn the dispute into an election theme as it happened in Odense (study 4). Bringing the dispute into the election process is probably the most comprehensive and far-reaching expression of inter-organizational resistance within a democratic framework. This may be seen as a parallel to the concerted and organized extra-organizational counter narratives mentioned in literature. The resistance is made visible in all arenas and to everybody.

Study 2 and 4 demonstrate how the loss of political support may be critical to a project. A brand project is a long-term process but the turnover of politicians is likely to affect the organizational memory as well as attitude in the political arena. The Danish municipal election period is 4 years, and 43 % of local politicians were changed during the election in 2013. Political support must continue over time and changes in the city councils attitude to a project may be detrimental as described in study 2.

An interesting perspective from the political arena was also found in study 4. If part of the council may feel that a potentially successful brand project is *'hijacked'* by individual politicians or a particular party, it could lead to resistance in the political arena no matter how the project is understood, organized and/or accepted by the citizens. These *'silent'* intra-organizational counter-narratives can be very critical. On the other hand study 5 is an example of how political dissonance may develop over time into a collective ownership of a project.

12.1.4 Financing city brand projects

Pike (2012) writes about political lobbying to secure long-time funding security and influence policies, and funding security is also an issue in Moilanen (2015). All Danish brand projects are wholly or predominantly (4 projects) tax-financed, study 3, and according to literature this is the normal situation in most countries. Four Danish cities had established Public-Private Partnerships with the city as part of the project and involving a substantial city investment. This leads to the rhetoric question – will other bodies than the council have access to make decisions on how to spend tax-payers money to a non-obligatory municipal activity? This is most unlikely. Other bodies may argue, they may appeal, they may use all kinds of political persuasion, but the power of decision lies within the council.

12.1.5 Top-down or bottom-up

In the Netherlands Braun et al. (2013) argue that: *'only meaningful participation and consultation can produce a more effective and sustainable place branding'* and *place brand management urgently needs to strengthen the communication between residents and the city's officials'*, and in Braun et al (2017) this perspective is taken further into *'place branding is a matter of governance in a network of actors, dependent on stakeholder input to address policy problems'*. This experience from The Netherlands is not supported by the Danish findings (in study 1, 2, 4, and 5), where top-down decisions from local politicians have proven successful as they have in Israel (Herstein and Jaffe 2008). The far-reaching citizen involvement (in Kolding) and the collective decision to follow the vision *'Kolding – we design life'* was supported by the city council. Subsequently the project led to political disengagement, non-affiliation and lack of ownership – because the politicians felt alienated from the project.

12.1.6 National differences

It is well known but hardly ever noted in city branding literature that the function and role of politicians, the executive body, the council and eventually the city CEO, vary from one country to the next, as described by Mouritzen and Svava (2002), Larsen (2005), Getimis & Hlepas (2006) and others. For instance is a mayor in Holland not the same as a mayor in Denmark or a *Bürgermeister* in Germany, while the mayor's function in England may depend on the individual city. And politicians in Sweden are extremely involved in administrative functions compared to most other countries. Equal variation is found concerning the CEOs.

Other national differences are related to the balance between the state and local councils, to the extent of the municipal economy and the resulting organizational power, to the character of the municipal geography (the cities in relation to suburbs), to the political tradition for cooperation, and to the differences in municipal size in terms of population and area. These national differences are rarely mentioned in studies including comments and views on politicians but they may influence theory building.

Politicians play a very crucial role in Danish city brand projects. They take top-down decisions on projects in spite of resident's attitude, they may end projects, funding is mainly or totally tax paid, and projects are organized in close relation to the city's top management (mayor and city CEO). And no-one outside the council has the power to engage the community in inter-city competition. The five studies may sum up to a national Danish case-study and could be compared with other national case-studies (i.e. studies by Klijn et al. 2012 in The Netherlands, Rössler 2018 in Germany, and Lucarelli & Hallin 2017 in Sweden). Besides Moilanen (2015) found challenges with political support to brand projects in nine out of 10 cities across Europe. All the national case-studies demonstrate that there is no common understanding of politician's position, role and function in city branding but so far only national perspectives – but that the politicians are of great significance.

12.1.7 Towards a theoretical perspective

In the perspective of Freeman (1984) that there must exist a '*focal organization*' in relation to stakeholders, and as Winch (2014) pointed out '*the focal organization is the 'owners' organization who raises capital for investment in a project, 'owns' the assets generated, and goes on to exploit it for the beneficial use to provide a return to the investors*'. Based on politician's involvement in city branding as described above and listed below, they act as representatives for and on behalf of the focal organization, the city or municipality, as shareholders or – if tax payers are seen as shareholders in the city – as proxy shareholders.

- Brand objectives are political in nature
- Place improvement strategies rely on political decisions and investments
- Only politicians can decide to involve a city in inter-city competition
- Only politicians can decide to spend tax-payers money on brand projects
- Lack of political support is crucial to projects and politicians can independently of others decide to close down projects

But there is also something at stake for politicians. Investing in city branding is a non-obligatory activity, election period is four years, and as a successful project may support a political carrier, failures in projects do not. Besides the discussion of political ownership and intra-organizational resistance has another political perspective - the potential of internal political conflict.

In other words local politicians face as well the shareholder (or shareholder by proxy) as the stakeholder perspective. This duality for local politicians has as far as I have seen it not been described in literature before.

In order to focus on the political stakeholder issue on one hand, and on the other hand to remind anyone involved in stakeholder management of the potential significant influences displayed by local politicians, I suggest that they are labeled and addressed as:

The political stakeholders

And defined as '*stakeholders with political authority including the power to initiate and to end city brand projects*'

This definition may seem close to the stakeholder definition by Freeman (1984) where '*A stakeholder in an organization is (by definition) any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievements of the organization's objectives*'. But by using the definite form I try to underline the fact that politicians are

not *'just another group of stakeholders'*, but that they occupy a powerful position different from other stakeholders, and that they should be treated accordingly in strategic stakeholder management. They can be targeted in a more appropriate way to address their needs, to establish the dialogue so far missing in most literature. Besides, the more systematic approach may lead to a more sustainable political ownership.

Theory cannot be built on experience from one country alone but must cover a multitude of countries. Evidence is accumulating that politicians in many countries occupy a critical and sometimes criticized, but obviously powerful position. The definition may therefore serve as a general definition across countries with different local government systems, which may lead to an increased and more systematic awareness of their specific dual position and how to address it.

12.2 Is it possible to propose a more systematic approach to data collection and monitoring in city brand projects?

Respecting once more that there are several different definitions of the noun *'brand'* and the verb *'branding'* I will again take the view that a *'city brand'* describe the cognitive and affective valuation of a particular city in a consumer/citizen/stakeholders mind. *'Branding'* is all types of communication, deliberate or not, that is being distributed from the city which, eventually, may have an impact on the consumer/citizen/stakeholders cognitive or affective valuation of the city.

Another precondition is that the purpose of investing in a city brand process is to create, protect, change, or develop the brand of the city. Opposite to obligatory tax financed public activities like road building, running schools and taking care of the elderly, city brand processes – however necessary they might seem – are a non-obligatory investments that compete with obligatory activities in legitimacy as well as in cash. So the key word is *investing*, and normally investments are made solely with tax payer money or in cooperation between public and private investors. And investors may have a legitimate interest in the results of the investment and that they are measured and monitored. But scholars disagree on how to understand, define and describe brand equity as mentioned in section 5.3. They nevertheless agree – explicitly or implicitly – that equity should be measured.

The case from Horsens (study 2) and chapters 2, 3 and 4 bring up an additional theme, the theme of geography and the question of city brand target groups. Are the target groups local citizens or companies? Are they foreign visitors or international investors? Answers to questions like this will define communication strategies and consequentially strategies for measurements.

Measurements may include qualitative, quantitative and multi-mixed methods, and the intention is to measure the output, outcome and impact like identity- image, socio-political, and economic impact, and they may contain tangible and intangible metrics. It is a challenge for further development that important studies like Eshuis (2011), Klijn et al. (2012) and Braun et al. (2017) on for instance stakeholder involvement, politicians and de facto place reputation, are bound to rely on perceptual information from project responsible - *'If we had data about attracting target groups for each municipality it would have been very hard to relate those to the marketing activities'* (Klijn et al. 2012). And measurements are generally missing as pointed out by numerous authors.

While there are many ideas as to what should be included in brand equity, there are not an abundance of models that in a relatively simple construction meet the criteria on output, outcome and impact combined with material and immaterial results in an investment framework. This gap led Jørgensen (2015, study 1) to propose a city brand balance sheet suited to give the focal organization (in Jørgensen 2015 described as shareholders) insight with progress in a city brand project.

The investor part of the scheme is considered the domain of the focal organization, while 1.order effects and 2.order effects (impact) will be of interest for the focal organization as well as for stakeholders.

12.2.1 The City Brand Balance Sheet

The two case studies in Horsens (study 1 and 5) show how systematic Top of Mind Awareness (TOMA) analysis at national level is suitable to demonstrate as well stability as development in the city's image. The method is well known from product branding but rarely used (and without success, see Pike et al. 2018) in city branding in spite of the findings of Stepchenkova and Li (2014) that '*Top of Mind brand awareness may effectively capture a large portion of the overall brand knowledge*'. Govers (2018) argue that people do not like to change their fundamental beliefs as these are comforting ways of reducing complexity and as a result community reputations are generally conservative, static and based on influential stereotypes.

Study 1 shows how it is actually possible to follow the relative stable cognitive position of the prison in people's minds, and at the same time register an increase on events and cultural activities in line with the growth of the concert activity. The old prison has been developed into an event venue and a prison museum, and in study 5 it is demonstrated how the affective evaluation of the prison as image factor for Horsens has changed over the years.

Somehow information and numbers must end up in a balance sheet to demonstrate some kind of brand equity. In commercial organizations there is increasing awareness of the balance sheet value of brands, referred to as brand equity. And the value of a brand cannot be brought to the balance sheet unless data have been acquired for financial consideration (James 2007). Brand awareness is seen as the first step to build brand equity (Keller 1993) and Aker (1996) suggests that brand equity metrics should be sensitive enough to pick up change, be transferable across brands, and reflect the construct being measured. Tracking brand awareness is today done routinely by private companies to monitor the development of their different brands, but in city branding it is a problem getting measurements at all and there are no standardized models for brand monitoring.

The experience from Horsens led to a proposal for a City Brand Balance Sheet as a more systematic approach to city brand equity in study 1. It is based on the assumptions that the purpose of investing in a city brand process is to create, protect, change, or develop the brand of the city.

Investments	1. order effect, outcome and output	Impact within the municipality	Impact outside the municipality
		Material results	Material results
		Immaterial results	Immaterial results

Fig. 12.1. The City Brand Balance Sheet

The investor part of the scheme is considered the domain of the focal organization, while 1.order effects (output and outcome) and 2.order effects (impact) will be of interest for all groups of stakeholders. If this was founded in a strategy case, all the investment would probably register as outputs. But here, but as it is a cost, it should be held against output, outcome and impact

The first order effects – may be comparable to output and outcomes

The first results to be seen in a brand project will often be line counts from newspapers, counts of minutes and seconds from radio and television, number of visitors to homepages, number of people asking for more material, number of members in social networks etc. Garcia (2017) studied the European Capital of Culture led regeneration of Glasgow and Liverpool and she argues that *'Evidenceable and sustained change in media representations of place can be taken as tantamount to image change, but she found little evidence of a long-term sustained image change'*. And Govers (2018) found in his studies of positive and negative media coverage that media is highly event driven and highly volatile. Anyway they must all be documented but should be seen as first order effect with an uncertain impact. Obviously the figures are of great interest, but no project should settle by just having these figures.

The second order effects – impact

In an organizational context Rindova et al (2010) argue, that the value of reputation is an intangible asset, that *'depends not only on perceived quality (i.e., the extent to which an organization is evaluated positively by stakeholders) but also on its level (i.e., the extent to which large numbers of stakeholders focus their attention on the focal firm rather than on competitors'*. In this perspective they argue that it is important *'for future research studying reputation in different settings to account for both dimensions of reputation in order to better determine the importance of the prominence and quality dimensions of reputation in shaping organizational outcomes*. Actually I would here argue that impact would be a more relevant goal to pursue, because the mere outcome is no guarantee for any impact on stakeholders/citizens/consumers/customers. And as mentioned in the introduction to this section, I see a *'city brand'* as the cognitive and affective valuation of a particular city in a consumer/citizen/stakeholders mind.

The impact from the city branding process will occur and should be measured according to the character of the asset. Some assets will be tangible in the sense that they can be measured quantitatively and directly in monetary terms – or converted into monetary terms. Other assets cannot meaningful be measured in or converted into money and should thus categorize as intangible.

Some of those can be measured quantitatively while others require qualitative or mixed methods, but the results will in all cases be difficult to transform into monetary terms. Especially the intangible assets related to the participation of volunteers and the attitude of citizens in general should become visible in this part of the balance sheet.

It is however also important to take into account that impact and brand equity should be measured inside the city as well as outside. An illustration of the importance of this perspective is the Danish competition for the European Song Contest 2014, where the cities of Herning and Aarhus (with a distance of 90 km between the cities) decided to work together in an application for the event, Aarhus delivering the necessary hotels and Herning the concert facilities. Herning is getting the brand effect, Aarhus the sale of hotel nights.

Finally the need for time series of data, planned for at the beginning of a project, and the quality of benchmark data must be emphasized in order to produce reliable results. Since city branding is city politics, the political assessment of the brand project will be to compare investments with impact.

12.2.2 The Brand Strategy Platform

The importance of established standards is one of the lessons marketers can learn from the quality movement since standards are necessary as the basis for actions, accountability and improvement (Stewart 2008). It is also hard to disagree with DeMarco (1982) *'You can't control what you can't measure'* and Spitzer (2007) *'Everything is measurable in some way that is superior to not measuring at all'*. Without measurements marketers will simply not be able to improve over time (Stewart 2009). Even accepting the unique elements of development and innovation in each place brand project there is a common demand for target setting and evaluation strategies to document accountability and performance over time. In fact, one of the greatest lessons learnt from the quality movement is that improvement over time requires systematic measurements and documentation.

But data are missing, and in a Danish context Jørgensen (2016b, table 2) gives a list of explanatory statements, see table 12.1. The statements came as direct answers or imbedded in discussions about documentation and data collection based on the questions:

- Did you do ex-ante analysis inside the municipality?
- Did you do ex-ante analysis outside the municipality?
- Did you do ex-ante analysis within particular groups of people, organizations or companies?
- Do you formulate specific targets for the project?
- Have you performance measurements or defined KPIs?
- How do you measure?
- Do you develop time series, benchmark over time and eventually with others?
- How do you communicate results?

No data collection	Data available
The project is in a start-up phase and there has been no time for a measurement strategy	Measurements show no results
Knowledge of relevant methods is missing	Measurements do not show expected results
Disagreements about choice of audience and methods	Measurements are not relevant or related to strategy
Lack of political or economical support to spend money on measurements	Measurements without ex-ante analysis lead to uncertain results
Measurements are considered difficult to plan or hard to achieve.	Results are considered confidential and therefore not available for interpretation by outside analysts
No tradition for measurements	And then the extremely few cases with relevant time series of data showing effects and development over time
No request for measurements	

Table 12.1. Explanatory statements for the lack of data or data analysis collected during interviews with Danish brand managers/CEOs

Since place and city brand models have been unable to convey the fundamental need for documentation other methods and models, traditionally used in private, public and non-profit organizations may help to close this gap and improve and structure performance management. The Balanced Scorecard is one such strategic planning and management system, originally developed within private companies (Kaplan and Norton 1992). The modern Balanced Scorecard is now used as a strategic planning framework going beyond

its original focus on performance measurement and management, since moving into the non-profit and public sector organizations in the early 2000's. Government and nonprofit organizations align business activities to the vision and strategy of the organization and monitor organization performance against strategic goals (Kaplan and Norton 1996). This performance measurement framework has added strategic non-financial performance measures to traditional financial metrics to give managers and executives a more 'balanced' view of organizational performance, now as a third-generation Balanced Scorecard with the key components (Lawrie and Cobbold 2004): **Destination statement:** *A description, ideally including quantitative detail, of what the organization (or part of an organization managed by the balanced scorecard users) is likely to appear in at an agreed future date.* **Strategic Linkage Model with "Activity" and "Outcome" Perspectives:** *A simplification of a 2nd Generation Balances Scorecard strategic linkage model – with a single "outcome" perspective, and a single "activity" perspective. Definitions are given for the strategic objectives and a set of outlines for each of the measures selected to monitor each of the strategic objectives, including targets.*

The process helps identify inconsistencies in the profile of objectives chosen (Lawrie and Cobbold 2004), but this development simply involves the destination statement becoming the focal point of the Balanced Scorecard, not just an afterthought. Careful choice of category heading during the design of the destination statement can be equally effective in selecting non-financial measures. A simple choice of "activity" and "outcome" objectives linked with simple causality removes debate about missing perspectives. Still the combinations of non-financial and financial measures play a huge part in driving the strategy (Coe and Letza, 2014). The inspiration from Balanced Scorecard is behind the City Brand Balance Sheet (Jørgensen 2014) as a framework to understand and describe brand equity.

Applying a management framework requires relevant key performance indicators (KPIs) linked to target values, so that the value of the measure can be assessed as meeting expectations or not. KPIs should traditionally be evaluated according to the SMART criteria (Doran 1982). This means the measure has to have a Specific purpose for the business; be Measurable and to really get a value of the KPI, the defined norms have to be Achievable and the improvement of a KPI Relevant to the success of the organization. Finally it must be Time phased, which means the value of outcomes must be shown for a predefined and relevant period. The concept of Balanced Scorecard will serve as inspiration for the proposal of a Brand Strategy Platform.

But some of the methodological problems mentioned above may be related to unclear or unspecified brand objectives since different brand objectives will require different data collection strategies using a variation of qualitative, quantitative and multi-mixed methods adapted to the motive in question. These methods may be difficult to develop and apply systematically and can be very expensive in use. They might also demand other analytical competences and tools than those normally expected from brand managers. On the other hand, study 3 revealed that municipalities are willing to set targets and formulate relevant KPIs reflecting brand objectives being consistent with the SMART criteria and readily communicated in public.

Since problems with funding and short sighted politicians seem to be a key limiting factors, not only in Denmark, the investors (the focal organization – in casu the politicians)) must be convinced that data collection and performance management is a necessary and meaningful precondition for a brand project and should be integrated in the strategic process from the beginning. But decision making should also be based on a sufficient description of the present situation including adequate audit and assessment data as basis for definition of one or more relevant brand objectives and outline a number of relevant and meaningful KPIs.

Based on the information collected in the national survey (Jørgensen 2016a) it turned out, that five Danish municipalities had formulated performance strategies including specific quantitative KPIs. This is of course a limited number of cases but as far as the author is aware it includes all known Danish projects and they are dealt with in the study on KPIs. It also turned out that the City Brand Balance Sheet turned out to be a suitable grid to organize and differentiate the KPIs, see table 3 in study 3.

In an attempt to bridge the dilemma between funding and the data issue I propose a strategic process model - a Brand Strategy Platform - as an approach combining the strategies defined by the brand motive in question with the logics of balanced scorecards. With relevant KPIs in a City Brand Balance Sheet framework this model will emphasize as well the funding issue as the data imperative already from the beginning, see fig. 12.2




Fig. 12.2. A brand strategy platform

Consequently the brand strategy platform takes the view of the politicians, the investors – since the investors will have to invest in data collection as well as in the brand process. Therefore the strategic process model could be used by investors in place and city branding to clarify the idea and intention behind the investment; the brand motive or motives, to establish a destination statement that will connect present ex-ante measurements with KPIs and measurement strategies. This brand strategy platform would also be supportive if brand management should develop targets for group specific sub-brands as proposed by Zenker and Braun (2017).

City and place brand motive	Key performance Indicators for city and place branding		
	1. Order – outcome and output	2. Order - Impact	
		Material Impact within the municipality	Material Impact outside the municipality
		Immaterial impact within the municipality	Immaterial impact outside the municipality

Fig. 12.3. City Brand Balance Sheet used for analysis of key performance indicators.

12.3 Limitations

It is a general limitation to this thesis that it is based solely on Danish examples. Local government in Denmark differ from local government in most other countries by political organization, cooperation and autonomy, number of employees and size of local economy, but even larger Danish cities are over-seeable in a small country with a limited population. This may lead to an over-simplification of the challenges imbedded in a brand project. On the other hand the study is the Danish contribution to a row of national studies which in the end might improve our understanding of the mechanisms that facilitate or constrain city branding.

An essential limitation is that the response to the first research question is based on a meta-aggregation of information from my five studies with different individual research questions. If the first research question in the thesis had been approached through a specific and targeted analysis involving a larger number of politicians from more cities – and preferably from different countries -, information would have been compiled and dealt with in a more structured process. This would have led to a more structured analysis (but hopefully to the same conclusion).

The analysis of KPIs would have benefitted from comparison with studies from other countries – but they are apparently difficult to find, so the response to the second research question is primarily based on the documentation experience from the same five studies as above.

Another limitation is that parts of the case studies 1 and 5 are based on historical data. Data have been mined from Horsens' TOMA but it has not been possible to elaborate further by introducing supplementary questions.

Chapter 13 Conclusions and implications

13.1 Empirical reflections

This thesis is based on 5 studies in Danish city branding, referred to as studies 1 to 5 in the discussion in chapter 13. Study 1 is based on archival analysis, Top of Mind Awareness Analysis (TOMA) and the authors intimate personal knowledge (city CEO 1989-2007) of the brand process in Horsens (see also Jørgensen 2005, 2009), studies 2 and 3 refer to a national survey with standardized exploratory questionnaires and semi-structured face-to-face interviews conducted by the author. Study 3 includes some archival analysis. Study 4 is a multiple case study, co-authored with two colleagues, based on an interpretive approach using a standardized explorative questionnaire involving open end questions asking for narratives and supplemented with archival studies. Study 5 is a case study combining archival analyses, a double interview based on a standardized explorative questionnaire, TOMA, and access to other survey data and media information.

To my knowledge study 1 and 5 represent the first studies of brand and image development in a city based on TOMA, and study 4 is the first study on intra-organizational brand resistance within the political and the administrative arena in a city. Study 3 is the first to demonstrate how Key Performance Indicators are actually used in city brand projects. It is also to my knowledge the first time a city's organizational development strategy is given a perspective into a city brand process.

As mentioned earlier the approach has been iterative in a hermeneutical process where my pre-understanding based on the personal knowledge of Horsens was developed during participation in conferences, giving presentations, and discussing with professionals, leading from one study to the next. Each study has its own research question developed during the process but the discussion makes it apparent that politicians and their involvement in city branding as well as measurements and monitoring have been focus points along the journey.

13.2 Conclusions

The thesis has been focused in a meta-perspective to find answers to the two research questions:

Research question 1

Is it possible to find a more appropriate definition of the role local politicians play in city branding?

Politicians act as representatives for and on behalf of the focal organization, the city or municipality, as shareholders or – if tax payers are seen as shareholders in the city – as the citizen's democratically elected representatives. I use here the expression '*proxy shareholders*'.

But there is also something at stake for politicians. Investing in city branding is a non-obligatory activity, election period is four years, but projects need more years to succeed. A successful project may support a political carrier and failures in projects may jeopardize it. Besides the discussion of political ownership and intra-organizational resistance has another political perspective - the potential of internal political conflict. In other words local politicians face as well the shareholder (or shareholder by proxy) as the stakeholder perspective.

It is suggested that the answer to the research question must respect this duality by relating directly to the political position and describe them as

The political stakeholders

And define them as *‘stakeholders with political authority including the power to initiate and to end city brand projects’*

The definition may therefore serve as a general definition across countries with different local government systems, which may lead to an increased and more systematic awareness of their specific dual position and how to address it.

Research question 2

Is it possible to propose a more systematic approach to data collection and monitoring in city brand projects?

Since problems with funding and short sighted politicians seem to be a key limiting factors, investors (in Denmark the politicians) must be convinced that data collection and performance management is a necessary and meaningful precondition for a brand project and should be integrated in the strategic process from the beginning. But decision making should also be based on a sufficient description of the present situation including adequate audit and assessment data as basis for definition of one or more relevant brand objectives and outline a number of relevant and meaningful KPIs. In an attempt to bridge the dilemma between funding and the data issue I propose a strategic process model - a Brand Strategy Platform - as an approach combining the strategies defined by the brand motive in question with the logics of balanced scorecards. With relevant KPIs in a City Brand Balance Sheet framework this model will emphasize as well the funding issue as the data imperative already from the beginning, see fig. 12.2.

Consequently the strategy platform takes the view of the politicians, the investors – since the investors will have to invest in data collection as well as in the brand process. Therefore the strategic process model could be used by investors in place and city branding to clarify the idea and intention behind the investment; the brand motive or motives, to establish a destination statement that will connect present ex-ante measurements with KPIs and measurement strategies. This brand strategy platform would also be supportive if brand management should develop targets for group specific sub-brands.

13.3 Methodical contribution

The two case studies in Horsens (study 1 and 5) show how systematic Top of Mind Awareness (TOMA) analysis at national level is suitable to demonstrate as well stability as development in the city's image. Study 1 shows how it is actually possible to follow the relative stable position of the prison in people's minds, and at the same time register an increase on events and cultural activities in line with the growth of the concert activity. The old prison has been developed into an event venue and a prison museum, and in study 5 it is demonstrated how the affective evaluation of the prison as image factor for Horsens has changed over the years.

The research has led to a proposal for a City Brand Balance Sheet as a more systematic approach to city brand equity. The investor part of the scheme is considered the domain of private and political investors

(keeping in mind that politicians will answer to stakeholder voters on Election Day) while 1.order effects and 2.order effects (impact)will be of interest for all groups.

Investments	1. order effect, outcome and output	Impact within the municipality	Impact outside the municipality
		Material results	Material results
		Immaterial results	Immaterial results

Fig. 13.1 The City Brand Balance Sheet

The author finally proposes a strategic process model - a Brand Strategy Platform - as an approach combining the strategies defined by the brand motive in question with the logics of balanced scorecards. With relevant KPIs in a City Brand Balance Sheet framework this model will emphasize as well the funding issue as the data imperative already from the beginning, see fig. 12.3




Fig. 13.2 A Brand Strategy Platform

Consequently the strategy platform takes the view of the politicians, the investors – since the investors will have to invest in data collection as well as in the brand process. Therefore the strategic process model could be used by investors in place and city branding to clarify the idea and intention behind the investment; the brand motive or motives, to establish a destination statement that will connect present ex-ante measurements with KPIs and measurement strategies.

The City Brand Balance Sheet has also turned out to be a suitable grid to organize and differentiate Key Performance Indicators as they have been found in five Danish cities.

City and place brand motive	Key performance Indicators for city and place branding		
	1. Order – outcome and output	2. Order - Impact	
		Material Impact within the municipality	Material Impact outside the municipality
		Immaterial impact within the municipality	Immaterial impact outside the municipality

Fig. 12.3. City Brand Balance Sheet used for analysis of key performance indicators.

13.4 Theoretical contribution

In the perspective of Freeman (1984) who speaks of a *'focal organization'* in relation to stakeholders, and as Winch (2014) pointed out *'the focal organization is the 'owners' organization who raises capital for investment in a project, 'owns' the assets generated, and goes on to exploit it for the beneficial use to provide a return to the investors'*. Politicians act as representatives for and on behalf of the focal organization, the city or municipality, as shareholders or – if tax payers are seen as shareholders in the city – as the citizen's democratically elected representatives, here expressed as proxy shareholders. The political element in city branding include that brand objectives are political in nature since place improvement strategies rely on political decisions and investments, only politicians can decide to involve a city in inter-city competition and only politicians can decide to spend tax-payers money on brand projects. It is also demonstrated how lack of political support is crucial to projects and politicians can independently of others decide to close down projects

But there is also something at stake for politicians. Investing in city branding is a non-obligatory activity, election period is four years, but projects need more years to succeed. A successful project may support a political carrier and failures in projects may jeopardize it. Besides the discussion of political ownership and intra-organizational resistance has another political perspective - the potential of internal political conflict. In other words local politicians face as well the shareholder (or shareholder by proxy) as the stakeholder perspective. This duality for local politicians has as far as I have seen it not been described in literature before.

The political stakeholders

And defined as *'stakeholders with political authority including the power to initiate and to end city brand projects'*

This definition may seem close to the stakeholder definition by Freeman (1984) where *'A stakeholder in an organization is (by definition) any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievements of the organization's objectives'*. But by using the definite form I try to underline the fact that politicians are not *'just another group of stakeholders'*, but that they occupy a powerful position different from other stakeholders, and that they should be treated accordingly in strategic stakeholder management. They can be targeted in a more appropriate way to address their needs, to establish the dialogue so far missing in most literature. Besides, the more systematic approach may lead to a more sustainable political ownership.

Theory cannot be built on experience from one country alone but must cover a multitude of countries. The definition may therefore serve as a general definition across countries with different local government systems, which may lead to an increased and more systematic awareness of their specific dual position and how to address it.

13.5 Implication for practice

13.5.1 Implication for politicians

Political stakeholders must exercise their political authority as proxy shareholders on behalf of the citizens to secure long term political and financial support to brand projects. The idea and intention behind a brand project, the brand objective or objectives must be defined to establish a destination statement that will connect present ex-ante measurements with KPIs and measurement strategies. The destination statement should describe the desired material and immaterial brand impact, and a strategic linkage between desired impact and planned brand activities including time schedule, systematic monitoring and fed back loops must be established.

13.5.2 Implication for managers.

The first implication for managers is to understand and recognize that politicians are not *'just'* another group of stakeholders, but occupy a powerful position that could seriously influence a project. It will be easier to target them in a more appropriate way, to address their needs, to establish the dialogue so far missing in most literature and possibly develop political ownership. Brand projects cannot live their own life separated from local politicians. Politicians must be involved and they must feel involved since political support is crucial. And the most central person to secure this involvement is the manager responsible for a brand project. Political ownership has turned out to be vital and must in some way be exercised in accordance with the mayor or another key politician. After election day the project must be reinforced (not changed) among politicians and they must be led to understand that city brand projects are long term (more than a four-year election period) projects with budget demands.

The second implication is that projects must be systematically monitored. So any investment in a brand project should be based on the Brand Strategy Platform, fig. 14.1, where consideration and decisions on brand objectives are the starting points. And the brand responsible must secure the necessary funding to monitor the project before it is launched and executed.




Fig. 13.1 The Brand Strategy Platform

The third implication relates to brand equity. It is proposed that brand equity should be managed within the framework of a City Brand Balance Sheet, see fig. 14.2. On a larger scale the city brand balance sheet is where the balance should be found between council investments (probably not only in the brand project but in infrastructure, events etc.) and outcome, output and impact. Output and outcome should be monitored but any results here are no documentation of impact. Impact measurement and monitoring should address the material and immaterial brand impact formulated in the destination statement in relation to brand objectives and the KPIs.

Investments	1. order effect, outcome and output	Impact within the municipality	Impact outside the municipality
		Material results	Material results
		Immaterial results	Immaterial results

Fig. 13.2 The City Brand Balance Sheet

The fourth implication for managers is that city brand projects should include Key Performance Indicators developed in accordance with the SMART criteria. They should relate to brand motive, and monitoring

should give information on KPI development over time and in geography according to the decided strategy, see fig. 13.3

City and place brand motive	Key performance Indicators for city and place branding		
	1. Order – outcome and output	2. Order - Impact	
		Material Impact within the municipality	Material Impact outside the municipality
		Immaterial impact within the municipality	Immaterial impact outside the municipality

Fig. 13.3. City Brand Balance Sheet used for analysis of key performance indicators.

13.5.3 Implications for employees.

Brand resistance within the administrative arena of a city administration (and this includes all employees, not just those sitting at city hall) must be addressed and generally employees should be seen as a specific target group demanding a high level of systematic information on brand activities since the average annual employee turnover exceeds 20 %. Inter-departmental competition should be addressed as soon as it appears to reduce the risk of internal conflict and to prevent that any internal conflict should become part of any external discussion.

14 Future research.

It is believed that the two conclusions derived from the Danish studies can be of value and support to the international audience since they all address well known problems in many countries, and may form the basis for further studies.

The comprehensive understanding of the situation in Denmark is that mayors and local councils play a crucial role in city branding exercising their responsibility for the city's development as they deliver political legitimacy for tax spending, political leadership and participation. From a scientific point of view, it would be relevant to get a better understanding of the motivation for and character of the political involvement in brand projects – what are the drivers of their engagement and priorities in material and immaterial dimensions? And how their unique and dualistic position can be developed and understood in relation to other stakeholders in brand projects. And does the notion of '*The political stakeholder*' hold for a closer examination and will it be applicable in a wider context?

The studies show the need for systematic and more consistent measurements reflecting development in as well tangible as intangible assets, time series and benchmark to describe possible causality and impact of a brand project. More research is also needed to understand the reluctance and bridge the conflict between the insufficient and unsystematic data collection and the demand for performance management.

Scholars should also look for more examples of practical use of KPIs in order to study how they are formulated and how they work in practice. How data are analyzed and construed and how they are used in benchmarking, as well as in feed-back loops to improve brand management. Studies of this character might also reduce constraints for those practitioners and investors still insecure with data collection strategies and performance management.

Studies in the practical applicability of the models for a City Brand Balance Sheet and The Brand Strategy Platform would also be valuable to validate or further develop the models.

15

Summaries of papers 1-5.

Jørgensen, O.H. (2015) Developing a City Brand Balance Sheet – using the case of Horsens, Denmark. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, 11 (2), pp. 148 – 160.

Conclusion

The analysis has shown that the Danish city Horsens over the years 2000 – 2013 has been able to successfully develop a well documented “new brand champion” based on culture and events and is in the process of rebranding the “old champion”, the state prison as demonstrated by annual unaided top of mind awareness among citizens living in Denmark outside Horsens. During the same period the brand project has increased the level of awareness of the city in general. As strategic responsible for the city’s development the city council has acted as shareholders, investing tax money in the brand project alone and together with local private companies and the council has also developed and financed the necessary city structures to support the project. The project has successfully lived up to the goal put forward by the city council in 1996.

Apart from the image change and economic turnover related to individual events, it is however very difficult to document impact from the brand project in the city. Horsens has had a relatively higher net influx of citizens than all neighbor municipalities and cities but among newcomers more than 50 % tell that geographical position, work opportunities and friends and family has been decisive or very decisive for their decision to move to Horsens while cultural activities only has been decisive for 1/3 (Horsens kommune 2004, 2008). Large numbers of local volunteers have participated in the process, but there is no data to describe the details in relation to cooperation with volunteers and the character and degree of possible co-creation in the process.

The case shows the need for systematic and more consistent measurements reflecting development in as well tangible as intangible assets, time series and benchmark to describe possible causality and impact of a brand project. Finally the article proposes a city brand balance sheet to ease the process of analyzing and presenting the brand equity in shareholder and stakeholder perspective.

Jørgensen, O.H. (2016) Place and city branding in Danish municipalities with focus on political involvement and leadership. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, 12 (1), pp. 68 – 77.

Conclusion

At least in Denmark, brand projects are developed and decided upon by mayors and the council or in close circles involving administration and semi-public organizations like business committees and tourist committees. Selected private companies and larger groups of citizens were only rarely involved in the process. Projects are managed by communication officers (or in smaller municipalities the CEO) with direct access to and sometimes sitting literally speaking next door to the mayor and/or the CEO. Annual or more frequent status reports are presented to the council, and council committees and brand responsible typically see the politicians (or the CEO) as ‘project owners’. This intimate relationship with the political system also means a high sensitivity in relation to 4-year election periods and change of political leadership. General political conflict or lack of political support may also be detrimental to the projects as experienced in at some municipalities. Thus, the comprehensive understanding of the situation in Denmark is that mayors and local councils play a crucial role in city branding exercising their responsibility as shareholders for the city’s development as they deliver political legitimacy for tax spending, political leadership and participation.

Jørgensen, O.H. (2016) Key Performance Indicators in Danish Place and City Branding – Proposal for a new Brand Strategy Platform. *Place Branding and Public Diplomacy*, 12 (4), pp.339 – 351.

Conclusion

In a research project concerning status quo of city and municipal branding in Denmark (Jørgensen 2015) information was obtained from 25 municipalities about municipal performance management strategies and explanatory statements if strategies were missing. The primary aim of this paper has been to identify and analyze the documented performance strategies and as a second aim also to analyze explanatory statements for the lack of data. The analysis has led to introduction of a model for a more strategic approach to performance management based on brand motive and brand equity in the framework of third-generation balanced scorecards – a Brand Strategy Platform.

While the majority of municipalities had no strategy for data collection and performance management five municipalities had a clear strategy including Key Performance Indicators. These KPIs are analyzed according to the City Brand Balance Sheet framework, see table. 3. KPIs are consistent with SMART criteria, relate to the local brand motive, imply quantitative measurements and express some kind of development over time. The KPIs stated under First Order Effects are all related to media. Most of the KPIs under 'Material Impact within the municipality' depend on available local, regional or national statistical information. The two examples of 'Immaterial Impact within the municipality', relate to an annual survey carried out by the Confederation of Danish Industry among local members in the different municipalities, as well as the National Health Survey organized by regional and national authorities every 4 years. Finally, the three examples under 'Immaterial Impact outside the municipality' all depend on analysis carried out by the individual municipality at own initiative.

All projects were tax funded and 4 municipalities had additional funding from private companies and three of these projects had well established performance management strategies, while one project was recently started (Billund in 2014). It is suggested that cooperation with private investors creates a more systematic approach to documentation and performance management.

A number of explanatory statements for the lack of data were collected and discussed during the interviews, see table 1. The explanatory statements can be aggregated into three main categories: Lack of funding and political support, the uncertainty of methods, and the fact that cities and municipalities usually work in a non-scientific environment with no obligation or tradition to organize and publish data or other analytical information.

All Danish projects are tax funded and since political leadership is found essential (Jørgensen 2015) the long term process of place and city branding may be challenged by the 4-year election period for politicians. As well as restricted budgets, political impatience to wait for results and reluctance to present data showing no effect may also be of influence. An additional risk is that politicians see the mere launching of a brand project as the Key Performance Indicator without paying much attention to later data collection and documentation and therefore being unwilling to pay for it.

Methodological uncertainty may be related to unclear brand objectives requiring different data collection strategies and a variation of qualitative, quantitative and multi-mixed methods adapted to the motive in question. Methods may be expensive, difficult to develop and apply systematically and may demand other analytical competences and tools than those normally expected from brand managers. Besides it must not be overlooked that missing or unclear instructions for target settings, corresponding ex-ante and ex-post data collection and performance measurements in well known place and city brand models, also plays a role.

Nevertheless the Danish cases illustrate that it is possible to achieve political long time support and funding. Municipalities are also willing to develop performance management strategies including relevant KPIs reflecting different brand motives and based on the SMART criteria. The challenge is to make place and city brand investors understand that a brand project needs targets for impact in relation to brand motive, ex-ante benchmark and relevant KPIs and that they must secure funding of a performance management system to evaluate the process.

Combining the strategies defined by the brand motive in question with the logics of Balanced Scorecards and relevant key performance indicators in a City Brand Balance Sheet framework the data imperative will be emphasized already from the beginning. The author proposes a simple process diagram – a Brand Strategy Platform - to be used by city councils or private investors as a strategic platform, see fig. 1.

The Danish survey has shown the same reluctance for systematic data collection and performance management, reported by other authors. But it has also discovered examples of successful work with KPIs in relation to different brand motives. More research is needed to understand the reluctance and bridge the conflict between the insufficient and unsystematic data collection and the demand for performance management in New Public Management.

Lundholt, M.W., Jørgensen, O.H. and Blichfeldt, B.S. (2019) Intra-organizational Brand Resistance and Counter-narratives in City branding – a Comparative Study of three Danish Cities. Accepted for publication in *Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal*. Forthcoming.

Conclusion

Brand resistance occurs as extra-organizational resistance, inter-organizational resistance and intra-organizational resistance. The aim of this exploratory study is to investigate intra-organizational brand resistance and counter-narratives in the political and administrative arenas in Danish municipalities and how this affects city branding initiatives. The study indicates that brand resistance is produced in the political arena as well as in the administrative arena within the city's organization. Brand resistance within the political arena relates to lack of political influence, lack of political ownership and identification, potential political competition and reactions to counter-narratives among citizens. Although mayors are aware of the importance of continued political support for branding projects, the cases suggest that projects will be realized in spite of resistance if there is a political majority to take responsibility. Brand resistance among employees relates, among other things, to competition between departments and to general skepticism towards new branding initiatives. Furthermore, the high turn-over/replacement rates of politicians and staff are likely to affect organizational memory and should be taken into account when city brand initiatives are planned and executed. All of these issues points to the necessity of further investigations into the phenomenon of "*intra – organizational counter-narratives*" among politicians and within the municipal organization.

Jørgensen, O.H. (2019) THE PRISON – From liability to asset in branding of the Danish city Horsens. Accepted for publication in Cassinger, C., A. Lucarelli, & S. Gyimóthy, (Eds.) *The Nordic Wave in Place Branding, Poetics, Practices, Politics*. Edward Elgar Publishing.

Conclusion

This case represents a brand governance situation where the citizens as well as the politicians are well aware of the problem (the negative image effect from the prison) but disagree on solutions. At the end of the day it is the local consensual democracy within the council that decides with or without citizens' accept supporting the view of Lucarelli and Hallin (2017) and Lundholt et al. (2019). THE PRISON is a dominant element of the brand of Horsens among local citizens as well as in the outside world, and this element has now changed from a liability into an asset. The change was brought about in a number of steps including "Nordic-style" consensual governance by the city council, a "pre-branding" explorative process to build local support, skunk work on content, timing, systematic documentation, - and time. The case illustrates the importance of a branding process involving communication on all available media platforms. Still it should be born in mind that the data in this case represent a "communication snapshot" in a time where the media world is changing (printed media dropping, TV developing and social media growing) making any comparison with older studies very difficult. Finally this case illustrates one of the extremely few examples from literature where the change of the affective evaluation of a city brand is well documented over time.

Chapter 16 Summary in English

The increasing national and international competition between cities has led to concepts such as branding, reputation and image gaining increasing attention because everyone wants to be better in the public's opinion than their competitors. As a result, branding of cities has become a growing area of research over the past 30 years, but also an area with a number of research challenges, because neither traditional marketing strategies nor organizational management models can be directly transferred to an urban community.

This thesis is based on 5 scientific articles, which are briefly discussed below. Each article has its own research question, but the thesis is built on two meta-perspectives involving all 5 papers. The thesis raises two research questions:

- 1) *Is it possible to find a more appropriate definition of the role local politicians plays in city branding?*
- 2) *Is it possible to propose a more systematic approach to data collection and monitoring in city brand projects?*

The first paper '*Developing a city brand balance sheet – Using the case of Horsens, Denmark*' is a case study of the image development of Horsens where particularly the systematic annual analysis of Top of Mind Awareness among people living outside Horsens plays a central role.

During the preparation of the case study paper my attention was drawn to the general lack of documentation and time series of data in city branding. Besides, there was no common understanding of city brand equity, and the role of local politicians in brand projects was also disputed and unsettled. Consequently the case study in Horsens led to proposal of the City Brand Balance Sheet and a survey of the state of city branding in Denmark. The outcome of this survey is presented in '*Place and city branding in Danish municipalities with focus on political involvement and leadership*' and '*Key Performance indicators in Danish place and city branding – proposal for a new brand strategy platform*'. The first paper illustrates how important politicians are in development and support of Danish brand projects. The second paper uses the City Brand Balance Sheet to structure the different key performance indicators found in the national survey and to propose a more strategic approach to city branding using a Brand Strategy Platform inspired from Balanced Scorecards.

The issue of political involvement and brand resistance was studied further in the next paper '*Intra-organizational Brand Resistance and Counter-narratives in City Branding - a comparative Study of three Danish Cities*'. The paper, based on personal interviews with mayors and city executives, supports the earlier findings about the significance of political influence on city branding. It also clarifies and describes the character of intra-organizational brand resistance within the political and the administrative arenas. The final paper '*THE PRISON - From liability to asset in branding of the Danish city Horsens*' is in a way a follow up to the first paper. The old state prison in Horsens has been closed and is now developed into an event venue and a museum with a total of 900.000 visitors over the period 2012-2017. Findings are that the process of change has been brought about by consensual governance by the city council, a 'pre-branding' explorative process to build local support, skunk work on content, timing, systematic documentation - and time. Besides it is found how the cognitive knowledge of the prison in national TOMA is slightly varying but that the affective evaluation is growing positive (as one of the extremely few examples of image change described in the literature).

The thesis concludes to the first research question that politicians act as representatives for and on behalf of the focal organization, the city or municipality, as shareholders or – if tax payers are seen as

shareholders in the city – as the citizen's democratically elected representatives. I use the expression '*proxy shareholders*'.

But there is also something at stake for politicians. Investing in city branding is a non-obligatory activity, election period is four years, but projects need more years to succeed. A successful project may support a political carrier and failures in projects may jeopardize it. Besides the discussion of political ownership and intra-organizational resistance has another political perspective - the potential of internal political conflict. In other words local politicians face as well the shareholder (or shareholder by proxy) as the stakeholder perspective.

It is suggested that the answer to the research question must respect this duality by relating directly to the political position and describe them as

The political stakeholders

And define them as '*stakeholders with political authority including the power to initiate and to end city brand projects*'. The definition may therefore serve as a general definition across countries with different local government systems, which may lead to an increased and more systematic awareness of their specific dual position and how to address it.

The thesis concludes to the second research question that problems with funding and short sighted politicians seem to be a key limiting factor for systematic monitoring. Investors (in Denmark the politicians) must be convinced that data collection and performance management is a necessary and meaningful precondition for a brand project and should be integrated in the strategic process from the beginning. But decision making should also be based on a sufficient description of the present situation including adequate audit and assessment data as basis for definition of one or more relevant brand objectives and outline a number of relevant and meaningful KPIs. In an attempt to bridge the dilemma between funding and the data issue I propose a strategic process model - a Brand Strategy Platform - as an approach combining the strategies defined by the brand motive in question with the logics of balanced scorecards. With relevant KPIs in a City Brand Balance Sheet framework this model will emphasize as well the funding issue as the data imperative already from the beginning.

Consequently the strategy platform takes the view of the politicians, the investors – since the investors will have to invest in data collection as well as in the brand process. Therefore the strategic process model could be used by investors in place and city branding to clarify the idea and intention behind the investment; the brand motive or motives, to establish a destination statement that will connect present ex-ante measurements with KPIs and measurement strategies. This brand strategy platform would also be supportive if brand management should develop targets for group specific sub-brands.

Chapter 17

Resume på dansk

Den stigende nationale og internationale konkurrence mellem byer har ført til, at koncepter som branding, omdømme og image får stigende opmærksomhed, fordi alle ønsker at være bedre i offentlighedens mening end deres konkurrenter. Som et resultat af denne udvikling er branding af byer blevet et voksende forskningsområde i løbet af de sidste 30 år. Men også et område med en række forskningsudfordringer, fordi hverken traditionelle marketingstrategier eller organisatoriske styringsmodeller direkte kan overføres til en by.

Denne afhandling er baseret på 5 videnskabelige artikler, som kort omtales nedenfor. Hver artikel har sit eget forskningsspørgsmål, men afhandlingen er bygget på to metaperspektiver, der involverer alle 5 artikler. Forskningsspørgsmålene er:

Er det muligt at finde en mere passende definition af den rolle, som lokale politikere spiller i bybranding?

Er det muligt at foreslå en mere systematisk tilgang til dataindsamling og overvågning i bybranding?

Den første artikel '*Developing a city brand balance sheet – Using the case of Horsens, Denmark*' er et casestudie udviklingen i Horsens, hvor især den systematiske årlige analyse af Top of Mind Awareness blandt mennesker, der bor uden for Horsens, spiller en central rolle. Under forberedelsen af casestudiet blev jeg opmærksom på den generelle mangel på dokumentation og tidsserier af data for branding af byer. Derudover var der ingen fælles forståelse af brandets værdi. De lokale politikeres rolle i brandprojekter var også uafklaret. Som følge heraf førte casestudiet i Horsens til forslag til et City Brand Balance Sheet som en struktur for undersøgelse af status på bybranding projekter.

Resultatet af denne undersøgelse er præsenteret i '*Place and city branding in Danish municipalities with focus on political involvement and leadership*' og '*Key Performance indicators in Danish place and city branding – proposal for a new brand strategy platform*'. Den første artikel illustrerer, hvor vigtig politikernes rolle er omkring udvikling og støtte til danske brandprojekter. Den anden artikel anvender City Brand Balance Sheet til at strukturere de forskellige KPI'er, der er fundet i den nationale undersøgelse, og til at foreslå en mere strategisk tilgang til bybranding ved hjælp af en Brand Strategi Platform inspireret af Balanced Scorecard.

Spørgsmålet om politisk engagement og modstand blev undersøgt nærmere i næste artikel '*Intra-organizational Brand Resistance and Counter-narratives in City Branding - a comparative Study of three Danish Cities*'. Artiklen, der er baseret på personlige interviews med borgmestre og kommunaldirektører, støtter de tidligere resultater om betydningen af politisk indflydelse på byens branding. Karakteren af den interne organisatoriske modstand inden for de politiske og administrative arenaer præciseres og beskrives.

Den afsluttende artikel '*THE PRISON - From liability to asset in branding of the Danish city Horsens*' er på en måde en opfølgning til den første artikel. Det gamle statsfængsel i Horsens er lukket og er nu udviklet til et venue og et museum med i alt 900.000 besøgende i perioden 2012-2017. Det er konstateret, at forandringsprocessen er skabt af konsensusstyring fra byrådet, en "pre-branding" undersøgelsesproces til opbygning af lokal støtte, skunk-arbejde med indhold, timing, systematisk dokumentation - og tid. Derudover beskrives det, hvordan den kognitive viden om fængslet i det nationale TOMA varierer, men at den affektive evaluering vokser positivt (som et af de ekstremt få eksempler på imageændring, der er beskrevet i litteraturen).

Afhandlingen konkluderer på det første forskningsspørgsmål, at politikere fungerer som repræsentanter for og på vegne af byen eller kommunen, at de er 'aktionærer', eller hvis skatteyderne ses som aktionærer i byen, da som 'proxy aktionærer', der tager ansvaret for at anvende skattemidler til bybranding. Men der er også noget, der står på spil for politikere. Investering i city branding er en ikke-obligatorisk aktivitet, valgperioden er fire år, men projekter har brug for flere år for at få succes. Et vellykket projekt kan understøtte en politisk karriere, en fiasko kan give problemer. Udover diskussionen om politisk ejerskab og eventuel intra-organisatorisk modstand, findes der også et andet politisk perspektiv - potentialet i interne politiske konflikter.

Med andre ord står lokale politikere både som investorer i projektet og som interessenter. Det foreslås derfor, at denne dualitet skal respekteres og komme til udtryk, ved at man direkte taler om og beskriver politikerne i bestemt form som:

De politiske interessenter

Og definer dem som '*interessenter med politisk autoritet herunder magten til at indgå og afslutte bybrandprojekter*'. Definitionen kan derfor tjene som en generel definition på tværs af lande med forskellige lokale regeringssystemer, hvilket kan føre til en øget og mere systematisk bevidsthed om politikernes specifikke dobbeltposition og hvordan man skal tackle den.

Afhandlingen konkluderer med det andet forskningsspørgsmål, at problemer med finansiering og kortsynede politikere er en vigtig begrænsende faktor for systematisk overvågning. Investorer (i Danmark politikere) skal overbevises om, at dataindsamling og performance management er en nødvendig og meningsfuld forudsætning for et brandprojekt og bør integreres i den strategiske proces fra starten. Men beslutningstagning bør også være baseret på en tilstrækkelig beskrivelse af den nuværende situation, herunder passende analyser og vurdering af data som grundlag for definition af et eller flere relevante formål med brand projektet, og foreslå en række relevante og meningsfulde KPI'er.

I et forsøg på at bygge bro over dilemmaet mellem finansiering og dataspørgsmålet foreslår jeg en strategisk procesmodel – The Brand Strategy Platform - som en tilgang, der kombinerer de strategier, der er defineret af det pågældende brand formål, med logikken for Balanced Scorecards. Med relevante KPI'er i vil denne model også understrege både finansieringsspørgsmålet som datakravet allerede fra begyndelsen

Chapter 18 References

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Appendix 1

Coauthors statement



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Co-author Statement

Name of applicant: Ole Have Jørgensen

Application for position: § 15, stk.2 PhD application

Co-author statement concerning publication (title):

Intra-organizational Brand Resistance and Counter-narratives in City Branding - a Comparative Study of Three Danish Cities

Name of co-author	Share of the complete work (i.e. writing and underlying research)	Signature of co-author
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